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ABSTRACT
Synchrony, or rhythmic bodily unison activities such as drumming or cadence marching, 
has attracted growing scholarly interest. Among laboratory subjects, synchrony elicits 
prosocial responses, including altruism and empathy. In light of such findings, 
researchers in social psychology and the bio-cultural study of religion have suggested that  
synchrony played a role in humanity’s evolutionary history by engendering collectivistic 
commitments and social cohesion. These models propose that synchrony enhances 
cohesion by making people feel united. However, such models overlook the importance 
of differentiated social relations, such as hierarchies. This dissertation builds on this 
insight by drawing on neuroscience, coordination dynamics, social psychology, 
anthropology, and ritual studies to generate a complex model of synchrony, ritual, and 
social hierarchy, which is then tested in an experimental study.
v
In the hypothesized model, shared motor unison suppresses the brain’s ability to 
distinguish cognitively between self-caused and exogenous motor acts, resulting in 
subjective self-other overlap. During synchrony each participant is dynamically entrained 
to a group mean rhythm; this “immanent authority” prevents any one participant from 
unilaterally dictating the rhythm, flattening relative hierarchy. As a ritualized behavior, 
synchrony therefore paradigmatically evokes shared ideals of equality and unity. 
However, when lab participants were assigned to either a synchrony or asynchrony 
manipulation and given a collaborative task requiring complex coordination, synchrony 
predicted a marginally lower degree of collaboration and significantly lower interpersonal 
satisfaction. These findings imply that unity and equality can undercut group cohesion if 
the collective agenda is a shared goal that requires interpersonal coordination.
My results emphasize that, despite the inevitable tensions associated with social 
hierarchy, complementary roles and hierarchy are vital for certain aspects of social 
cohesion. Ritual and convention institute social boundaries that can be adroitly 
negotiated, even as egalitarian effervescence such as communitas (in the sense of Victor 
Turner) facilitates social unity and inspires affective commitments. These findings 
corroborate theories in ritual studies and sociology that caution both against excessive 
emphasis on inner emotive states (such as empathy) and against excessively rigid 
vi
conventions or roles. An organic balance between unity and functional differentiation is 
vital for genuinely robust, long-term social cohesion.
vii
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CHAPTER ONE: THE RHYTHMS OF HUMAN INTERACTIONS
1. Introduction
A platoon of soldiers marches in cadence across a parade ground, their footsteps sounding 
out a crisp rhythm. A group of southern African San Khoi clap in unison during a raucous 
nighttime ceremony, helping to bring forth num, or healing energy. A staid congregation 
of New England Protestants open their hymnals, clear their throats, and sing “What 
Wondrous Love Is This?”. These are real-world examples of the uniquely human 
phenomenon of synchrony, or shared rhythmic action in intentional groups. It is no 
exaggeration to call synchrony a cornerstone for human sociality. From somber military 
drills to all-night dance parties, from the droning recital of church creeds to the 
drumming of ecstatic spirit-possession cults, “keeping together in time,” in historian 
William McNeill’s words (1995), is something humans do ubiquitously, across cultures 
and throughout eras. In part because it subjectively binds and unifies people under a 
single rhythmic beat, synchrony is thought to help undergird many crucial social 
processes, including group bonding, intragroup trust, and mutual rapport (Ehrenreich 
2006; Freeman 1995; Wiltermuth & Heath 2009). Many of these bonding effects emerge 
even from unintended or automatic synchronization with conversation partners, friends, 
and colleagues, such as when two people unconsciously exchange gestures in time with 
the rhythm of their ongoing conversation – a common feature of human interactions  
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(Birdwhistell 1970; Chartrand & Lakin 2013; Condon 1982). Indeed, this ability to 
rhythmically synchronize with each other – both consciously and unconsciously – is 
nearly unique to human beings, an expression of our species’ extraordinary, unmatched 
capacity for motor mimicry, or copying and reflecting one another’s bodily movements 
and actions (Bellah 2011; Cattaneo & Rizzolatti 2009; Hagen & Bryant 2003). There thus 
appears to be something intrinsically human about synchrony. 
 As such, synchrony may offer valuable insights into both the cultural and 
biological evolution of our “eusocial” (that is, hypersocial) species (E. Wilson 2013). 
Over the past decade, synchrony has therefore increasingly become a subject of interest 
in social psychology and the bio-cultural study of religion, both as a unique 
psychosociological phenomenon and as a window into a uniquely human social 
phenomenon in particular – namely, religion (Haidt 2012; Reddish, Fischer, & Bulbulia 
2013). Many real-world examples of synchrony occur in contexts that Western observers 
would characterize as “religious,” including the synchronous bowing and prostrating of 
Muslim salat, the use of drumming and rhythm in Haitian Voudu, and the simultaneous 
chanting (or mumbling, as the case may be) of the Lord’s Prayer in Christian 
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congregations.1 As we will see in Chapter Five, scientists in these fields specifically 
argue that synchrony facilitates ingroup cooperation and prosociality (Reddish, Bulbulia 
& Fischer 2014; Wiltermuth & Heath 2009) and as such may have played a central role in 
the evolution of Durkheimian religious behavior and ritual – inasmuch as religious ritual 
engenders group identity and affiliation through nonverbal, effervescent channels (Bellah 
2011; Haidt 2012). Namely, synchrony is thought to leverage inherent physiological 
release mechanisms that trigger group consciousness and suppress self-other distinctions. 
In this way, it putatively engenders a subjective sense of similarity and even numinous 
unity between participants, which temporarily becomes the primary source of personal 
identity – thereby activating quasi-religious states of consciousness (Haidt 2012). Out of 
these basic physiological building blocks, numerous researchers have posited, uniquely 
human religious behaviors may have accreted – particularly as the brute biological 
responses became augmented with mythological, subjunctive, or other fictive content 
(e.g., Bellah 2011; Rappaport 1999). Thus, synchrony is regarded in the bio-cultural 
study of religion and in the social psychological literature as one of the fundamental 
3
1 I make the somewhat lumbering qualification that certain behaviors and contexts may be imputed to be 
religious by Western observers, rather than simply describing them as “religious” outright, in deference to 
longstanding disputes within the field of academic religious studies about the universality of the concept of 
“religion” as a natural kind (e.g., Asad 1993, J. Smith 1982). This dissertation is not and cannot be a 
defense of the proposition that the word “religion” actually carves nature at its joints, but neither can it 
avoid making reference to religion as one of several basic categories for interpreting my subject matter, as 
we will see. Thus I acknowledge that religion may be a constructed term and situate my description of 
“religious” phenomena as a function of a Western interpretive standpoint, hoping that the discrete 
behaviors, beliefs, and social forms I reference can be usefully bundled with this strategy of reference for 
the reader’s understanding (which is what matters). I personally doubt that religion is as artificial and 
politically motivated a concept as Asad (1993) suggests, nor as semantically incoherent as J.Z. Smith 
(1982) claims, but I cannot defend that point here; thus the utilitarian approach.
explanatory tools to be brought to bear on comprehensive cognitive-evolutionary models 
of human religiosity (e.g., Fischer et al. 2013).
 As of yet, however, few analyses have investigated synchrony’s effects on one of 
human societies’ other most important features: formal and informal social structure – 
including the ubiquitous social hierarchies and rank orders that define relative statuses, 
roles, preeminence, privileges, and responsibilities among co-inhabitants of a culture 
(e.g., Mazur 2005). This relative absence of investigations into synchrony and hierarchy 
constitutes a lacuna that, I contend, jeopardizes the usefulness of the synchrony concept 
in terms of explaining religious phenomena and shedding explanatory light on human 
social evolution, since – despite widespread egalitarian ideals – human beings manifestly 
remain a stubbornly hierarchical species (Boehm 1999).2 Indeed, “(d)espotic tendencies 
in human beings are so deeply ingrained that they cannot simply be renounced” (Bellah 
2011, p. 177). And as five generations of social anthropology have taught us, religious 
ritual cannot be reduced simply to the evocation of an undifferentiated group “fellow-
feeling” (Geertz 1977; McNeill 1995; Rappaport 1999). Indeed, all religious phenomena 
have complex relations with the differentiated, hierarchical structures of their respective 
societies, from legitimating and sanctifying the social order (e.g., Bell 1992; Berger 
1969) to subversively challenging it (Bell 1992; Lewis 1971) and, in probably the vast 
majority of real-world cases, both challenging and bolstering it in tandem through 
4
2 As we will see in Chapter Four, this characterization is certainly not limited to humans, but applies to 
mammals in general. The formation of dominance hierarchies is, in fact, an ethological near-universal 
(Kudryavtseva 2000).
parallel and reciprocal processes (Turner 1974). In short, is has been left unclear in the 
cognitive and bio-cultural sciences of religion whether synchrony better serves the priests 
of the temple or the prophets of the wilderness, or in which ways it can be bent to serve 
either. Inasmuch as both the functions of social legitimation and social subversion are 
fundamentally implicated in many of the phenomena Westerners term “religious” (Asad 
1993; Rappaport 1999; Turner 1969), this matter must be attended to if ongoing bio-
cultural researches into synchrony are to make useful contact with the rich, ecologically 
valid religious data that so colorfully define human cultures.
1.1. Object and Outline of the Dissertation
The object of this dissertation is, therefore, specifically to investigate the effects of 
synchrony on human social hierarchy. Previous studies have explored the effect of 
synchronous group rhythm on outcomes such as cooperation (Wiltermuth & Heath 2009), 
ingroup/outgroup prosociality (Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer 2014), and empathy 
(Valdesolo & DeSteno 2011). This dissertation will constitute the first sustained 
investigation of which I am aware into the interplay of synchronous rhythm and rank 
relations or leader/follower distinctions in human groups. The endeavor will of necessity 
be interdisciplinary, inasmuch as the literatures relevant to synchrony and human 
hierarchy span fields as diverse as social psychology (e.g., Wiltermuth & Heath 2009), 
sociology (e.g., Bellah 2011; Hall 1976); neuroscience (e.g., Baldissera et al. 2001); 
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coordination dynamics (e.g., Haken, Kelso, & Bunz 1985); anthropology (e.g., Rappaport 
1999); the cognitive science of religion (e.g., Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer 2014) and 
religious studies (e.g., Bell 1992; Seligman et al. 2008). Thus, the task of organizing and 
interrelating the widely disparate literatures from which I will draw threatens to be an 
intricate one.
 Rather, then, than structuring my examination to focus first on human hierarchy 
and then synchrony, or vice versa, I will instead integrate my investigation of both in 
each chapter, so that theories and data surveyed will be juxtaposed specifically for their 
relevance to my unifying question. To whit: the present chapter, Chapter One, presents 
an overview of the empirical literature on both synchrony and motor mimicry, and sets up 
the problem of synchrony’s effects on social hierarchy. Chapter Two, “The Neurology of 
Synchrony,” is a survey of the neuroscience literature relevant to synchrony, motor 
mimicry, and self-other discrimination. In this chapter, I will both present an argument 
that self-other distinctions are neurologically suppressed during synchrony – an effect 
that is particularly centered on the temporoparietal and prefrontal areas of the brain – and 
that such self-other “blurring” is logically incompatible with distinct leadership/
followership roles within the participating group. Chapter Three, “Dynamics, 
Synchrony, and Authority,” is a detailed investigation of coupled-oscillator models and 
social coordination dynamics in relation to synchrony, leading to the presentation of a 
model in which participants transiently surrender their personal agency over their own 
motor acts to the “immanent authority” of the group’s rhythm which they are in turn 
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themselves producing. Thus, synchrony is inherently a subordinating phenomenon for its 
individual partakers. Chapter Four, “Ritualization and the Inevitability of Structure,” 
outlines the ethological, evolutionary, and anthropological case that hierarchy and some 
level of structural inequality are inevitable in human societies, and turns to the theories of 
Roy Rappaport (1999) and Victor Turner (1969; 1974) to explore the role of ritual and 
ritualized behavior in managing the social tensions that emerge from inevitable 
inequality. I then highlight synchrony as an ideal-typical example of a ritualized 
evocation of equality and unity, in which an egalitarian cultural ideal is temporarily 
enacted, and thus made socially salient and apparent, in contrast to the strict distinctions 
in role and rank that characterize everyday social structure. 
 My overall investigation culminates, in Chapter Five (“An Empirical Study of 
Synchrony and Group Function”), with a report of an empirical social psychology study 
carried out under the supervision of Dr. Catherine Caldwell-Harris in the Boston 
University Department of Psychology, which tested the effects of synchrony on a 
coordinative, complex group task that has previously been shown to yield better 
outcomes in the presence of a functioning leadership hierarchy (Ronay et al. 2012). 
Finally, I conclude with a general summary, in Chapter Six (“Complementary 
Coordination and the Problem of Human Boundaries”), of the relevance of this 
investigation for broader questions of hierarchy in culture. This final chapter utilizes both 
my own empirical findings from Chapter Five and the sociological and anthropological 
work of Adam Seligman et al. (2008) and Mary Douglas (1970) to chart the roiling 
7
waters of the anti-ritual (“sincere”) social and ethical orientation that, historically and 
cross-culturally, can characterize many expressions of antagonism to or rejection of social 
structural hierarchy. This conclusion is presented with an eye to the unique dangers of 
such expressions if left unchecked by complementary ritualizing influences.
 As befits an essentially interdisciplinary project, my interlocutors in this 
dissertation are diverse. My primary theoretical and interpretive sources are Roy 
Rappaport, Victor Turner, Christopher Boehm, Allan Mazur, Adam Seligman, Catherine 
Bell, and Mary Douglas – a list that encompasses, to different extents, sociology, cultural 
anthropology, biological anthropology, systems theory, and ritual studies. My empirical 
sources are drawn primarily from the fields of experimental psychology, management 
studies, and the cognitive science of religion, while the original empirical research that 
serves as the interpretive fodder for the project was carried out in a social psychology lab. 
The research questions I have set out to address, meanwhile, are most germane to and 
currently active within the bio-cultural study of religion, and thus it is to this field that I 
most explicitly address this work – particularly in its capacity as a contributing subfield 
within religious studies. Although it is not focused on a particular religious tradition, text, 
or culture, this dissertation is therefore situated firmly within the field of academic 
religious studies, as a theoretical investigation of the intersection of ritualization and 
hierarchy in general – two of the sturdiest conceptual building blocks that, cross-
culturally, help anchor distinct and varying religious forms.
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2. An Overview of Synchrony, or “Keeping Together in Time”
Investigations and treatments of synchrony often hearken to historian William McNeill’s 
now-classic study, Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History (1995). 
In this seminal work, McNeill argues that the evolutionary provenance and continued 
existence of religion itself is inextricably centered on the physiological and emotional 
process by which synchrony binds individuals into collectives:
Dance and dance-like behavior continue to play a very prominent role in 
religion, whether or not trance states are involved. The emotional impact 
on human societies of keeping together in time at religious ceremonies 
was, indeed, second in general importance only to community-wide 
dancing at festivals; and, of course, the two regularly merged.
1995, p. 47; emphasis mine.
It is worth emphasizing that McNeill’s insights into the role in human affairs of 
synchrony, or “muscular bonding” as he termed it, stemmed from his own experience as 
an infantryman in World War II. Although infantry units are (thankfully) no longer 
deployed in rank formations in actual combat, cadence drilling in formation was a 
mainstay of the formation and training of new warriors during McNeill’s soldiering days, 
and still is in the 21st century (McNeill 1995). At first, McNeill found it odd that his 
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sergeants were so insistent on new recruits’ learning how to march in time, when they 
would never actually need to do so while in combat. However, he eventually began to 
experience a subjective unification with the other recruits in his unit that verged on a kind 
of Durkheimian effervescence. This unifying sentiment arose, he later posited, from the 
synchronous repetitive muscular movements necessitated by cadence drill. Muscular 
bonding was, then, “the euphoric fellow feeling that prolonged and rhythmic muscular 
movement arouses among nearly all participants in such exercises” (1995, pp. 2-3). 
McNeill’s description of this immanent and unexpected sense of camaraderie has been 
quoted in many places (e.g., Ehrenreich 2006, Haidt 2012), but it rings with such 
immediacy and clarity that it is worth reproducing again here:
Words are inadequate to describe the emotion aroused by the prolonged 
movement in unison that drilling involved. A sense of pervasive well-
being is what I recall; more specifically, a strange sense of personal 
enlargement; a sort of swelling out, becoming bigger than life, thanks to 
participation in collective ritual…
1995, p. 2
Other writers have made similar observations regarding collective synchrony. Walter 
Freeman famously described rhythmic, collective dance as “the biotechnology of group 
formation,” and particularly noted the psychologically immersive features of the 
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experience of ecstatic synchrony (1995, p. 129). In ecstatic dance, Freeman argued, 
individual identities were subsumed into the collective “communal spirit of the events,” 
and afterward “immersion in the dance is followed by a refreshed sense of belonging to 
the tribe” (p. 130). Thus, the undifferentiated experience of group identity – a falling 
away of individual consciousness, replaced by an immersive awareness of the higher-
order collective self – serves, according to Freeman, a linking role that transcends the 
temporary condition of rhythmic ecstasy. Just as a daily welcome-home embrace may last 
only a few moments but freshly nourishes and energizes the continuing bond between 
husband and wife, so a single evening of collective rhythmic dance reawakens the sense 
of affiliation between the individual and group, extending it into the days and weeks that 
follow. In temporarily lowering the thresholds between self and other, collective dance is 
thus a “human technology for crossing the solipsistic gulf” and for forging enduring 
collective relations (p. 131).
2.1. Empirical Evidence for Synchrony’s Effects
The foundational claims regarding synchrony’s social and cognitive effects made by 
Freeman and McNeill (see also Ehrenreich 2006) sprang largely from anecdotal, textual, 
and ethnographic or observational evidence. However, in recent years social 
psychological researchers have empirically tested the hypothesis that synchrony does, in 
fact, offer the group-bonding and interpersonal benefits that anthropologists and theorists 
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have claimed for it. Wiltermuth and Heath’s seminal paper reported that rhythmic 
synchrony in groups made participants more likely to contribute to group investments in 
public-goods games, and also increased participants’ senses of group belonging, 
compared with asynchronous or no-movement conditions. In one study, subjects were 
asked to either march around a university campus in cadence or at individual paces. 
Those groups that marched in cadence together were more generous in subsequent 
public-goods games. In two subsequent studies, subjects listened to music in headphones, 
singing and making meaningless motions either in synchrony or out of sync with each 
other. Again, subjects who had acted in synchrony were more generous contributors to a 
risky collective pot in a public-goods game, and reported feeling more team affiliation 
with their co-participants (Wiltermuth & Heath 2009). 
 However, contrary to predictions made by McNeill (1995), the subjects did not 
report feeling any more positive emotions in synchrony conditions than in control 
conditions, nor, interestingly, was there a significant difference in cooperation between 
subjects who merely sang together and those who both sang and moved their bodies in 
sync (Wiltermuth & Heath 2009). The authors concluded that McNeill’s “muscular 
bonding” hypothesis was mistaken, in that gross motor movement was apparently not 
required to produce the prosocial effects of synchrony. However, they suggested that 
synchrony probably did help solve “free rider” dilemmas, in which human collectives 
whose group benefits accrue to all members must somehow weed out nonproductive 
followers (see Iannaccone 1994; Sosis & Bressler 2003). According to Wiltermuth and 
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Heath, synchrony thus actually engenders, rather than merely symbolizes, prosocial 
commitment; hence, collective synchrony could be seen as an important tool for 
overcoming free-riding inclinations by ensuring that those who participate in group ritual 
are more inclined to contribute to group welfare – a crucial point to which we will return 
in later chapters. The authors also drew on their findings to challenge the Durkheimian 
thesis of collective effervescence, pointing out that these prosocial and group-bonding 
effects were achieved without any statistically significant boost in positive affect. Similar 
findings have since been reported by others (Paxton & Dale 2013; Miles, Nind, 
Henderson, & McCrae 2010), suggesting that conscious positive emotional experience is 
not a necessary condition for achieving collective benefits from synchrony.
 However, a subjective sense of agential overlap between self and other (e.g., Aron 
et al. 2004) may be. Valdesolo and DeSteno (2011) showed that merely tapping fingers 
together in synchrony predicted a higher sense of similarity between self and other, which 
in turn predicted greater compassion (operationalized as willingness to help in a tedious 
task). Synchrony also predicted greater liking of partners, but this effect did not influence 
subjects’ willingness to offer help. Hove and Risen (2009) found that intentional 
synchrony during rhythmic finger-tapping increased subjects’ sense of affiliation with 
their partners, and suggested that neurological self-other overlap could be the mediating 
factor.3 Lumsden, Miles, and Macrae (2014) found that synchronous rowing increased 
both subjects’ sense of self-other overlap with rowing partners and their reported self-
13
3 See Chapter Two for a fuller treatment of this hypothesis.
esteem, implying that including close others in one’s concept of self (Aron, Aron, & 
Smollan 1992) may be an important contributor to self-appraisal. Fischer et al. (2013) 
reported that, of nine different ecologically valid rituals, those featuring bodily synchrony  
were most likely to predict prosocial actions in lab experiments, and found evidence that 
this effect was mediated by “perceptions of oneness with others” following synchronous 
movement. Thus, synchrony may boost self-esteem, prosociality, and other desirable 
affective states by bringing others closer to being included in to one’s own sense of 
identity (see also Tarr, Launay, & Dunbar 2014).
 Reddish, Fischer, and Bulbulia (2013) parsed the distinction between bodily 
synchrony produced by shared intentionality – participants watching each other and 
consciously attempting to produce the same rhythm – and as a “byproduct” of hearing the 
same beat through headphones, finding that synchrony boosted public-goods game 
outcomes when it resulted from shared intentionality. Hence, the shared intention to 
maintain rhythmic synchrony across participants may be an important ingredient in 
producing prosocial effects – and thus in giving rise to a subjective sense of perceived 
similarity and “entitativity,” or a sense of belonging to the same social unit (see also 
Reddish 2012). These results are echoed in Launay, Dean, and Bailes (2013), who found 
that objective measures of synchrony predicted trust towards an automated (computer) 
rhythm “partner” only when synchrony had been instructed (and thus intentional on the 
part of the human subjects). In a report of a null finding, Cohen, Mundry, and Kirschner 
(2014) found that synchronous drumming artificially orchestrated by computer cues did 
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not predict increased cooperation among Brazilian subjects, and similarly suggested that 
lack of shared intentionality may have been among the reasons for the null result.4
 Notably, Reddish, Fischer, and Bulbulia (2013) measured “perceived similarity” 
used the same “Inclusion of Other in Self” scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan 1992) as 
Lumsden, Miles, and Macrae (2014); thus, the perceived similarity they found as a result 
of intentional synchrony was conceptually identical to the self-other overlap that, 
according to the latter authors, itself predicted greater self-esteem. The binding of 
individuals into a subjectively salient collective is, then, a crucial – possibly central – 
outcome of synchrony. Indeed, the group-defining signals that synchrony sends can be 
received by observers as well as participants. For instance, Lakens (2010) found that 
subjects viewing movies and videos of interacting figures rated the figures higher on 
entitativity, or imputed group cohesion and identity, when they moved in synchrony. The 
same effects also obtained for imputations of group rapport (Lakens 2011). Similarly, 
Miles, Nind, and Macrae (2009) found that subjects imputed greater levels of rapport to 
groups of human figures walking together either in phase or in anti-phase than to those 
walking out of phase. Interestingly, this effect was found equally for both in-phase and 
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4 The authors also indicated that lack of serious physical exertion may have played a role; see immediately 
below. However, numerous other paradigms lacking significant physical exertion have reported positive 
findings (e.g., the finger-tapping paradigms used in Hove & Risen 2009 and Valdesolo & DeSteno 2011), 
which sheds doubt on this hypothesis. In my judgment, this discrepancy suggests that, ceteris paribus, 
shared intentionality may be more important for achieving prosocial effects than gross motor movements, 
as Wiltermuth and Heath suggest (2009).
anti-phase periodic relationships.5 However, there is convincing evidence that in-phase 
synchrony tends to have greater group bonding and prosocial effects than anti-phase 
rhythms. For instance, Miles et al. (2010) also reported that subjects who had performed 
in-phase synchrony together showed greater memory for details of their partners than 
those who had performed anti-phase synchrony. These findings corroborated those of 
Macrae et al. (2008), who reported that brief episodes of synchrony predicted better later 
recall for facial details and words spoken by partners. 
 Additional beneficial effects of synchrony have been identified with unique 
neurophysiological pathways. Kokal et al. (2011) found that subjects who had drummed 
together in synchrony with others showed increased activity in the caudate, an area of the 
brain central to reward processing. Subjects also volunteered to pick up more pencils the 
experimenter “accidentally” dropped following the synchrony condition than after the 
asynchrony (control) condition. Importantly, both these effects were mediated by 
subjective ease of the rhythm – subjects who found the drumming procedure easier to 
master showed more reward system activity and exhibited more prosocial behavior. The 
researchers concluded that rhythmic synchrony enhances participants’ prosocial 
orientations in part by generating neurological rewards, provided that maintaining the 
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5 As we will see in Chapter Three, in-phase and and antiphase synchrony describes a bistable dynamic 
regime commonly found in motor coordination researches (e.g., Haken, Kelso, and Bunz 1985). Laken’s 
(2010; 2011) work suggests that both poles of this regime can serve to signal interpersonal coherence to 
participants and observers alike. However, Miles et al.’s (2010) finding that the in-phase pole may be a 
stronger signal of interpersonal rapport corresponds to the common finding (again, surveyed in depth in 
Chapter Three) that in-phase synchrony comprises a stronger attractor basin than antiphase synchrony (e.g., 
Schmidt, Carello, & Turvey 1990).
shared rhythm does not require undue (presumably distracting) effort. (We will explore 
the complex relationship between cognitive effort and synchrony’s social effects further 
in Chapters Two and Three). 
 A further neurophysiological consequence of synchrony may be the increase of 
pain thresholds mediated by endogenous opioid release. Cohen et al. (2010) found that 
rowing crew athletes who rowed in synchrony with each other subsequently showed a 
higher pain tolerance than those who rowed out-of-sync on separate machines. Cohen et 
al. concluded that synchrony stimulated the release of endorphins or endogenous opioids 
above and beyond the mere physical exertion of rowing. This conclusion is echoed by 
that of Tarr, Launay, and Dunbar (2014), who argue that both neuromotor “self-other 
merging” and the endogenous release of opioids are jointly responsible for the prosocial 
and affective benefits of synchrony.6 Tarr et al. subsequently (2015) replicated the finding 
that synchrony increases subjects’ pain threshold, reporting additionally that both 
physical exertion and synchrony had independent positive effects on pain tolerance as 
well as social bonding. Given that many real-world examples of synchrony (such as 
group dancing or crew rowing) also feature significant physical exertion, Tarr et al.’s 
results offer important insights into the ecologically valid dynamics of synchrony and 
espirit de corps. 
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6 I will not address the question of endorphin release at any significant depth in this dissertation – not 
because I think it is irrelevant or unimportant (indeed, I think the addition of endorphin effects will be 
crucial for future models of synchrony and social hierarchy) but because there is as yet fairly little research 
on the topic, and because my foremost need is for a tight and parsimonious initial model with which to 
interpret my own results and by which to posit general patterns likely to emerge from similar researches. 
That is to say, I find myself without sufficient space or resources to follow this interesting line of inquiry.
 Indeed, these synchrony-exertion dynamics are apparently strong enough to even 
counter extant ingroup/outgroup distinctions. Sullivan and Rickers (2013) found that 
synchronous rowing boosted pain tolerance in subjects regardless of whether they rowed 
in sync with real-life teammates or with strangers. The crucial predictor was simply 
rowing in sync with others rather than alone – suggesting, in line with Tarr et al. (2015), 
that the endocrinological effects of mere physical exertion are independent of the effects 
of interpersonal synchrony. Sullivan’s and Rickers’s (2013) finding thus raises the 
possibility that the effects of synchrony may be generalized beyond established ingroups. 
On a similar note, Reddish, Bulbulia, and Fischer (2014) found that participation in 
synchrony predicted prosocial behavior even toward social others who had not 
themselves participated in the synchrony exercise. They also recorded prosocial behavior 
directed at generalized outgroups (groups that did not participate in synchrony) as well as 
at nonparticipating individuals. Thus, the self-expanding or prosociality-inducing effects 
of synchrony may not be limited to the local set of actors who directly partake in 
synchrony. Notably, however, the synchrony manipulation used by Reddish, Bulbulia, 
and Fischer (2014) did not produce the usual effects of greater entitativity and 
interdependent self-construal, in contrast to most other studies of synchrony (e.g., Lakens 
2010; Reddish, Fischer, & Bulbulia 2013; Wiltermuth & Heath 2009). Thus, it may be 
that synchrony exercises that produce stronger feelings of group entitativity or self-other 
overlap could have effects on outgroup-directed prosociality different than those reported 
by Reddish, Bulbulia, and Fischer (2014). Nonetheless, it is clear that synchrony’s effects 
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are complex, and synchronous activity may generate new social affiliations and 
boundaries as well as shoring up extant ones. 
 Finally, an interesting if small subset of the synchrony literature has focused on 
children. Rabinowitch and Knafo-Noam (2015) found that eight- and nine-year-old 
children who participated in synchronous rhythmic exercises with partners rated those 
partners as more similar to themselves than partners who had partaken in aysnchronous 
exercises or who had not interacted together at all. Synchrony also predicted greater 
ratings of closeness. Self-other overlap – as reported, for example, in Valdesolo and 
DeSteno (2011) – thus results from synchrony in children as well as adults. This result 
suggests that the neural, endocrinological, or dynamical mechanisms by which this effect 
is achieved may not be fully dependent on socialization or enculturation. However, 
Kirschner and Ilari (2013) obtained null results for prosociality in an experiment that 
examined synchronization to a drumbeat among both Brazilian and German children. 
Although children who had drummed in synchrony were no more likely to act prosocially 
than those who had not, Brazilian children were, interestingly, more likely than Germans 
to spontaneously synchronize their own drumming with others’. Thus, cultural 
socialization can interact with rhythmic stimuli to predict different levels of interest in 
performing synchrony, even at very young ages. In contrast, though, Kirschner and 
Tomasello previously (2010) found that four-year-old children who participated in 
synchronous motions set to music were more likely to cooperate afterwards, even at a 
personal cost. In sum, the literature thus far suggests that synchrony has similar effects on 
19
children as on adults, with qualifications. Some aspects of synchrony’s effects may be 
moderated by enculturation factors, while others may be independent of socialization and 
thus universal.
3. The Roots of Synchrony: Mimesis, Mimicry, and Imitation
Where does synchrony come from? Why are humans able to “keep together in time,” 
while nearly all other species aren’t?7 The neurological and behavioral capacities that 
underlie synchrony as surveyed in the foregoing studies are manifold, but they minimally 
include somatic mimicry – the ability to register and replicate postures, gestures, facial 
expressions, and other bodily acts in the real-time course of interactions. This is a 
characteristically human function; for instance, a small, generation-old, but compelling 
body of research empirically demonstrates that people tend to automatically mimic and 
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7 There are a smattering of reports of synchronized behavior among other animals, but none approach the 
level and sophistication (or ubiquity) of synchrony in humans. For instance, chimpanzees chorus loudly in 
groups, but do not achieve synchrony in their calls (Merker 2000). Most famously, fireflies in certain parts 
of the world (particularly Southeast Asia) become entrained into synchrony when flashing at night, 
apparently due to the oscillatory attractor dynamics that are the topic of Chapter Three (Strogatz 2003). 
Backwell et al. (1999) noted that male fiddler crabs wave their claws in synchrony when attempting to 
attract mates, but proposed that this synchronization in fact results epiphenomenally from each animal’s 
competitive attempt to wave first – not entrainment or social coordination. Their hypothesis was supported 
by data showing that males that successfully waved in asynchrony enjoyed better mating success rates. 
Finally, and most relevantly for our investigation, Richard Connor and his colleagues have found one 
ecological setting (Shark Bay, Australia) in which individual bottlenose dolphins form alliances that dive 
and surface in rhythmic synchrony (Connor, Heithaus, & Barre 1999). This is the only non-human instance 
I have discovered of intentional, rhythmic synchrony serving as a probable coalition signal. Notably, the 
social dynamics of the bottlenose community in Shark Bay bear strong similarities to the fission-fusion 
nature of many human societies (see, e.g., Radcliffe-Brown 1922). This similarity suggests that facilitating 
bonding between groups, in addition to bonding between individuals, may be a key ethological function of 
synchrony. We will return to this correlation in the final chapter.  
mirror one another during conversations, thus setting up “interaction rhythms” that 
nonverbally coordinate turn-taking and mimesis across dyads and larger groups 
(Birdwhistell 1970; Condon 1982; Kendon 1970; LaFrance 1982). Dynamic, mutual 
mimicry is thus a foundational characteristic of human interactions – a fact that has 
profound implications for the social psychology, cognitive science, and our very 
understanding of human sociality. Authors such as Ray Birdwhistell, Eliot Chapple 
(1982) and Edward Hall (1976), extrapolating at some length from these findings, went 
so far as to contend that mimesis-based coordination, a “patterned interdependence of 
human beings” (Birdwhistell 1970: 5), was one of the major drivers of culture itself.8 
According to these writers, bodily postures, nods, facial expressions, and gestures are 
bundled into rhythms that guide and coordinate interactions, such that members of a 
culture can communicate beyond verbal and explicit channels (LaFrance 1982). Hence, 
these motions and speech patterns vary by culture, as in distinct interaction rhythms in 
Hopi and Euro-Americans (Hall 1976), or in the articulatory rhythms of Euro-American 
and African-American cultures (Lomax 1982). But all cultures were thought to share a 
reliance on regularized, distinct interaction rhythms that establish a multi-channel 
communications infrastructure extending far beyond the verbal. The bedrock for these 
complex communicative rhythms was seen as the human propensity to mimic and imitate 
the bodily expressions of others in real time.
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8 On mimesis and culture, see, e.g., Bellah (2011); Donald (1993).
 Importantly, most of this postural and gestural mimicry was found to be mediated 
non-consciously. For instance, William S. Condon’s seminal film microanalyses, which 
focused on the systematic analysis of very short segments of filmed natural interactions, 
found that conversation partners in normal interactions mimicked and responded to each 
other’s posture shifts at intervals of c. 50 milliseconds – significantly shorter windows 
than those found in responses mediated by conscious executive decisions (Condon 1982; 
Condon & Sander 1974). Similarly, after analyzing films of real-world classroom 
interactions between students and teachers, Marianne LaFrance (1982) concluded that 
interactional synchrony and postural mirroring – such as students’ sitting up in their desks 
when teachers leaned forward while speaking – predicted interpersonal rapport but 
remained outside of conscious awareness or control.9 Alan Lomax summarized such 
findings:
transmission of information and successful coordination at the level of 
everyday life would be impossible without this “dance” of microgestures 
which seems to link all communicating humans below the level of 
conscious perception.
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9 Of note, however, this effect obtained only for mirroring, not for strict anatomical mimicry in the sense of 
directly translating body plans. That is, raising your left arm in response to the raised right arm of a 
colleague you are standing directly across from would tend to induce rapport, even though you and he 
would be using different effectors. If you were to replicate his body pattern exactly by raising your right 
arm, you would no longer be mirroring one another, and the rapport-building effect would be lost. This 
observation is relevant for the experimental design in the empirical portion of this dissertation, as we will 
see in Chapter Five.
Lomax 1982, p. 167
 Drawing on these and similar findings, the anthropologist Ray Birdwhistell 
pioneered methodologies for quantitative visual analysis of filmed human interactions, 
thereby inaugurating the field of kinesics – the study of “communicative body 
motion” (1970, p. 71). Kinesics entailed analysis of the enculturation processes by which 
humans become adapted to maximize behavioral and communicative predictability 
within bounded cultural contexts. Dysfunctions of such predictability – what in 
Confucian terms might be called failures of ritual propriety – indicated pathology or a 
disruption of the attentional processes by which interactions were regulated. For instance, 
Birdwhistell noted that, in his observation of films of psychotherapy residents interacting 
with clients, a key sign of inexperience was the misuse of the “understanding nod.” 
Experienced therapists nodded in appropriate rhythm along with their clients’ speech, 
indicating that they were listening and engaged. On the other hand, less experienced 
therapists, distracted by their own anxieties, mistimed their nodding and thus used their 
bodily expressions “like an overheavy baton,” failing to maintain the appropriate dyadic 
rhythm (Birdwhistell 1970, p. 102). According to Birdwhistell, then, the maintenance of a 
carefully structured rhythm of coordinated activity is a crucial index of successful social 
interaction, mutual attention, and general rapport.
 In the late 1980s, Frank Bernieri spearheaded a revival of studies in interaction 
mimicry, using films of interactions between dyads (Bernieri 1988; Bernieri, Steven, & 
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Rosenthal 1988).10 In one study, dyadic interactions between students and teachers 
showed a strong positive correlation between temporally coordinated movement and 
interpersonal rapport, even after controlling for baseline sociality or friendliness (Bernieri 
1988). In another study, raters found that interactional synchrony, such as facial mimicry 
or simultaneous motions, was much higher for real-time interactions between mothers 
and their own infants than for the “pseudosynchronous” or time-randomized videos, or 
for videos of interactions between mothers and strange infants (Bernieri, Steven, & 
Rosenthal 1988). Importantly, interactions between mothers and unrelated infants 
actually showed the reverse effect: there was more dissynchrony than chance would 
predict. This dissynchrony was observed primarily in the final minute of the filmed 
interactions, prompting Bernieri et al. to suggest that such anti-mimicry might signal a 
desire to end unwanted social encounters (1988; see also Johnston 2002). Thus both 
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10 The initial research program into interaction rhythms, primarily active from the 1960s through the early 
1980s, was immensely productive of useful theoretical insights. It also provided respectable empirical 
support for claims that subconscious imitation mediates rhythmic somatic exchanges between humans in 
most interaction contexts, and that such rhythmic mimesis is an index of social concord. However, its first 
wave – long on grand, insightful interpretations and somewhat short on peer-reviewed publications – 
petered out rapidly not long after the publication of Interaction Rhythms (Davis 1982), a compendium of 
papers and talks by Condon, LaFrance, Chapple, Lomax and others that remains the primary cited text in 
the field more than 30 years later. I mention this not in order to narrate a comprehensive literature history, 
but because the sudden cessation of publication and interest in the topic is genuinely puzzling. Condon is 
cited ubiquitously even today by researchers in synchrony and mimesis. His ideas, along with those of 
Birdwhistell and LaFrance, are the fount of many of the central ideas in mimesis and synchrony studies. 
The paucity of peer-reviewed publications following up on his original flurry of results is thus genuinely 
odd, and could raise suspicions about the replicability and reliability of his fairly sweeping claims and 
findings. Nonetheless, no serious empirical challenges to his basic arguments appear to have emerged from 
the current upswell of new research into synchrony and mimesis, and so I have elected to report his findings 
and those of this early interaction rhythms research program more or less as they stand, with only the 
present caveats. Still, it really is strange how the original, apparently very promising research program 
appears to have pretty much vanished into thin air so suddenly.
mimicry and anti-mimicry, although unconscious processes, appeared to fulfill crucial 
social signaling functions. 
 Linda Tickle-Degnen and Frank Rosenthal (1990) similarly argued that failures of 
gestalt-level interaction coordination indexed lack of social investment, since complex 
somatic mirroring and rhythmic coordination can only be easily achieved if the 
interaction partners are paying careful attention to each other’s somatic cues. Tickle-
Degnan and Rosenthal suggested that since such “coordination cues” are outside the 
sphere of conscious control, they represent a more honest signal of actual social attitudes 
than verbal or symbolic forms of communication. Thus, bodily coordination and 
synchrony are appropriately described as indices of social concord, in the Peircean sense 
(Perice & Hoopes 1991; see Rappaport 1999), because they are not easily amenable to 
the conscious, strategic manipulation on which deceit is predicated.11 In short, it’s very 
hard to lie about how you feel with subtle bodily signals – somatic cues such as mimicry 
tend to be difficult to consciously control or simulate, and thus they serve as fairly 
accurate indices of one’s actual social attitudes. This does not mean that it is impossible 
to consciously intend to mimic someone else – indeed, as we will see in Chapters Two 
and Three, conscious control is crucial for rhythmic synchrony, which is a form of 
iterated mutual mimicry. Instead, it means that you cannot mimic another person 
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11 The semiotic distinction between symbols and indexes will be treated more thoroughly in Chapter Four. 
Briefly, an index is a sign that points to its referent by virtue of intrinsic or causal connection – red maple 
leaves are an index of fall. A symbol, meanwhile, represents its referent by virtue of purely arbitrary 
convention: the English word “fall” or the German “Herbst” are symbols that arbitrarily refer to the autumn 
season.
effectively unless you are actually paying attention to what she is saying and doing – that 
is, unless you are genuinely attuned to her rhythms and gestures, and not distracted by 
your own goals or intentions (as, for instance, Birdwhistell’s inexperienced therapists 
were). In this sense, accurate and subtle bodily mimicry is a very reliable signal of 
interpersonal attention.12
 These social signaling functions of mimicry and postural sharing shed explanatory 
light on the extensive body of research that has since established mimicry’s association 
with a wide variety of positive social outcomes. Stel and Vonk (2010) found that subjects 
who had been mimicked reported more feelings of interpersonal closeness, and that dyads 
showed more emotional contagion after mimicry than after mimicry-free interactions. 
Ashton-James et al. (2007) found that subjects who had been subtly mimicked felt closer 
not only to their mimickers, but to other people at large. Additionally, being mimicked 
predicted more interdependent self-construals – that is, subjects who were mimicked 
chose more relational modes of describing themselves (such as “being so-and-so’s sister” 
or a “goalie for my soccer team”) than individualist, adjectival modes (such as being 
“smart,” “ambitious,” etc.). In a cleverly designed study that demonstrated generalized 
prosocial effects of mimicry, Fischer-Lokou et al. (2011) found that passersby who had 
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12 The foregoing points (i.e., that mimesis must not be forced if it is to function optimally as a social signal)  
may seem to sit uncomfortably with earlier claims that synchrony’s prosocial effects may be enhanced by 
intentionality (e.g., Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer 2014). However, again, the linchpin for both claims is 
attention – if synchrony is incidental, as when subjects each listen to their own (synchronous) metronome 
beats while carrying out a rhythmic action, then their attention is not on each other, but on their own 
metronome cues and their own actions. If synchrony is the result of conscious intention, then participants’ 
attention must perforce be on each other. Thus, both intentional synchrony and fluid somatic mimicry – 
whether conscious or non-conscious – are signals of close interpersonal attention. 
been subtly mimicked by a confederate pretending to ask for directions subsequently 
were more likely than those who had not been mimicked to give money to another 
confederate posing as a panhandler. When they gave money, they also gave more on 
average than those who had not experienced previous mimicking. 
 Moreover, as might be expected, these prosocial effects of mimicry have clinical 
ramifications; in another video study of interactions between therapists and clients, 
nonverbal mimicry and postural convergence predicted both rapport between the patient 
and therapist as well as reduction of psychological symptoms (Ramseyer & Tschacher 
2011). Mimicry is also context-sensitive, capable of modulation to meet changes in the 
strategic social environment; Lakin, Chartrand, and Arkin (2008) found that subjects who 
had been made to feel excluded from a social in-group subsequently (and unconsciously) 
mimicked a member of that in-group more. An analogous effect was also found for social 
exclusion from dyads, such that subjects mimicked interaction partners more after being 
made to feel socially excluded. Conversely, Paxton and Dale (2013) reported that 
interaction partners displayed less behavioral convergence – including unconscious 
synchronizing of bodily sway and mimicry of speech patterns – during arguments than 
during pleasant discussions. Thus, unconscious mimicry can serve socially strategic ends 
that vary by context, including reintegration with or separation from social collectives. 
On an important related note, Tidens and Fragale (2003) found that social status evoked 
complementary rather than strictly mimetic responses. Subjects who viewed a target 
holding his body in a way that contained no status-relevant signals mimicked the target’s 
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postures directly, but when subjects viewed a target holding his body in a way that 
communicated either high or low social rank (i.e., expansive vs. constricted body posture, 
upright head vs. slouching, steady gaze vs. averted eyes), they tended to respond with the 
opposite – that is, complementary – body language.13  Mimicry and behavioral 
convergence therefore may index feelings of closeness, affiliation, and rank or 
complementary status in addition to generating them. 
 Taken together, the foregoing studies offer convincing support for what Chartrand 
and Bargh (1999) call “the chameleon effect,” or the tendency of humans to selectively 
replicate each other’s body postures, motions, and expressions in order to express or 
modulate affinity. Importantly, the chameleon effect is thought to be enabled specifically 
by perceptuomotor coupling, or the automatic tendency for the perception of motor 
actions to activate the performance of similar or identical acts by the perceiver (Chartrand 
& Bargh 1999). Perceptuomotor coupling is, in turn, a species of what William James 
(1890/1950) called “ideomotor” action, the cognitive process by which mental 
representations of motor acts automatically activate the efferent (that is, muscular) 
channels for those very acts (Hurley 2008). The endless stippling of unconscious, 
reciprocal imitation and interaction rhythms that animate the vast majority of real-life 
human interactions may emerge, then, from what researchers call a “common coding” 
mechanism by which the brain is thought to represent both self-caused and exogenous 
motor acts identically.
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13 This important finding will be revisited in Chapter Six.
4. Typology: Mimicry, Coordination, and Synchrony
In this chapter, the literature review has thus far focused on – and perhaps somewhat 
conflated – the twin phenomena of 1) somatic mimicry, and 2) interactional synchrony. In 
order to proceed with the subsequent chapters, it will be helpful to clarify categorical 
distinctions. Loosely, both mimicry and synchrony are members of a broader class that 
writers have termed “interpersonal coordination” (Bernieri & Rosenthal 1991; Chartrand 
& Lakin 2013) or simply “joint action” (Schmidt et al. 2011). According to Bernieri and 
Rosenthal (1991), interpersonal coordination generally refers to the mutual influence by 
which individuals’ actions and behavior affect one another in interpersonal settings, such 
that their motor and speech acts are not random or statistically independent of each other. 
Mimicry, or “behavior matching” in Bernieri and Rosenthal’s (1991) terminology, is the 
exact or near-exact reflection or repetition of particular actions, phrases, vocal tones, 
gestures, or postures, usually within a few seconds (Chartrand & Lakin 2013). 
Interactional synchrony, meanwhile, is defined by Chartrand and Lakin as the near-
precise temporal convergence of behavior which may or may not be morphologically 
identical and is not periodic or rhythmic (2013). By contrast, though, Cacioppo and 
Cacioppo (2012) specify that synchrony entails both exact temporal and configuration 
matching. 
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 Since there are obviously significant inconsistencies in the terminology used by 
different scholars and different times (Dale et al. 2014; see Cacioppo & Cacioppo 2012; 
Semin & Cacioppo 2009), I think it is best to put together a de novo standardized 
typology that extrapolates from the haphazardly deployed categories found elsewhere. 
For this task, I find Semin and Cacioppo’s (2009) categorization scheme especially 
useful. They describe three major categories of co-action: mimicry, entrainment, and 
coordination. Mimicry is defined exactly as above (the imitation of another’s discrete 
acts), while entrainment is the periodic repetition of co-enacted behaviors such as 
clapping. Coordination, meanwhile, is the enacting of complementary, non-identical 
behaviors for the sake of achieving a goal. Note that – because it emphasizes periodicity 
– entrainment here is different from Chartrand’s and Lakin’s (2013) concept of 
interactional synchrony. Thus, “synchrony” in the lingo of social psychology and the bio-
cultural study of religion is essentially identical to what has elsewhere tended to be called 
“entrainment.” Since the current investigation is situated within religious studies, I will 
abide by the standard dominant within the bio-cultural study of religion and use the word 
synchrony to mean periodic, repetitive, mutually identical acts. From this base, I arrive at 
four basic categories of socially coordinated action:
1) Mimicry. The reflection of motor (or audio) acts, matching in form but not precisely 
temporally aligned; synonymous with imitation or mimesis.
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2) Synchronized action. Non-periodic behavioral convergence; the precise but non-
repeated temporal alignment of acts, which may or may not be identical in form. Both 
conversation partners at a table moving to stand up simultaneously, with no prior 
signal given, would constitute a synchronized action.
3) Synchrony. The mutual, periodic repetition of mimetic acts, matching both in form 
and in periodic tempo; entrainment. Identical with McNeill’s “muscular bonding.”
4) Complementary coordination. The performance of distinct but mutually relevant 
behaviors, generally for achieving a joint outcome. 
In addition, then, synchrony is a form of sensorimotor synchronization, or “the rhythmic 
coordination of perception and action” (Repp 2005). The other categories, 1), 2), and 4), 
meanwhile, do not necessarily imply rhythmicity. The majority of this dissertation will 
focus on what I call synchrony according to this typology, but complementary 
coordination is also crucial to my investigation – particularly as regards the relationship 
between social unity and the accomplishment of shared goals. As such, I will turn my 
attention increasingly to complementary coordination in Chapters Five and Six. There 
remains a possible fifth category of interpersonal coordination: the periodic repetition of 
non-identical acts, as when one person beats out a rhythm with his hand on the wall while 
another stamps the same rhythm with her foot (Hove & Risen 2009). Although this 
arrangement is not addressed very extensively in the literature, we will return to it as 
important theoretical fodder at the end of Chapter Four. 
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 The terms listed here do not exactly match those used by primary researchers in 
the relevant literatures, but it is precisely the inconsistency in the current working 
terminology that necessitates their coinage. In my terms, the bulk of the growing 
literature on mimesis and mirroring focuses on simple mimicry and, to an extent, 
synchronized action, while the social psychology literature on rhythmic interactions (e.g., 
Wiltermuth & Heath 2009) refers mostly to synchrony proper. Finally, because “joint 
action” has recently begun to emerge as the standard umbrella term for all forms of what 
was previously known as interpersonal coordination (e.g., Bekkering et al. 2009; Keller, 
Novembre, & Hove 2014; Sebanz & Knoblich 2009), I adopt that phrase for the 
overarching meta-category of all socially coordinated motor acts.
5. Hierarchy and Synchrony in Society
Pithily emphasizing how important synchrony and mimicry are in orchestrating human 
sociality, the sociologist Edward Hall wrote that “what we know as dance is really a 
slowed-down, stylized version of what human beings do whenever they interact” (1976, 
p. 72). As we will see, this heuristic window into the dance of human social life has 
important implications for leader-follower and power dynamics in dyads and groups 
(Naber, Pashkam, & Nakayama 2013; Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal 1990). In particular, 
over the following chapters I will argue that the dynamics of synchrony tend to flatten out 
hierarchies and attenuate leader-follower distinctions between co-participants, leading to 
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a transient social experience of relative equality whenever synchrony is performed. This 
role- and hierarchy-blurring effect is, of course, uniquely contrasted with that of 
complementary coordination, in which co-actors take different actions and play distinct 
roles (Dale et al. 2014). 
 I will argue that synchrony tends to suppress hierarchy and blur social rules 
through two main channels: neurocognitive and dynamical. Briefly, the emerging 
neuroimaging literature on imitation and synchrony tentatively supports the conclusion 
that, during synchrony, every participant becomes a kind of “hyper-follower,” bound and 
passively constrained by the dictates of what I will call an “immanent authority” of the 
group rhythm (Konvalinka et al. 2010; see Chapter Three). While the precise 
neurological foundations for synchrony are still only incompletely known, the evidence is 
compelling that high-quality synchrony (in which participants are truly “in a groove,” 
finding it easy to maintain the rhythm) is associated with downregulation of brain 
networks involved in leader-follower interaction dynamics and in maintaining self-other 
distinctions generally (e.g., Cacioppo et al. 2014; Fairhust, Janata, & Keller 2013; Jiang 
et al. 2015). That is, these networks of the brain are what we use when we need to pay 
close attention to what others are doing in order to decide what we ourselves are going to 
do, and when we need to make executive decisions that will impact others (Keller, 
Novembre, & Hove 2014). Since synchrony appears to preferentially suppress activity in 
precisely these networks, the subjective salience of interpersonal differences and leader-
follower distinctions is attenuated. Additionally, as we shall see, a brain belonging to a 
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body that is moving synchronously with other bodies is afforded little or no empirical 
criteria for usefully distinguishing between perceived motor acts generated by itself and 
those generated by other brains (Hove 2008; Semin & Cacioppo 2009; Tognoli et al. 
2007). Thus, synchrony leads to a phenomenological experience of self-other blurring – 
which in itself is, of course, incompatible with rank and hierarchy distinctions.14
 From a dynamical perspective, we will see that the most accurate and useful 
mathematical methods for modeling synchrony draw on coupled oscillator network 
models, which describe individual participants in synchrony as periodic oscillators – 
similar to clock pendulums – that attract or draw each other’s rhythms toward a common, 
unified beat. These models stipulate that no single participant can be a “dictator” of the 
group rhythm if synchrony is to function optimally. More specifically, as the parameters 
of a synchrony interaction emerge from each individuals’ contributions, the shared motor 
dynamics undergo nonlinear transitions from one state into another (Kelso 2012). 
Coordination dynamics models demonstrate that these emergent coordinated states in turn 
feed back to exert a top-down constraining influence on each participant (Thompson & 
Varela 2001). The rhythm of a synchrony event, then, emerges from all interactants, and 
then feeds back as a top-down constraining influence on those very producers. In strong 
group synchrony, such as dance or military cadence marching, the emergent rhythm that 
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14 As we will see in the subsequent chapter, for instance, viewing other faces being touched synchronously 
and in the same manner as their own leads participants to feel increased ownership over the other’s face; to 
feel greater closeness, more attraction, and a greater subjective sense of physical resemblance to the other; 
and to be more easily swayed by opinions attributed to the other (Paladino et al. 2010). A similar 
manipulation has also led to increases in subjects’ ability to accurately detect very subtle stimuli delivered 
at the same time to a stranger’s face (Cardini et al. 2013). 
guides the interactants is therefore, I will argue, a form of authority – it dictates what 
each person does, in terms of rhythm and motion. Phenomenologically, the effect is that 
synchrony subordinates each participant to an immanent authority instantiated by the 
group – thus suppressing rank and hierarchy distinctions between co-participants 
themselves.
 The effects of synchrony on hierarchy and social differentiation then redound onto 
its function as a ritualized act – a social signal that enacts a particular social paradigm 
(specifically, social unity and equality). This is where the relevance of my inquiry into 
synchrony becomes most sharply apparent. As we will see, this ritualized aspect of 
synchrony makes it a richly fruitful heuristic for shedding light on the methods by which 
people and cultures engage with the ideals and the subjunctive values that animate them. 
In the case of synchrony, this is particularly true for ideals that have to do with equality 
and hierarchy – features of social life that are both ubiquitous and give rise to profound, 
often irreconcilable tensions in every society. Because authority and status are rarely 
wholly uncontested, and often inspire serious breaches and conflicts between competing 
members of otherwise cooperative societies (Boehm 1999, passim), the layout and 
distribution of social rank presents a significant social problem to be solved. However, 
this problem can never be fully resolved, because no matter what social structural 
arrangement obtains, it will invariably contain hierarchies and inequalities that will chafe 
some and benefit others – and thereby sow the seeds of strife and contention (Turner 
1969). Synchrony, as a ritualized index of equality in structurally unequal human 
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societies, is then a kind of embodied nexus for resolving and contending with the 
inescapable tensions of life in a segmented world. More than that – its effects (obscuring 
self-other differences, smoothing out hierarchies) can awaken a sense of effervescent 
communing with fellows, beyond the reach of everyday role distinctions that cut 
everywhere between person and person. In its unity, though, synchrony also dampens the 
expression of complementary coordination, of functional differentiation. It thus evokes 
the dangers of idealistic flight from social structure and hierarchy, of the blind pursuit of 
absolute equality and total statuslessness that characterizes many millenniarian and 
revolutionary movements. Social structure is both the wellspring of conflict and the life 
support system of human societies. To reject the one is to shut down the other. In this 
way, then, synchrony is both a basic human behavioral phenomenon, often minutely 
integrated into culturally distinctive contexts and forms to meet specific needs across 
wildly varying cultures, and a sweeping, universal lens into some of the most basic 
tensions and disharmonies faced by human societies – and the endless attempts people 
must make to reconcile them.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE NEUROLOGY OF SYNCHRONY
1. Introduction: The Usefulness of an Irksome Science
We have now surveyed the evidence for the prosocial effects of synchrony, 
perceptuomotor coupling, and what Chartrand & Bargh (1999) call the “chameleon 
effect” – the apparently universal tendency of human beings to subtly mimic one another 
and set up coherent somatic interaction rhythms, contingent on social contexts. In this 
chapter, we will investigate what is currently known (or, perhaps more accurately, 
postulated on the basis of what is known) about the neurophysiological bases of these 
mimetic social traits of the human species. While neuroscience is a troubled field in many 
ways (see below), enough convergence of data and theory exists regarding the human 
brain’s activity during motor mimicry and related behaviors – including rhythmic 
synchrony – that a truly robust account of McNeill’s “muscular bonding” would be 
impoverished without some careful attention to it.
 We will begin with the “congruency effect,” a well-documented phenomenon in 
which the successful performance of a motor act is inhibited by the simultaneous 
perception of an incompatible action. For instance, most people find it difficult to move 
their hand one direction while watching someone else move her hand in the opposite way 
(Ainley, Brass, Tsakiris 2014; Cross et al. 2013; De Coster et al. 2014). The accepted 
explanation for this phenomenon is the prepotent imitative response that is so well-
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documented in the interaction rhythm and social mimicry literature (Bernieri 1988; 
Chartrand & Lakin 2013; van Baaren et al. 2009), and which is activated by the 
perception of motor acts that can be isomorphically mapped onto the perceiver’s body 
and behavioral repertoire (Baldissera et al. 2001; Rizzolati & Craighero 2004). Thus, 
watching a dog bite down activates the mimetic response, but seeing a dog bark does not, 
because humans cannot bark (Hickok 2009; Rizzolati & Craighero 2004). Such responses 
are among the most compelling evidence for the existence of a human mirror neuron 
system, a postulated integrated network of brain regions that respond similarly to both 
performed and observed motor acts (Hurley 2008).
 The postulated human mirror neuron system is comprised of motor and 
perception-related regions of the brain that are activated both by the perception and 
execution of motor acts. A presumably homologous mirror neuron system is better-
documented in the macaque (Hickok 2014), but similarities between monkeys and 
humans in behavioral and perceptual responses at the gestalt level have led many 
researchers to conclude that the homology at the granular (neuronal) level is genuine 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; although see below for a short discussion of 
controversies). The presumed social-cognitive functions of the human mirror system are 
the primary points of interest for most researchers; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia have 
described the “mirror mechanism” as “a very general, widespread mechanism 
transforming sensory information [from others’ actions] into a motor format” (2015: 3). 
Others have called this effect “motor resonance” (Heyes 2011). These writers argue that 
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this internal motor response is a key conduit for social information, enabling a kind of 
direct implicit understanding of the nature and intentions of others’ motor behavior. Many 
theorists conclude that mirroring responses enable a “common coding” of action and 
perception, such that motor acts are represented identically in the brain regardless of who 
performs them (Hurley 2008). The congruency effect is often cited as evidence in favor 
of common coding theory, since the tendency to unintentionally copy others’ incongruent 
actions implies the existence of competing, abstract motor representations that interfere 
with each other when they are instantiated simultaneously in the brain (e.g., Brass, Ruby, 
& Spengler 2009; Hurley 2008). As Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2010) point out, this model 
of the percepuomotor system has roots in the ideomotor theory famously articulated by 
William James:
(E)very representation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual 
movement which is its object; and awakens it in a maximum degree 
whenever it is not kept from so doing by an antagonistic representation 
present simultaneously in the mind.
James 1890/1950, p. 526
The source of our generalized tendency to mimic and imitate each other is thus, it seems, 
found at the very basic level of automatic motor cognition and planning.
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2. The Neuroanatomy of Mirroring and Mimicry
I have no wish to become ensnared in contemporary science’s favorite bad habit: 
indulgence in what one pair of researchers (Sebanz & Knoblich 2009) adroitly describe 
as “neophrenological” speculation about complex brain functions, based on questionable 
imaging studies with low Ns and an almost Baconian lack of guiding theory.1 However, 
several fairly well-established, basic findings in the neuroanatomy of mirroring and 
imitation are crucial for properly understanding the physiological substrates of, and 
relevant constraints on, mimicry and synchrony. I will therefore attempt to outline these 
points quickly and parsimoniously, with an eye to establishing their functionality for 
synchrony, imitation, and joint action.2
 Generally, most sources argue that the human brain’s mirror system comprises a 
frontoparietal axis (Bekkering et al. 2009; Newman-Norlund et al. 2007). That is, the 
mirror system hinges on portions of both the frontal and the upper-rear (parietal) areas of 
the brain. According to researchers such as Rizzolati and Sinigaglia (2010), this axis is 
activated by both the execution and external perception of motor acts. At the upper-rear 
node of this axis, the temporoparietal junction (including the inferior parietal lobule 
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1 Anyone wishing to disabuse herself of the 21st-century conceit that science has the world entirely figured 
out, and that there is nothing left for humans to do but wait for the experts to write it all down, could do no 
better than sit down and read several hundred current papers on neuroimaging. Seeing firsthand how little 
agreement, or even basic theoretical scaffolding, holds up the supposed towering edifice of neuroscience is 
liable incite a feeling similar to that shocked bittersweetness of suddenly perceiving, as a teenager, that the 
adults who run the world have practically no idea what they are doing.
2 For clarity, brain regions will be bolded when first mentioned.
and the superior temporal sulcus) is believed to anchor a great deal of social motor 
processing (Cattaneo & Rizzolati 2009; Rumiati, Carmo, & Corradi-Dell’Acqua 2009). 
In particular, neurons in the superior temporal sulcus appear to be “sensitive to biological 
motion” (Gallese et al. 2011). Overall, the temporoparietal junction is thought to be 
responsible for orienting the body in space (Serino et al. 2013) and – particularly in the 
right hemisphere – for distinguishing self from other (Decety & Chaminade 2003; 
Tognoli et al. 2007).3
 At the frontal node of this frontoparietal mirror axis, the inferior frontal gyrus 
and the ventral premotor cortex are implicated in response inhibition and executive 
motor planning (Bekkering et al. 2009). These processes are crucially important for 
avoiding inappropriate imitation of others as well as preventing motor perseveration, or 
an endless loop of self-imitation (Schütz-Bosbach et al. 2009). The inferior frontal gyrus 
includes portions of the dorsal and medial prefrontal cortex that are involved in social 
mirroring and in the inhibition of mimicry (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler 2009; Haker et al. 
2013). Not incidentally, the ventral premotor cortex is a probable homologue of monkey 
motor area F5, where mirror neurons were first discovered in macaques (Cerri et al. 
2015). The ventral premotor cortex is thought to be responsible for the sense of 
ownership of the body (Serino et al. 2013). 
 Thus, in addition to grounding imitation, mimicry, and possibly action 
understanding (Brass & Heyes 2005; Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004), this frontoparietal 
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3 There appears to be broad agreement on this matter, but not unanimity; see, e.g., Donaldson, Rinehart, & 
Enticott (2015) for a useful critical review.
mirror system appears to play a central role in constructing a sense of the bounded self 
and in maintaining self-other distinctions (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler 2009; Hove 2008; 
Hurley 2008; Schütz-Bosbach et al. 2009). Neuroimaging evidence, while subject to 
competing interpretations, appears to broadly support this conclusion. In a study using 
transcranial magnetic stimulation to simulate lesioning, Ritterband-Rosenbaum and 
colleagues (2014) showed that interruption of right inferior parietal functions predicted 
errors in correctly parsing self- versus other-caused motor acts. Inhibitory transcranial 
magnetic stimulation to the right inferior parietal region has also been found to predict 
reduced performance on a self-other photo recognition and discrimination task (Uddin et 
al. 2006). Conversely, excitatory stimulation to the same area apparently improved 
performance on imitation and perspective-taking tasks that hinge on effective self-other 
distinctions (Santiesteban et a. 2012). 
 Generating self-other distinctions is important because we need to inhibit our 
innate imitative reflexes if we want to carry out independent actions in social contexts 
where other people are doing different things (Brass & Heyes 2005; Hurley 2008). It 
would not do at all if we imitated each other all the time; the result would be a 
catastrophic form of what Rappaport (1999) has called “hypercoherence,” a maladaptive 
phase lockdown of moving parts within a social system. Accordingly, evidence is 
accumulating that the brain devotes substantial resources to this critical response 
inhibition function. In a seminal paper, Baldissera and colleagues (2001) found that the 
spinal H-reflex for muscles extending to the fingers was activated merely by viewing a 
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film of a human hand. However, the pattern of H-reflex activation was opposite that 
which would be found if the subjects were actually carrying out an identical action 
themselves. Baldissera et al. concluded that the inverse spinal H-reflex represented a 
back-end suppression of automatic imitative motor signals (2001). Spengler, von 
Cramon, and Brass (2010) found that, among patients with frontal and temporoparietal 
lesions, the ability to control imitation was positively correlated with distinct suites of 
mentalizing skills. That is, patients with reduced mentalizing abilities also were less able 
to suppress prepotent imitation responses. Thus, the ability to identify and parse one’s 
own actions from those of others, and therefore to inhibit inappropriate motor imitation, 
appears to recruit cortical areas necessary both for mentalizing – understanding the 
intentions and motives of others – and for registering and responding to the perception of 
motor acts. In another influential paper, Brass, Ruby, and Spengler (2009) demonstrated 
that frontal regions of the mirror system as well as the right temporoparietal junction 
were implicated in suppressing imitative mirroring responses. The frontal pole of the axis 
was specifically recruited for inhibiting contradictory motor impulses, while the 
temporoparietal junction was activated by cues that the observed action was different 
from the self-performed one. Concomitantly, the right temporoparietal region was 
deactivated when the observed action was both simultaneous and identical to the 
performed one. Thus, witnessing someone else perform an action identical to one’s own 
at the same time, when no immediate inhibition of one’s own mimetic response is 
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required, appears to selectively downregulate the very regions of the brain responsible for 
self-other cognitive distinctions.
 These inhibitory self-other discriminatory functions are necessary for purposive 
mentalizing in other contexts as well. For instance, we apparently use motor mirroring of 
others’ acts in order to prepare and perform complementary or even competitive actions 
which are not identical to those we have observed (Bekkering et al. 2009). Rather than 
passively relaying motor information to the brain, then, the mirror neuron system may be 
particularly involved in socially contingent action planning, drawing on self-other 
distinctions in order to help us decide what to do (Newman-Norlund et al. 2007). For 
instance, skilled tennis players more effectively return serves sent by real humans than by 
machines, suggesting that internal bodily simulations of the server’s biomechanics are 
crucial for the player’s assessment and response (Mann et al. 2007). Newman-Norlund et 
al. (2007) found that preparing complementary actions – that is, motor acts 
morphologically different from those observed on a video screen, which therefore require 
suppression of visually cued imitative responses in order to enact – recruited the right 
inferior frontal gyrus and bilateral inferior parietal regions even more than did preparing 
an identical action. Together, this body of findings offers convincing evidence of what 
Brass, Ruby, and Spengler call “a persuasive overlap of activations between imitative 
control and the social-cognitive functions” within the mirror system (2009, p. 2361). The 
mirror system, then – fêted in popular culture for its supposed role in achieving unity and 
harmonious, intuitive rapport between individuals (e.g., Ramachandran 2012) – may 
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actually be more responsive to difference between people than to similarities, and 
activated more by cues of complementary than of overlapping social roles.
2.1. A Brief Note on Critiques of Mirror Neuron Theories
Before proceeding further, I am obliged to pause and acknowledge that it is not an 
entirely comfortable thing to rest any of my theoretical argument on research in mirror 
neurons, “the most hyped concept in neuroscience” (Jarrett 2013). The mirror system has, 
after all, only conclusively been documented in macaque monkeys, whose motor area F5 
contains neurons that fire both during action performance and observation (Cattaneo & 
Rizzolatti 2009; Ferrari et al. 2003). The existence of these macaque mirror neurons is 
not contested (Hickok 2014), but there are serious functional differences between the 
macaque mirror system and its purported human analogue. In macaques, mirror neurons 
do not respond strongly to intransitive or meaningless actions (Hecht et al. 2013), while 
structurally homologous regions of the human brain react to perceptions of both transitive 
and intransitive actions – apparently enabling a mirroring response not only to goal-
directed motor acts, but also their constituent subcomponents (Rizzolatti & Craighero 
2004). Therefore, it is not entirely clear how much may be inferred about the human 
mirror system on the basis of monkey research. Another source of difficulty arises from 
the fact that, while mirror neurons can be identified at the single-cell level in macaques, 
such measurements are impossible to take on human brains. Most research on the human 
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mirror system has therefore been forced to rely on functional imaging of brain areas 
homologous to those in which mirror cells are found in macaques. This methodology is 
discouragingly indirect and requires a leap of logical inference – namely, that increased 
gross activity in the human brain corresponds to the activity of individual mirror cells in 
homologous macaque regions, an inference that has certainly not gone unchallenged 
(Hickok 2009, 2014). One study using epileptic patients implanted with electrodes did 
recently find a subset of individual human neurons that responded both to action and 
observation, lending some credibility to homology inferences – but the regions 
investigated were not those commonly cited as belonging to the human mirror system 
(Mukamel et al. 2010)! 
 In short, there are reasons to be cautious about taking at face value studies or 
findings that purport to describe mirror neurons in human subjects. This is particularly 
true when it comes to claims that mirror responses enable “action understanding,” 
however that may be construed (Hickok 2014; see Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). 
However, the neurocognitive effects described above appear to be well-established (e.g., 
the involvement of the right temporoparietal area in social motor processing; Brass, 
Ruby, & Spengler 2009) and would, I think, be cast in no different light by a change in 
our theoretical perspective on the neurology of motor mirroring. For this reason, I submit 
that, although it is important to acknowledge the ongoing controversies regarding the 
interpretation of mirror neuron findings (Gallese et al. 2011), for our purposes it is largely 
immaterial whether there are individual mirror neurons, properly so-called, firing away in 
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these regions of the human brain or not. Whether we call them a mirror system, a 
perceptuomotor circuit, or something else entirely, the broader regions behave the way 
they are said to, and the neurocognitive effects turn out the way they are predicted to, in 
the contexts where researchers say they ought to. While the debates around mirror 
neurons – and some of the more wild-eyed promises that boosters have giddily made 
about them (e.g., Ramachandran 2000) – look to be enlivening over the coming years, I 
will therefore let them lie here. My framework holds whether its girders are made of 
mirror neurons, or merely of motor responses, and I hope that is sufficient.
3. The Mirror System during Synchrony
While most studies of synchrony have focused on the social and cognitive levels, a 
number of studies have produced compelling results by investigating the neurological 
correlates of synchrony. Because of the nearly intractable difficulties of neuroimaging 
during gross physical activity (such as marching in step), these studies have tended to use 
finger-tapping paradigms, in which audio cues are the main carriers of social information. 
Limiting periodic stimuli to the auditory channel may appear to render experiments less 
ecologically valid, since in real-world scenarios (such as soldiers marching together) both 
visual and auditory cues are obviously salient. However, audio-only signals have been 
found to reliably facilitate interpersonal synchrony in a number of experimental 
paradigms (Demos et al. 2011; Repp 2005). Indeed, the configurations of the human 
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audio and visual perceptual systems may be such that audio cues are, in some ways, 
superior when it comes to synchronizing and guiding motor actions; for instance, people 
are able to stay in sync with much faster beats when the stimulus is auditory than when it 
is solely visual (Repp 2005). We can thus tentatively accept that a good deal, though not 
all, of the relevant socio-motor dynamics for synchrony are captured through tapping 
paradigms. This assumption is strengthened by the notable overlap of cortical regions 
implicated in synchrony and those regions, detailed above, which drive social mirroring 
and imitation inhibition (Cacioppo et al. 2014; Decety & Chaminade 2003; Fairhurst, 
Janata, & Keller 2014; Stephan et al. 2002).
 This overlap is, however, one of reversal. Namely, the very cortical networks 
recruited for inhibiting imitation, mentalizing, and distinguishing between self from other 
are typically found to be in quiescence during high-quality interpersonal synchrony 
(Bijsterbosch et al. 2011; Cacioppo et al. 2014; Fairhurst, Janata, & Keller 2013). The 
qualification is crucial; when the beat is difficult to follow or when one is attempting to 
synchronize with an incompetent or unresponsive partner, the mirror regions of the brain 
are once again awakened (Stephan et al. 2002). It is only when all participants are synced 
up in a reliable, easy-to-predict, unified rhythm that the cortical regions responsible for 
socio-motor cognition are, it seems, allowed to go quietly offline. For instance, Ono, 
Nakamura, and Maess (2015) found that the inferior parietal lobule came online when a 
partner’s tempo noticeably changed during synchrony. Presumably, the partner’s tempo 
change activated a demand for explicit cognitive control – that is, conscious focus – in 
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order to re-establish the shared rhythm. Similarly, Bijsterbosch et al. (2011) reported that 
correcting for subliminal phase shifts during synchrony recruited only the cerebellum 
(responsible for coordinating basic motor control and movement timing), but both the 
right inferior parietal lobule and the frontal cortex were impressed into service when 
correcting for grosser, noticeable phase shifts. 
 Indeed, the more effort is needed to maintain synchrony, the more intensive the 
demand on the mirror or socio-motor system. Fairhurst, Janata, and Keller, for instance, 
(2013) found that when subjects subjectively experienced synchronization to be difficult, 
heightened activity was registered in the right inferior frontal gyrus and bilateral 
temporoparietal junction. Stephan et al. (2002) used a paradigm in which finger-tapping 
subjects attempted to synchronize with a computer that was programmed to produce 
progressively larger phase-shifted asynchronies (that is, to shift further and further out of 
sync from the established rhythm). At the lowest level of asynchrony, only 3% shifted 
from the baseline phase, the irregularity was not consciously registered, but activity in the 
right inferior parietal lobule increased as subjects subliminally adjusted their tapping to 
compensate. As the size of the asynchrony increased to the point of being consciously 
noticeable, activity in the right inferior parietal area also increased apace. Finally, at the 
highest level of programmed asynchrony – a 20% shift, quite noticeable – the inferior 
parietal lobule was recruited bilaterally, and prefrontal areas were activated as well. 
 Somewhat in parallel, Cacioppo et al. (2014) reported that synchrony, while 
activating the left inferior parietal lobule, deactivated the right, and also deactivated the 
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frontal cortical regions that Brass, Ruby, & Spengler (2009) identified as being 
responsible for inhibiting inappropriate imitation. These downregulated frontal regions 
included the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), which Cacioppo et al. describe as 
being implicated in processing information about social others; accordingly, this same 
region, the dmPFC, was activated during asynchrony.4 Cacioppo et al. summarize these 
findings as being 
what might be expected if interpersonal synchrony increases self-other 
overlap or egocentric information processing about the partner…When a 
synchronous, relative to an asynchronous, partner is assimilated to the self, 
it is the asynchronous partner who requires the most attention and 
mentalizing to understand and predict.
(2014, p. 855)
Taken together, these results indicate that the human mirror system may be progressively 
activated by interactions that require more and more attending to and responding to 
distinct social others. The level of activation of the mirror system during social 
interactions thus may constitute a rough continuum from 1:) relative suppression during 
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4 It should be noted that these effects were moderated by self-perception of synchrony and affiliation; 
subjects who indicated that they felt more “in sync” with their partners showed more activation in the 
dmPFC during asynchrony, and more deactivation during synchrony, than those who noticed less difference 
between the synchrony and asynchrony conditions. Similarly, subjects who reported the most affiliative 
feelings toward synchronous partners showed the most downregulation of the right inferior parietal lobule 
during synchrony (Cacioppo et al. 2014). 
“flow” synchrony, to 2:) greater activation during imitation of others; and finally 3:) 
highest cortical activity during execution of complementary actions that require strong 
self-other distinctions. 
3.1. Simulation and Prediction in Synchrony
If we zoom out briefly from this fine-grained neurological level to the more familiar 
terrain of phenomenology,5 we find that rhythmic synchrony indeed seems to induce the 
subjective sense of blurred boundaries between the self and other. I briefly mentioned in a 
footnote in the previous chapter, that in an important study by Paladino et al. (2010), 
subjects watched a video of an actor’s face being brushed rhythmically with a feather. 
Simultaneously, a real feather was brushed against their own faces, either synchronously 
or asynchronously with motion shown on the video. Subsequent to the synchronous 
brushing condition, subjects reported significantly greater feelings of self-other merging, 
as measured by the visual Inclusion of the Other in the Self Scale (Aron, Aron, & 
Smollan 1992; Schubert & Otten 2002); rated themselves as more physically similar to 
the actor; felt more interpersonal attraction to the actor; and were more swayed by the 
purported opinions of the actor on a task that involved estimating how many letters 
appeared on the screen. Additionally, subjects in the synchronous brushing condition felt 
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5 In philosophy, the term “phenomenology” entails a systematic investigation of the subjective contents of 
experience (e.g., Merleau-Ponty 1945/2002); in the current context, taking a phenomenological perspective 
simply means shifting our emphasis to focus on how synchrony feels and seems to people who undergo or 
observe it.
significantly more strongly that the sensations on their own faces were caused by the 
motions they saw on the screen. Such effects are not restricted to passive sensory stimuli; 
Fessler and Holbrook (2014) found that marching in cadence with others predicted 
significantly higher scores on the Inclusion of Other in Self Scale, while Lumsden, Miles, 
and Macrae (2014) obtained the same results from a manipulation in which subjects 
performed arm curls either in synchrony or in asynchrony with a model.
 It thus appears that the lines of evidence in both neurology and social psychology 
are reassuringly convergent: whether at the level of the brain or of gestalt selves, we 
distinguish less between self and other when performing or experiencing repetitive, 
identical, synchronic actions. But by what precise mechanism is this convergence 
achieved? The answer is likely to be found in the predictive function of the socio-motor 
mirroring processes we have outlined in this chapter. The internal simulation of motor 
acts that mirroring affords is thought to hinge on what Decety and Sommerville (2003) 
call efference copies of the perceived and planned motor acts.6  According to Decety and 
Sommerville, the perception or preparation of a motor command automatically generates 
an internal copy of the probable consequences of that command, which is then used as an 
afferent input for an ongoing model. That is to say, when our brains issue a motor 
command, they simultaneously produce an internal sensory prediction of what that motor 
act will look or feel like when completed. This internal prediction is then fed back into 
the overall internal model of the in-progress motor act (Hurley 2008). These predictions, 
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6 “Efferent” signals are those that are outgoing from the central nervous system (CNS) to effectors such as 
hands or fingers, while “afferent” signals are incoming signals.
known as “forward models,” are thought to be grounded in the neural substrate of the 
mirror system (Hove 2008). Following the initiation of an action, they generate an 
internal process of feedback and control, enabling the brain’s motor system to use internal 
simulations to dynamically correct and guide motor plans (Hurley 2008). This capacity 
for internal simulation greatly streamlines motor decision-making, freeing the brain from 
slavish dependence on actual feedback and enabling a more nimble process of action 
selection. However, the brain must of course also be able to assimilate external, non-
simulated sensory reports when its predictions are not corroborated. Thus, although
(a) control system with predictive simulation no longer need await actual 
feedback…(w)hen real and simulated results don’t match, a local switch 
can default back to actual feedback control while predictive simulations 
are fine-tuned to improve subsequent predictions. 
(Hurley 2008, p. 13). 
There are, of course, few situations in which the predicted consequences of one’s own 
motor acts are more likely to crash and founder on the shoals of reality than during flesh-
and-blood interactions with other human beings. If a partner and I are working on a 
scaffolding and, say, handing each other tools, it is crucial that we not rely mindlessly on 
our own happy simulations of the consequences of our respective acts. My partner might 
get a sudden cramp just as I am handing down a bucket full of tools, and in consequence 
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his hand might not be where my internal simulation says it should be; if I proceed with 
my original plan anyway, trusting the cozy reassurances of my mental model rather than 
the frantic warnings of external reality, I will drop the bucket into empty space, and the 
result is liable to be somewhat worse than someone’s cramp. Thus it is in dealing with 
fellow agents that we most heavily lean on our external senses, and keep most careful 
track of whether our own motor behaviors are on track for accomplishing what we 
intended them to.
 As such, one the best clues that we are dealing with another person rather than 
only with ourselves is that the actual consequences of an initiated motor act are different 
from those which our internal efference copy predicts (Hove 2008). If I see my own hand 
reach for a cup, and then observe my fingers clutch its handle at precisely the moment my  
internal simulation said that they would, I can be reasonably confident that it is my own 
hand I am in fact observing. However, even the most casual observation shows that 
predicting the precise timing and morphology of other people’s actions is impossible. 
Sitting in a café, one might watch one’s friend reach for her coffee cup, the visual 
perception of which instigates an internal simulation – an efference copy – which predicts 
the likely timing and consequences of that action. But then the friend might stop her hand 
halfway to its destination, maybe distracted by the need to emphasize a particular point 
with a gesture. This pause was not in our prediction; the sensory consequences of the 
motor act on which our mirror system was chewing have not been fulfilled. In this way, 
our brain is cued that we are dealing with a social other. This post-hoc discrimination is 
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necessary because, as common coding theory proposes and mirror neuron research 
suggests, recognizable motor behaviors are not represented differently at the base level 
according to their source. The grasping of a coffee cup activates the same neurological 
pattern in the brain regardless of whether it is oneself or another who is doing the 
grasping. We therefore rely on a somewhat downstream set of cues to determine whose 
agency is actually giving rise to the act. When this downstream source is muddled, our 
ability to discriminate between ourselves and others as agents is crimped – and absolute 
repetitive synchrony between our own acts and those which we are perceiving is just such 
a muddling. Hove explains:
If predicted and actual sensory consequences of an action closely 
correspond, then the action can be attributed to the self. …But when 
another’s movement is similar to one’s own in both form and timing, 
sensory consequences from the other’s movement overlap with one’s own 
movement prediction [that is, predicted efference copy] and therefore can 
render self-other attributions ineffective.
(2008, p. 29; emphasis mine)
In this way, the never-ending stream of predictions and online, constantly updated 
corrections that drive our motor behavior is the primary grist for the mill of self-other 
discrimination, at the neurological, the social-psychological, and the phenomenological 
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levels alike. When our internal motor predictions match the external sensory 
consequences of acts which we are observing, our brains are “tricked” into processing 
those actions as obviously belonging to us. 
 Practically, of course, the simplest way to establish an interactive scenario in 
which such crisp temporal and morphological convergence of predictions and 
consequences can be achieved is through shared rhythm (Hove 2008). Once a tempo is 
established, decisions to act can be automatically aligned across participants, eliminating 
much of the need for cognitive control – and for intensive social processing. By 
offloading the agency for the periodic choice to act onto the collective rhythm,7 
participants in synchrony establish an ongoing basis for achieving temporal and 
morphological alignment of their actions. Once established, this alignment demands little 
cognitive effort to maintain, unless and until someone falls out of rhythm – thus calling 
attention to himself and, by implication, his status as a distinct person who must be 
effortfully processed in order to accurately predict what he will do next. This context-
based variability in the need to expend energy for social prediction, then, explains the 
increase in mirror system activity and attendant socio-motor processing when synchrony 
partners are incompetent or become more difficult to sync with (e.g., Fairhurst, Janata, & 
Keller 2013). 
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7 The coordinative systems dynamics by which this process of establishing a rhythm is best modeled will be 
addressed extensively in the next chapter.
3.2. Rank and Hierarchical Distinctions in Synchrony
It is logically obvious, but calls for explicit mentioning regardless, that the social 
distinctions within groups based on rank or precedence are, clearly, a species of self-other 
differentiation. It is impossible to have a leader and a follower if there are no distinct 
persons to take on those roles. While high-quality synchrony appears to blur self-other 
boundaries, as detailed above, and downregulates the cortical networks responsible for 
mentalizing (Cacioppo et al. 2014), the establishment of synchrony can, in certain 
conditions, entail subtle leader-follower distinctions. For instance, when one partner is 
less skilled at maintaining a steady beat, the other partner may step up his or her signaling 
efforts, exaggerating movements and audio cues to help guide the other (Keller, 
Novembre, & Hove 2014). The specific neurologic effects of leader-follower roles appear 
to be a matter of some uncertainty; Yun, Watanabe, & Shimojo (2012) reported that 
followers in synchrony exhibited greater activation than leaders in the inferior frontal 
gyrus, but Fairhurst, Janata, & Keller (2014) found opposite results – that is, that the 
inferior frontal gyrus was more active in leaders – and additionally reported greater 
activity in the right inferior parietal lobule for leaders. While these apparent 
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contradictions must await clarification,8 a wider-angle view impresses us once more with 
the more general realization that both leaders and followers during synchrony must be 
necessarily socially different from each other. It is therefore to be expected that regions of 
the mirror system, recruited for social motor cognition and mentalizing in general, would 
be engaged by contexts in which roles were distinguished.  Moreover, in light of 
Cacioppo et al.’s (2014) report that social affiliation during synchrony apparently 
downregulates parietal areas of the mirror system, it is reasonable to expect that strong 
leader-follower distinctions should be negatively correlated with subjective quality of 
synchrony; that is, the more social roles are distinguished during synchrony, whether 
along leader-follower lines or otherwise, the less the self-other overlap effect can be 
expected to take place – along with all the prosocial and cortical consequences that 
follow. This prediction awaits empirical confirmation; regardless, it appears that the 
contexts in which leader-follower distinctions during synchrony have been documented 
thus far are limited to scenarios in which incompetence, different levels of ability, or 
other contingency renders the smooth establishment of a shared rhythm more difficult. 
Since extant work shows that increased difficulty of synchrony predicts greater cognitive 
load and more intensive awakening of the brain regions recruited for social processing 
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8 One possible reason for the discrepancy in these findings is that, in Yun, Watanabe, and Shimojo’s design, 
leaders moved their own fingers “spontaneously and randomly,” while followers were obliged to carefully 
follow and track those movements (2012), while in Fairhurst, Janata, and Keller’s work leadership was 
operationalized as having a feeling of influence over a dyadic rhythmic interaction (2014). In the latter 
design, leadership was an explicitly social thing, while in the former leaders were free to pay as little 
attention to the followers as they liked. This simple variation in the social demands of the subjects’ roles in 
their interactions could itself explain the different patterns of activation in socio-motor cortical networks.
and self-other discrimination, I think that the commonsense view should meanwhile be 
considered unproblematic: that smoother, more fluid, more all-absorbing synchrony – a 
really good drum jam, say, or a true soldier’s trance induced by cadence marching – 
probably entails blurring between leader and follower roles just as it does between self 
and other. Indeed, logically the two are overlapped.
3.3. Other Brain Regions and Processes Involved in Synchrony
It should be noted that other brain systems are, of course, also involved in synchrony, 
particularly a cerebellar network – including the basal ganglia – that underlies rhythmic 
motor entrainment and which overlaps with the frontal regions of the mirror system (Van 
Der Steen & Keller 2013). There is reason to think that phase correction recruits auditory 
and somatosensory regions, while period correction draws on the supplementary motor 
cortex (Praamstra et al. 2003). As mentioned in Chapter One, neuroendocrinological 
effects are also likely; Cohen et al. (2010) interpreted increased pain thresholds following 
synchronous rowing to indicate that synchrony stimulates increased production of 
endogenous opioids, while Zak (2013) has claimed that oxytocin levels are elevated after 
real-world synchronous dancing among Pacific Islanders. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Kokal et al. (2011) also found activation in the caudate, which is involved in 
reward processing, when subjects drum in an easy rhythm together. However, while 
acknowledging that synchrony is a complex social-cognitive process that recruits 
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numerous regions of the brain in different contexts, I have constrained my own theorizing 
to the frontoparietal motor-mimicry system for the sake of space and precision. It is, after 
all, this network that is particularly relevant for understanding the phenomenological 
experience of self-other overlap, which is of greater importance for the topic at hand than 
some other documented effects of synchrony (e.g., increased prosociality; see 
Wiltersmuth & Heath 2009). I pause only to note the importance of the reward system’s 
crucial involvement in synchrony – and the contingency of the caudate’s activation on the 
social fluidity and ease of the interaction. The neural rewards do not flow when one has 
to struggle to find the rhythm.
4. Conclusion
“In essence,” write Wheatley et al., “synchrony weakens the neural encoding of another 
person as a separate entity” (2012, p. 597). This chapter has outlined how this effect is 
achieved through a complex neurological process. In this process, efference copies of 
motor acts serve as crucial input for the brain’s higher-level cognitive discrimination 
between self and other. These efference copies, powered by a frontoparietal cortical or 
mirror network implicated in social motor processing, serve up motor predictions which 
are, during synchrony, neatly corroborated not only in one’s own actions but in those of 
others. Because periodicity is, across substrates, an booster of prediction (e.g., Rappaport 
1999), it is specifically rhythmic and repetitive shared motor acts that most easily enable 
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this convergence of prediction and consequence. As the rhythm becomes established, 
discrete choices to act become automatized, and the need to effortfully parse and predict 
others’ likely actions attenuates. Concomitantly, the frontoparietal network that drives 
socio-motor processing is comparatively subdued during smooth and easy synchrony, and 
awakened again when the rhythm is interrupted or when a partner proves difficult to sync 
with. Thus, both neurocognitively and subjectively, the practice of high-quality 
synchrony is marked by a gentle suppression of the experience of, and the neural 
grounding for, our promiscuous but careful everyday parsing of self from other – I from 
you, and indeed from everyone else.
61
CHAPTER THREE: DYNAMICS, SYNCHRONY, AND AUTHORITY
1. Introduction
I will introduce this chapter with an interesting bit of trivia. If you hold your hands out, 
make fists, and waggle your two index fingers at about the same frequency – say, one 
cycle per second – you will find it fairly easy to maintain a constant antiphase 
relationship between the two cycles. (In an antiphase relationship, the left finger reaches 
the apex of its waggle just as the right reaches its nadir, and vice-versa.) If you speed up 
the frequency of waggling past around two cycles per second, however, it will become 
increasingly difficult to maintain this antiphase state. Beyond this threshold, the two 
fingers gravitate rapidly into an in-phase dynamic, in which their peaks and troughs now 
coincide. Due to constraints in the fingers’ musculoskeletal configuration, 
neurophysiology, and shared motor control, at high frequencies the in-phase relation 
becomes the only stable state for the system.
 This phenomenon, first comprehensively described by Haken, Kelso, and Bunz 
(1985) and since deployed in an increasingly wide variety of biological and physiological 
researches, is a coupled oscillator system – a system in which periodically oscillating 
elements become entrained over time. The archetypal example of coupled oscillators is 
found in Christiaan Huygen’s 17th-century clock pendulum experiments for the Royal 
Society. When Huygens placed two heavy clocks on a single platform, their pendulums 
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invariably drifted into a stable antiphase relationship regardless of the configuration they 
began with, and returned to antiphase after being perturbed – with the coupling achieved 
through vibrations transmitted between the two clocks via their shared platform (Bennett 
et al. 2002). Similar coupled oscillators are common in physical systems, across a wide 
range of domains and scales, including orbital bodies, chemical oscillations, and the 
synchronization of firefly flashes (Néda et al. 2000; Strogatz 2003). Dynamic oscillatory 
entrainment is thus ubiquitous in the natural world.
 Humans, of course, are part of the natural world, and, being animals, many of our 
functions and behaviors are periodic, from sleep/wake cycles to respiration and yearly 
Thanksgiving migrations. We might expect, then, that at least some of the processes that 
define human behavior would be describable using the language of dynamic entrainment. 
And we would be right: as we have seen, humans are, in fact, constantly “syncing up” 
with one another, falling into orbits of mutually constrained periodic behavior through 
visual contact, adjusting our own schedules to match with our neighbors’ or loved ones’, 
and mimicking each other’s actions and rhythms of speech (Birdwhistell 1970; Condon & 
Sander 1974; Hall 1976; Lakin & Chartrand 2003; Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). 
Accordingly, a growing body of empirical research has shown that many of these shared 
behaviors, from postural sway during conversation to the emergence of synchronous 
applause in audiences, can be accurately modeled using equations originally formulated 
to describe networks of coupled oscillators (Frank & Richardson 2014; Louwerse et al. 
2012; Néda et al. 2000; Strogatz 2000). The study of the time-dependent evolution of 
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oscillatory social interactions comprises the field of social coordination dynamics 
(Ouiller & Kelso 2009). 
 The periodic behavioral phenomena investigated in social coordination dynamics 
are, of course, neurologically mediated, including by the temporoparietal and prefrontal 
“mirror” effects discussed in the previous chapter (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler 2009; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004; Tognoli et al. 2007). The potential for an integrated 
neurophysiological coordination dynamics is thus clear (e.g., Bernieri, Steven, & 
Rosenthal 1988; Cacioppo et al. 2014; Sacheli et al. 2013). However, neurocognitive (or 
“information processing”; Repp 2005) models of human motor entrainment are 
sometimes seen as competitors to the coupled-oscillator models of social coordination 
dynamics (Dale et al. 2014; Wagenmakers, Van der Maas, & Farrell 2012). Despite this 
ongoing debate, it is my contention that both programs appear to complement and shed 
important light on the other’s predictions and assumptions (e.g., Carr & Winkielman 
2014). The purpose of this chapter, then, is to describe human group synchrony in terms 
of social coordination dynamics and coupled oscillator networks, while leaving open 
points of contact with the neurocognitive research detailed in Chapter Two.
1.1. Immanent Authority and Synchrony
This chapter’s investigation will provide the necessary framework for introducing an 
important for my broader investigation: immanent authority. An immanent authority is 
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the top-down authority that a group wields over its members, specifically (in this context) 
during synchrony. Constraining individuals’ periodic behavior, a group’s immanent 
authority is also simultaneously the product of that individual behavior. The immanent 
authority concept is derived from dynamical models of synchrony, particularly their 
description of global states that, in emerging from local interactions, “pull” the entire 
system toward a collective synchronous behavior. Yet its implications extend far beyond 
coordination dynamics, into the territory of ritual and ritualization. This chapter’s 
investigation, then, affords a tight conceptual link between the spheres of religious 
studies and psychology – between the cognitive and religious dimensions of the human 
mind.
2. Self-Organization in Synchrony
The basic claim of coordination dynamics regarding social synchrony is that synchrony is 
a phenomenon of self-organization (Kelso 2012). In any system (physical, biological, 
sociological, etc.) comprised of many parts, self-organization is characterized (among 
other things) by the sudden appearance of novel, global dynamics upon the crossing of 
some critical parameter threshold, such that order emerges out of constituents’ 
interactions despite the lack of any central agent orchestrating the system’s behavior 
(Oullier & Kelso 2009). Importantly, in a paradigmatic self-organized ensemble, the new 
macroscopic features of the system are not linearly or proportionally reducible to the 
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behavior of its components, but instead are distributed across its entirety (Strogatz 2003; 
Thompson & Varela 2001). In a tornado, for example, the twisting mass of the funnel 
cloud is not a simple, additive combination of the trillions of trajectories of each of the 
pieces of debris that make it up. In part, this is because the violent global dynamics of the 
funnel itself are a constraining influence on the local trajectories of its components. In a 
self-organized system, then, you cannot simply measure the behavior of each of the 
constituents alone, add them up carefully, and produce a clean sum that describes the 
entirety. The behavior of such systems is described as nonlinear, because linearity would 
imply simple additivity.
 Importantly for our purposes, researchers from Winfree (1967) to Kuramoto 
(1984) and Kelso (2009) have postulated that, in coupled oscillator networks, the 
collective patterns that generate global synchrony obey similar general rules of 
dynamical and nonlinear self-organization. The sinusoidal coupling model of Yoshiki 
Kuramoto (1984) has been particularly influential. Kuramoto’s paradigm posits that 
networked limit-cycle oscillators1 undergo phase transition into a synchronized state 
when their mutual coupling strength passes a critical threshold (Strogatz 2000, 2003). 
Thus, the dynamics of coupled oscillator networks are thought to be commensurate with 
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1 A limit cycle is an oscillation that tends to “attract” patterns that exist nearby in two-dimensional phase 
space. This means that limit-cycle oscillators tend to self-regulate, returning to stable frequencies after 
being slightly perturbed. An example is the body’s circadian sleep-wake rhythm: after an all-night study 
session or a plane trip across many time zones, the circadian endocrine cycle is thrown out of whack for 
several days. But rather than remaining in its new, disrupted pattern forever, the rhythm soon settles back to 
its old (roughly) 24-hour cycle, reestablishing a normal sleep-wake routine again. See the discussion of 
attractors immediately below. 
those of other self-organized systems. Accordingly, formal theorems such as those of 
Kuramoto, based on models from physics and thermodynamics, have been extensively 
applied to biological oscillator networks, including groups of people clapping in time or 
rocking in chairs (Néda et al. 2000; Richardson et al. 2012; Strogatz 2003). 
2.1. Phase Transitions and Social Coordination Dynamics2
The usefulness of interpreting synchrony through the lens of coordination dynamics rests 
foremost on a number of observations and predictions set forth by Haken, Kelso, and 
Bunz (1985) in their seminal research on motor coordination. As outlined above, these 
authors discovered two basic stable configurations for rhythmic interactions of 
complementary digits (such as index fingers): anti-phase and in phase. (As rhythmic 
oscillators, fingers on different hands are coupled through the nervous system and the 
musculoskeletal system, just as Huygens’ clocks were coupled through their shared 
platform.) These two stable states were described by the relative phase relationship 
between the two digits:
1. Perfectly in phase: φ = 0º
67
2 Somewhat confusingly, the word “phase” is used in two different senses in this chapter. The first sense 
simply references the position of an oscillating pattern along its trajectory, or in relationship to another 
oscillator. See Footnote 3. The second sense of “phase” refers to the forms or states of matter (liquid, solid, 
magnetized, etc.) between which a body can undergo transitions (such as when a chunk of iron becomes 
magnetized). This second sense is relevant for our description of synchrony as a dynamical analog of a 
phase transition, in which the system switches from a less-ordered to a more-ordered state.
2. Perfectly anti-phase: φ = 180º 
Here, φ represents the relative phase angles between the two oscillators (index fingers).3 
Attractor states are states within the space of possible configurations of the system that 
exhibit particularly high stability, and into which the system is liable to be “pulled.” Once 
the system slides into one of its attractor states, further perturbation may not easily 
dislodge it. Haken, Kelso, and Bunz (hereafter, HKB) found that, of these two attractors 
(in-phase and antiphase), the in-phase, φ = 0º attractor was stronger.4 That is, it was 
somewhat easier to tap one’s two fingers in exact, aligned synchrony than in exact anti-
phase synchrony, although the anti-phase synchrony was itself easier than all the other 
possible arrangements. Moreover, φ inevitably collapsed onto the 0º value when the 
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3 The relative phase between two oscillators (φ) is defined simply: φ = θ2  – θ1, where θ = the simple 
phase of a single oscillator (Haken, Kelso, and Bunz 1985). That is, one oscillation is conceptualized as a 
full cyclic or sinusoidal revolution from 0º (0π) through 180º (π) and completing at 360º (360º= 0º, or 2π). 
Assuming that both oscillators have identical frequencies, or periods (ω), the amount of time it takes to 
complete a full cycle is the same for both. If, at a single moment, oscillator 2 has reached 270º (three-
quarters of the way through its cycle), while oscillator 1 has only reached 90º (one-quarter of the way), then 
the relative phase (φ) between the two oscillators will be 180º. The two oscillators’ phases are thus 
separated by half the total cycle, and so φ = 180º describes a perfect antiphase relationship between two 
oscillators.
4 The shape of the attractor basin that describes any given coupled-oscillator system depends on the specific 
features of the oscillators and the medium that couples them. Hence Huygens’s clocks coupled by a shared 
plank tended to gravitate to an anti-phase pattern, but for muscle effectors coupled by a shared nervous 
system the in-phase attractor is stronger. 
frequency was sped up past a certain critical threshold.5 As suggested above, then, 
bimanual coordination thus exhibits important features of dynamic self-organization – 
including the emergence of global order out of local patterns of interactions, and 
nonlinear breaks in pattern stability as input parameters (in this case, frequency) move 
across a critical threshold (HKB 1985).
2.2. The Order Parameter and Relative Phase Clustering
The concept of an order parameter is used widely in social coordination dynamics, 
including in both the Kuramoto and HKB models. In physics, an order parameter 
(conventionally, r) is a value that singly represents the amount of order within a system, 
ranging from r = 0 (totally disordered) to r = 1 (completely ordered) (Landau 
1937/2008).6 The concept was originally introduced for quantifying certain types of 
physical phase transitions, such as between demagnetized and magnetized states in a 
ferromagnetic material such as iron (Kleman & Lavrentovich 2003; Landau 1937/2008). 
For our investigation, the order parameter concept is of importance not only because it is 
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5 HKB specify in their 1985 article that this critical frequency varies by individual. However, Schmidt, 
Carello, and Turvey (1990) found that for interpersonal synchrony the 180º attractor becomes unstable, and 
phase relationships collapse onto the φ = 0º value, at approximately 1.4 Hz. This finding has implications 
for the discussion of my own results, since our subjects synchronized to a beat of precisely 1 Hz (I was not 
aware of Schmidt et al.’s 1990 findings at the time of experiment design). This matter will be revisited in 
Chapter 5.
6 To say that the order parameter “singly” represents the level of orderedness in a system is not to imply 
that this measure must be in relation to only one variable, but only that the total order of the system is 
summed, from as many variables or dimensions as necessary, into a single value.
widely used as a measure of synchrony, but particularly because it is posited to index 
attractor states in coupled oscillator systems (e.g., HKB 1985; Thompson & Varela 2001; 
Richardson et al. 2012). That is, once the order parameter of a coupled oscillator system 
reaches a certain level, the newly achieved “orderedness” begins to exert a pull on all the 
system’s components, creating a self-perpetuating loop that entrains the individual 
oscillators more and more tightly onto the collective rhythm. To discern why this is 
important, consider an uncoupled system – where the order parameter could be high, but 
would not constitute an attractor. For instance, if the pendulums of two clocks 100 yards 
apart were to swing simultaneously, their shared oscillations would produce a high order 
parameter (at least initially) because they would be “in time” with each other. But the two 
clocks would not be transmitting any vibrations to each other, so the order of the system 
would exert no attractor force on the behavior of the pendulums. In coupled oscillatory 
networks, the case is otherwise; due to the reciprocal coupling between oscillators, the 
achievement of order is “sticky” and exhibits system memory (hysteresis; see below).
 The choice of order parameter for any given system is somewhat subjective, since 
the system’s level of order is a global trait that can often be assessed only in accordance 
with phenomenological, or macro-scale, criteria (Haken, Kelso, & Bunz 1985; Landau 
1937/2008). (The emphasis on global rather than local traits is important for our analysis; 
we will return to this in Section 3.) For a ferromagnetic material, for example, the most 
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useful order parameter measures net magnetization.7 For patterned human interactions, 
coordination dynamics researchers generally select the relative phase or relative phase 
clustering between oscillators as the order parameter (e.g., Richardson et al. 2012; see 
Footnote 3). For the purpose of describing coupled-oscillator systems, the relative phase 
order parameter r parsimoniously represents “the collective rhythm produced by the 
whole population” (Strogatz 2000, p. 4). 
2.3. Measuring the Amount of Order in Synchrony
When measuring synchronization in dyads, researchers typically collect numerous 
instantaneous measures of the relative phase between the two participants, compute the 
mean of those measures to produce a timespan average, and then use standard deviation 
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7 The case of a ferromagnetic lattice is often used as a paradigmatic case study for critical self-organization 
in a physical system defined by a global order parameter (e.g., Ivancevic & Ivancevic 2008), and may be 
useful to outline here. In a ferromagnetic substance, the atoms are dipole moments with electric charges in 
unique orientations arranged at regular intervals in a three-dimensional lattice. The order parameter, then, 
measures the net magnetization of the body (Brokate & Sprekels 2012). At high temperatures (but, 
importantly, below the material’s melting temperature), the atoms’ magnetic orientations are random with 
respect to one another, and so the material has no net magnetic charge, and the order parameter ≈ 0. As 
such, the system is rotationally symmetrical, because the magnetic field at any given point in the system is 
the same as at any other point; there is no overall polarization or directionality. Net magnetization only 
appears when the temperature of the lattice crosses a critical threshold (i.e., the Curie temperature) below 
which the dipoles spontaneously begin to align and generate a magnetic field. Symmetry is now broken, 
because one end of the system has become the positive pole and the other the negative pole; the magnetic 
orientation of the body is no longer universally identical, but has acquired a configuration in which one end 
is very different from the other. With the breaking of rotational symmetry, then, the order parameter 
describing the system rises above zero. It is relevant that in the HKB paradigm, when synchrony snaps into 
φ = 0º rather than φ = 180º, this is also a form of symmetry breaking. The system is initially symmetrical 
with respect to probability of the phase relationship between the interacting periodic oscillators, since either 
state is potentially stable; but once an antiphase or in-phase synchrony is achieved, the system has lost its 
symmetry in regards to probability distribution. Symmetry breaking is thus a crucial feature of many 
examples of dynamic self-organization.
from the mean to capture the overall stability of synchronization (Richardson et al. 2012). 
Relative coordination, a similar measure, is assessed by plotting snapshots of relative 
phase between dyad members and then examining the plot for clustering. If there is 
disproportionate clustering around the 0º-20º region, this is a sign that the participants 
have tended to be in sync, though not in lockstep. Relative coordination thus refers to a 
partial or statistical trend toward synchrony, and is a useful measure for unintentional 
rhythmic coordination, such as when people unconsciously mimic each other’s body 
sway during conversation (Issartel, Marin, & Cadopi 2007; Schmidt et al. 2011). For 
groups larger than dyads, a phase clustering method uses a time-averaged Kuramoto 
order parameter to determine the amount of clustering between participants’ phases 
(Frank & Richardson 2010; Richardson et al. 2012; see below). 
3. Evidence in Favor of Dynamical Models of Synchrony
Social coordination dynamics has produced a growing body of research in support of its 
claim that the physical interactions between people are examples of self-organized 
oscillator systems. In a seminal set of studies, Schmidt et al. (1990) had pairs of subjects 
sit side-by-side and each swing one leg in unison with their partner, with instructions to 
maintain either an in-phase or an antiphase relationship while slowly speeding up their 
motions. As HKB previously reported with bimanual coordination, the antiphase 
relationship became unstable, exhibited critical fluctuations, and spontaneously switched 
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to the in-phase state beyond a threshold frequency. Moreover, this new state exhibited 
hysteresis, or a tendency to remain stable even when the system frequency was slowed 
back down again below the critical threshold. These characteristics are considered 
paradigmatic examples of a dynamic phase transition into a stronger attractor state. (See 
Figure 1.)8
Figure 1: Transition between Antiphase and In-Phase States with Hysteresis
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8 In the lefthand graph, the state of the system (represented by the black ball) is resting in the weaker 
attractor – the 180º antiphase relation. As the frequency increases, the 180º attractor becomes shallower and 
weaker (central graph), until finally the state of the system falls into the 0º state (righthand graph). 
Hysteresis occurs because the 0º attractor is so deep that, even if the system were returned to its original 
equation (i.e., back to the shape of the lefthand graph), the black ball would still remain in the deep central 
trench. That is, the system would remain in phase, even if the oscillation frequency dropped back and 
enabled the antiphase state to reappear as a potential attractor. Because of the shape of the energy 
landscape, the 180º attractor remains inaccessible to the system: a form of hysteresis. Graphs are 
screenshots from the graphing calculator website Desmos.com, using a graphing function of -acosx – 
bcos2x, taken from Haken, Kelso, & Bunz (1985). The ratio b/a is varied as frequency is shifted.
 Schmidt and O’Brien (1997) later found that unintentional interpersonal 
coordination displayed many of the same dynamics as intentional synchronization, using 
a paradigm in which dyads swung pendulums without any explicit instructions to 
synchronize. Paired participants spent half the time swinging without looking at each 
other, and half the time looking at each other while swinging but not otherwise 
interacting. Additionally, some subjects were given slightly longer pendulums than their 
partners. As predicted by the HKB model, relative phase clustering was found near the 0º 
and 180º attractors when subjects had visual information about each other, but not 
otherwise. Viewing each other, then, impelled subjects to unconsciously entrain their 
oscillations near either the in-phase or the antiphase states, with a stronger pull towards 
the in-phase dynamic. This effect was attenuated when dyad members each swung 
pendulums of different lengths – a finding also predicted by dynamical coordination 
models, which stipulate that differing intrinsic frequencies (detuning) will degrade 
coupling strength and obscure the weaker, 180º attractor. Note that these findings tend to 
confirm that “coupling” between human participants is achieved through sensorimotor 
and informational channels (Oullier & Kelso 2009). Just as Huygen’s clocks were 
coupled by vibrations sent to each other through the board they rested on, people become 
dynamically coupled because they can see and hear each other’s motions – which 
automatically activates imitative motor responses, as surveyed in Chapter Two (Hurley 
2008).
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 Richardson et al. (2007) reported similar findings in a paradigm in which dyads 
rocked in chairs with either identical or different masses (and thus natural rocking 
periods). Both the 0º and 180º attractors were found to be stable, but the 180º attractor 
was less so. As in Schmidt and O’Brien (1997), detuning (giving subjects chairs with 
different natural rocking periods) weakened coordination, but much more so for the 
intrinsically weaker antiphase attractor. In another study, subjects were given no 
instructions to synchronize but simply rocked next to each other while either looking 
away from each other, straight ahead, or directly at each other’s chairs. Unintentional 
clustering around the 0º attractor was found to be a function of coupling strength, as 
defined by the amount of visual contact between the two subjects; subjects were slightly 
more likely to show relative coordination around the 0º state when looking at each other 
peripherally than when looking away, and much more likely to cluster around 0º when 
looking at each other’s chairs. In this case, there was no clustering around the 180º state. 
The authors suggested that rocking chairs are less easily influenced by subtle 
sensorimotor effects than pendulums wielded by humans, which attenuates coupling 
strength and renders the weaker attractor inaccessible (Richardson et al. 2007). 
 As might be expected, these relative phase relationships between people can have 
important social signaling functions. Marsh, Richardson, and Schmidt (2009) used a 
rocking-chair paradigm in which dyad members either had direct or indirect visual 
contact with each other while rocking. The results revealed that subjects’ ratings of their 
dyad partners were significantly higher when greater visual coupling led to more 
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unintentional in-phase synchronization. Subjects also expected their partners to be better 
teammates on an upcoming word task when they had unintentionally synced. Drawing on 
a similar dynamical framework, Miles, Nind, and Macrae (2009) presented subjects with 
representations of dyads walking in synchrony (in a video condition, stick figures; in an 
audio-only condition, recordings of footsteps). Although all fictional dyads maintained 
complete phase-locked synchrony with each other throughout the stimulus period, the 
relative phase varied along a continuum from 0º to 180º. Asked to rate the dyads’ levels 
of interpersonal rapport, subjects showed a strong preference for the 180º and 0º 
attractors. That is, they thought that the “people” in the dyads had much better rapport 
with one another when their relative phases fell into an antiphase or in-phase relationship 
– despite the fact that all dyads were synchronous in regards to period. Thus, the two 
basic phase attractors identified by HKB appear to possess recognizable signaling 
functions, advertising coalition strength even when periodic synchronization is controlled 
for.
 These findings shed interpretive light on Schmidt et al.’s (2011) report that natural 
conversational interactions generate coupled postural sway dynamics, in which 
interlocutors sway subtly at the trunk while speaking or listening. These dynamics are 
characterized by relative rather than absolute synchrony, with phase relations between 
speaker and listener tending to cluster around the in-phase attractor. In-phase postural 
dynamics may, then, serve as a reciprocal signal of engagement in the interaction (see 
also Louwerse et al. 2012). Conversely, M. Wilson and T. Wilson (2005) proposed a 
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model of conversational turn-taking in which syllable production is governed by an 
oscillator dynamic entrained in antiphase between the two interlocutors, enabling 
conversation partners to avoid interruptions or prolonged silences (see also Dale et al. 
2014). Turn-taking in conversation has since been found to predict convergent patterns of 
temporoparietal neural synchronization in each participant (Kawasaki et al. 2013), and 
convergence of speech rate predicts prosocial behavior (Manson et al. 2013). In-phase 
and antiphase dynamical coordination patterns hence appear to offer clear windows into 
the quality of the exchange and rapport between interactants, depending on context.  
 The studies mentioned thus far have each focused on dyads – and indeed until 
recently nearly all work in social coordination dynamics was conducted on dyads (Frank 
& Richardson 2010). However, several recent studies have expanded the dynamical 
perspective to account for synchrony in larger groups. In the earliest such example, Néda 
et al. (2000) derived a Kuramoto order parameter to measure spontaneous synchronized 
clapping in Romanian and Hungarian theater audiences comprised of many hundreds of 
people.9 The researchers found that the audience members slowed their clapping period 
by nearly 100 percent when transitioning into the synchronized phase, which 
measurements and surveys indicated enabled better prediction and synchronization across 
individuals. While transiently stable, this synchronized state would eventually give way 
to disordered, faster clapping, and such cycles of synchronized and random clapping 
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9 Unlike in the U.S., in Eastern Europe it is common for audiences to synchronize their clapping after a 
performance to signal appreciation (Néda et al. 2000; Strogatz 2003).
would repeat several times in the same round – with the value of the order parameter 
rising whenever the average period slowed down.10
 More recently, Frank and Richardson (2010) and Richardson et al. (2012) have 
described and tested a paradigm taken from Kuramoto’s model of coupled oscillator 
systems to quantify synchronization in groups. Frank and Richardson used groups of six 
subjects rocking in chairs during conditions of 1:) eyes closed; 2:) no instructed 
synchronization; and 3:) instructed synchronization. As expected, tests for phase 
synchronization showed appreciable order parameter values for all conditions, but a 
higher value for the third condition. A t-test showed that this difference was significant; 
thus, the group of participants behaved as a coupled oscillator system in the intentional 
condition. A later study by Richardson et al. (2012) replicated these results and 
successfully extended them to measure individual-group synchronization (how closely 
synchronized a particular group member is with the group average) and within-group 
dyad synchronization (how closely synced any two members of the group are with each 
other). Richardson et al.’s results validated the use of Kuramoto techniques to model 
human synchrony, and indicated that “the interactions between all group members 
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10 Note that this is an example of slowed frequency instigating the switch to interpersonal synchronization. 
In contrast, in HKB-based dyadic studies, the transition to in-phase states is usually triggered by an 
increase in frequency. This contradiction is only apparent, because each of these two examples is actually 
approaching its synchronic regime from a different starting point; if the synchronized clapping were slowed 
down too drastically, synchrony would be lost due to a collapse of the rhythm’s predictability, whereas if 
HKB dyads sped up too much the participants’ central nervous systems would lose the ability to process the 
rhythm.
establish a ‘central’ group behavior that acts in turn as an attractor for every individual 
member” (2012, p. 8).11 
3.1. Limitations of Findings in Social Coordination Dynamics
 It will be noted that the group of researchers here cited is a bit small, and the 
results are useful and telling, but not comprehensive. Not all predictions drawn from the 
HKB model have been corroborated; for example, Kodama, Furuyama, and Inamura 
recently (2015) reported that both the 0º and 180º attractors are equally stable in a 
double-finger (that is, four fingers total) tapping paradigm. Moreover, mathematical 
analyses of the HKB model have found formal weaknesses even while supporting its 
general applicability (Leise & Cohen 2007). Until recently, Kuramoto-derived models 
were constrained by the formal assumption that population size N → ∞, which is 
obviously not applicable in the real world. The empirical testing of hypotheses taken 
from oscillator dynamics models to measure and predict human synchrony is thus still 
developing, as is the formalism of the mathematical models. However, these studies 
amply demonstrate that modeling human synchrony using concepts and formulae drawn 
from phase transition problems and dynamical many-body systems produces, at the least, 
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11 This Kuramoto technique does not examine HKB dynamics specifically, but only measures the amount of 
order in an oscillator system. However, in a non-experimental mathematical investigation, at least one team 
has shown that HKB effects can also be modeled in groups of N > 0 using both linear and nonlinear 
modeling protocols. Relevantly, the dynamics predicted by nonlinear models were “the most 
realistic” (Alderisio, Bardy, & di Bernardo 2015).
informative and predictive results. Groups of people quantifiably behave like coupled 
oscillator systems during synchrony – exhibiting the nonlinear phase transitions (e.g., 
Néda et al. 2000), attractor states (e.g., Richardson et al. 2012), and hysteresis (e.g., 
Schmidt et al. 1990) that are thought to be indicators of dynamical self-organization 
(Strogatz 2003). It thus seems clear that, while cognitive processes are certainly also 
involved in synchrony (e.g., Keller, Novembre, & Hove 2014), “keeping together in 
time” can quite usefully be described as a form of collective self-organization. 
4. Implications of Dynamical Models of Synchrony
Having surveyed the methodology and evidence in support of social coordination 
dynamics models of synchrony, we may now widen our field of vision, and consider the 
ramifications of such models for interpersonal hierarchy. To reiterate, during synchrony, 
self-organization 1:) emerges out of the sensorimotor coupling between participants; 2:) 
is not directly guided by a single executive; and 3:) is “sticky,” pulling individuals into 
novel patterns that are often different from their own preferred pacing or rhythms. 
Extrapolating from these traits, the key takeaway from social coordination dynamics is 
that, during synchrony, “The dynamics of our relations…acquire an autonomy of their 
own” (Laroche, Berardi, & Brangier 2014, p. 7; emphasis mine). The implications of this 
heuristic for hierarchy are, clearly, manifold. Most importantly, models of oscillator 
dynamics specify that, by definition, partaking in synchrony entails that participants must 
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transiently cede significant personal agency over their own motor acts. One must allow 
the collective rhythm to set the pace for one’s own clapping, drumming, or chanting; 
one’s period and phase cannot be guided by one’s own preferred pacing, but by the 
emergent pattern which is produced and maintained by the entirety. Otherwise, one is not 
in sync, and is thus tautologically not participating in the synchrony event.
 This point may be highlighted by describing human oscillatory interactions as 
synergies, or systems in which the component parts constrain each other’s behavior in 
reference to some global state or trajectory (Bernstein 1967; Dale et al. 2014; Haken 
1977). Appropriately for our purposes, the concept of synergy is typically used to solve 
problems of degrees of freedom. For instance, each muscle in the human hand is capable 
of extending or contracting in a wide variety of different ways, which makes the hand a 
very complicated entity. But when muscles are linked together into a synergy, each 
muscle’s actions constrain all the others’ possible trajectories – reducing the degrees of 
freedom in the whole hand and making it a more tractable system.12 Similarly, synchrony 
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12 Unfortunately, the word “synergy” has become a prime example of those irritating pop-science 
buzzwords that, having been co-opted by far more people than actually understand it (particularly 
management experts), is now practically a verbal badge of dilettantism. But synergy is, in fact, the crucial 
concept in a well-established research program for examining the efficient coordination of muscles 
(Bernstein 1967; Castellini & van der Smagt 2013; Torres-Oviedo, Macpherson, & Ting 2006). The central 
theory posits that, since muscle groups are very complex and have many innate degrees of freedom, the 
central nervous system may simplify things by activating an entire predefined group of muscles for 
carrying out a given task. That muscle group then carries out the rest of the task entirely on its own, such 
that the separate muscles mutually correct each other’s motions without further efferent input from the 
CNS. Evidence for this claim is fairly good; for example, recent findings indicate that shifts between gaits 
(i.e., between walking and running) can be triggered automatically by afferent information impacting low-
dimensional muscle synergies (Hagio, Fukuda, and Kouzaki 2015). Shockley, Richardson, and Dale (2009) 
have additionally found perturbations to motor effectors to be automatically corrected for, mid-motion, by 
other involved effectors, at timescales (c. 20-30 ms) shorter than would be probable if coordinated by the 
executive system.
reduces the degrees of freedom in the possible behavior of participants, locking down 
their motor acts so that the whole system – the group – can be described using far fewer 
terms than would otherwise be necessary (Dale et al. 2014). Thus, self-organized 
synchrony imposes a low-dimensional, general character on the otherwise highly 
complex and multidimensional behavior of a human group.13 Again, this reduction in 
degrees of freedom implies, by definition, a contraction of participants’ personal motor 
agency, so long as they belong to the group.
 For illustration, consider a group of ten soldiers – an approximate size for military 
subunits such as army squads (U.S. Army Field Manual 3-21.5, 2003). For each soldier, 
posit four channels of possible behavior – say, locomotory, postural, gestural, and facial. 
The resulting (highly idealized) system has 40 independent degrees of freedom (4•10). Of 
course, ten people interacting in the flesh would begin almost immediately to couple in 
various ways: shifting postures to match one another, mimicking gestures unconsciously, 
reflecting facial expressions, and so forth (Bernieri, Steven, & Rosenthal 1986; Carr & 
Winkielman 2014; Chartrand & Bargh 1999). Nevertheless, during everyday interactions 
individual soldiers would still behave with a high degree of independence, and indeed 
might tend toward complementary rather than identical matching – carrying out distinct 
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13 “Low-dimensional” and “high-dimensional” are terms that describe, roughly, the total number of factors 
needed to characterize a system. A weather pattern is an almost infinitely high-dimensional system. A single 
pendulum swinging is a very low-dimensional system. A common technique in physics for making 
massively complex systems tractable for analysis is to reduce their high-dimensional actual behavior to 
low-dimensional summaries or models that highlight salient features; the Landau order parameter, which 
summarizes the very complex behavior of a physical body undergoing a phase transition as a simple 
quantity of order, is one example of this tactic. 
coordinative acts in relation to each other, possibly with complementary rather than 
synchronous timing (Dale et al. 2014). The system would thus retain many degrees of 
freedom in day-to-day settings: if you wanted to comprehensively describe the behavior 
of the entire squad, you would need a lot of rows and columns.
 But then comes cadence drilling. Members of the squad fall in with their platoon 
and, at the command of the platoon sergeant, march in time at a speed of 120 steps per 
minute – with stride lengths prescribed at 30 inches, and precise positioning of trunk, arm 
angles, and hands similarly dictated (U.S. Army Field Manual 3-21.5, 2003).14 Faces and 
eyes are directed forward, and individuality of facial expression is forbidden (Ibid.). In 
this heightened state of full synchrony, the number of degrees of freedom in the 40-
dimensional system collapses suddenly to one: each of the behavioral channels identified 
above is now fully constrained between every individual (Dale et al. 2014). At the same 
time, the dominant phase angle between any two soldiers shifts to 0º. In synchrony, 
therefore, the system is no longer complementary and coordinative; rather, it is a phase-
locked synergy in which the behavior of any one contributor is fully constrained by the 
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14 A quotation from the U.S. Army Drill and Ceremonies Manual illustrates the sheer extent and detail of 
the stipulations: “On the command of execution MARCH of Forward, MARCH, step forward 30 inches 
with the left foot. The head, eyes, and body remain as in the Position of Attention. The arms swing in 
natural motion, without exaggeration and without bending the elbows, about 9 inches straight to the front 
and 6 inches straight to the rear of the trouser seams. The fingers and thumbs are curled as in the Position of 
Attention, just barely clearing the trousers.” (U.S. Army Field Manual 3-21.5, 2003, p. 2-2)
others. The collective shows a concomitant increase in the value of the order parameter, 
and a radical decrease in independent degrees of freedom.15
 Importantly, such low-dimensional group behavior is highly salient for observers 
(Miles, Nind, & Macrae 2009). Synchrony subjectively defines boundaries of groups and 
inspires assessments of entitativity, or shared identity (Lakens 2010). Hence it is this 
most subjectively salient feature of the collective – synchrony – that defines its 
boundaries and enacts its members’ coalitional identity, both as experienced by 
themselves and as assessed by observers. The participants remain distinctive in facial 
features, height, name, memories, and all the other individuating characteristics that make 
people unique. What is identical from person to person is one thing only: their shared, 
mutually constrained periodic behavior. However, this one thing happens to be the most 
subjectively salient feature of the group for both observers and participants at that time 
(e.g., McNeill 1995). As such, it is also what defines the bounds of the synchronous 
collective. Group synergy, then, does not reduce constituents to homogenous or fungible 
atoms in every sense; individual participants remain distinct persons. But those things 
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15 The overt role of leadership structures in a military unit may seem to undermine the claim that synchrony 
is self-organized. However, it must be remembered that neither the sergeant nor the lieutenant is the active 
source for the rhythmic organization of the platoon during actual marching. Rather, each soldier must 
attune her own phase and period to the rhythm of the collective, including constant updates and corrections 
(e.g., Konvalinka et al. 2010; Van der Steen & Keller 2013). It is this self-correcting, coupled behavior on 
the part of each contributor that generates the stability of the collective cadence and enables its auto-
perpetuation once the initial command has been uttered. In this way, the conceptual analogy with a muscle 
synergy becomes even clearer: according to standard models, the CNS transmits the executive efferent 
order to a synergy group, but the synergy itself then carries out the remainder of the action through self-
organized mutual correction and constraint between the interlinked muscles. Similarly, the NCO barks the 
order that initializes the march, but after that order the cadence and mutual coupling of the platoon must be 
continually organized from the bottom up by the soldiers themselves in an interplay of real-time,  corrective 
feedback, such that “no agent-like entity is ordering the elements” (Oullier & Kelso 2009, p. 8198).
that are distinct about them – their unique features, accents, personalities, genders – are 
temporarily reduced to perceptual insignificance, and the behaviors that generate the 
synergy – and thus define the collective – are elevated to the forefront of attention. Once 
synergy is established, then, the dominant behavior of the collective “cannot be reduced 
to individual-level contributions, but instead must be evaluated on the basis of the social 
unit” (Dale et al. 2014, p. 62). Synergy thus creates definitional and functional unity out 
of diversity by dynamically constraining the local freedoms of individuals.
4.1. Adaptiveness and Authority
Who, then, wields authority over the group during synchrony? Is there a conductor with a 
baton? Is a platoon sergeant bellowing out a marching chorus? In real-life contexts, there 
often may seem to be an initiator or a leader who sets off the rhythm and exerts 
disproportionate influence on the cadence, but in fact the answer is much more complex. 
Cacioppo et al. (2014), for instance, suggest three models for achieving synchrony: 1) 
orchestration, in which all participants entrain their motions to an external timekeeper, 
such as a metronome; 2) reciprocal entrainment, in which participants mutually entrain to 
one another; and 3) unilateral entrainment, in which one person’s actions influence 
others to synchronize, but that person does not reciprocate and continues behaving 
unilaterally. However, reciprocal entrainment is by far the most stable and robust of these 
strategies. From a neurocognitive or information-processing perspective, this is because 
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mutual adaptiveness to slight irregularities in period and phase are what enable people to 
produce smooth sensorimotor synchronization, flexibly adapt to subtle shifts in the 
ongoing rhythm, and nimbly update internal models (Hennig, Fleischmann, & Geisel 
2012; Keller, Novembre, & Hove 2014). Complementing this insight, dynamical models 
stipulate that mutual coupling between participant-oscillators is what leads to an 
emergent, collective rhythm (e.g., HKB 1985). Moreover, once synchrony arises, 
Kuramoto models formally describe each oscillator as being entrained specifically to a 
mean field of the collective rhythm (Strogatz 2003). A mean field is an averaged 
approximation of the behavior of the entire network;16 Kuramoto models entail that each 
oscillator is entrained to this average, not to particular neighbors; in human terms, this is 
like saying that each person is keyed into the whole beat produced by the crowd, not just 
to her nearby friends – and she is certainly not leading the whole. 
 An unresponsive, leader-only oscillator – in the sense of Cacioppo et al.’s (2014) 
unilateral entrainment or orchestration – would thus be an impediment, not a benefit, for 
collective synchronization. And indeed, Konvalinka et al. (2010) found that test subjects 
were able to achieve better synchronization with reciprocally adaptive human partners 
than with metronomes – despite the absolute predictability of the metronome beat.  
Assuming that synchrony “is facilitated by the mutual abilities to (a) predict the other’s 
subsequent action and (b) adapt accordingly on a millisecond timescale,” these 
researchers specifically tested to see whether a natural leader-follower dynamic would 
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16 Yet another low-dimensional summation of the high-dimensional behavior of a complicated system.
emerge in an audio synchrony task (2010, p. 2220). Instead, they discovered that both 
partners continuously adjusted their timing based on the most recent “tap” heard from 
their partner, updating their predictions after each cycle. Both partners’ taps orbited 
around each other, preceding and then succeeding the other in a binary oscillation in 
which both participants acted as a kind of “hyper-follower” to the other (Konvalinka et 
al. 2010).
 This is not to say that power imbalance during synchrony is invariably disruptive 
to the shared rhythm. If one partner is less skilled than the other, the more-skilled partner 
can rescue the synchrony by taking on a leadership role and exaggerating her motions 
(Keller, Novembre, & Hove 2014). It is simply that synchrony can be hampered or even 
rendered impossible if any participants behave too much like leaders or like followers. 
Most relevantly, leaders tend to be insufficiently adaptive, responding more to their 
internal triggers than to signals and variations in others (Keller, Novembre, & Hove 2014; 
Miyamoto & Ji 2011). Fairhurst, Janata, and Keller found that the quality of dyadic 
synchrony declined when leaders or pace-setters were too influential, and therefore 
concluded that “an effective exchange must exist” if synchrony is to be stable (2014, p. 
694). In a parallel study, discussed already in the previous chapter, the same authors 
(2013) found reduced activation in sensorimotor and interpersonal cortical circuits when 
a virtual tapping partner was ideally responsive (that is, not too much of a follower or a 
leader). The researchers interpreted these neuroimaging results to imply that an 
asymmetrical power dynamic imposes greater cognitive demands on partners during 
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synchrony than a symmetrical relationship does. If, as Wheatley et al. (2012) have 
proposed, the activation of the brain’s reward circuitry during synchrony is partly a 
pleasurable response to the sensation of effortless coordination, then it follows that the 
increased cognitive effort needed for synchrony between strongly asymmetric partners 
would tend to decrease subjective pleasure and, with it, possibly also the group bonding 
effects for which synchrony is best-known in social psychology (e.g., Wiltermuth & 
Heath 2009; see also Kokal et al. 2011).
4.2. Immanent Authority
Thus, the relationship of group synchrony to leadership structures is complex: “(g)roup 
synchronization (is) not hierarchical, but it (is not) always purely democratic 
either” (Strogatz 2003, p. 53). Synchrony is not mutually exclusive with hierarchy, and 
can in fact sometimes benefit from confident rhythmic “nudging” by a competent partner. 
However, too-strong leadership tends to degrade the quality of the generalized coupling 
between all co-participants, putting ugly kinks in all-important passageways of mutual, 
corrective feedback (Konvalinka et al. 2012). More fundamentally, however, very strong 
leadership during synchrony is incompatible with the dynamical models of coupled 
oscillator systems we have surveyed – the most useful of which axiomatically require that 
each oscillator can be influenced by others and/or by the emergent group-level dynamics. 
As Kelso writes, “The classical view of phase-locked synchronization prescribes that 
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each recruited element loses its intrinsic behavior and obeys the dictates of the 
assembly” (2012, p. 914; emphasis mine).
 Thus, the authority during true synchrony is not personal; it does not rest 
concentrated on a focal individual, nor does it emanate from some crisply defined center 
which announces the law unilaterally, like a policeman with a megaphone. Instead, it is 
spread across the entire nexus of the group, a distributed set of rhythmic parameters to 
which every member must cleave if she wishes to remain in the fold. This, as I indicated 
in this chapter’s introductory section, is immanent authority. In producing a collective 
rhythm – which may very well not match any single member’s preferred pace and pattern 
(Richardson et al. 2014) – the individual participants generate an emergent order which, 
because its dynamics are those of self-organization and hysteresis, becomes a strong 
attractor for the behavior of each individual. It is not merely an orderedness. It is notably 
a dynamically stable orderedness, an order that pulls participants’ individual rhythms 
continually back to itself in constructive self-perpetuation.
 Even more extravagantly put, an immanent authority is the active diffusion of 
coercive agency across the entirety of a social body; it is the collective order that is 
instantiated across the entire group, yet which itself comprises the emergent construction 
of individual productions and acts. When authority is immanent across a social body, the 
rank distinctions between individual people are subsumed within that immanence and 
thereby rendered unimportant relative to one another. Once a collective rhythm passes the 
threshold at which self-stabilization catches and roars suddenly to life, its own dynamics 
89
cannot help but dominate the intrinsic patterns of the participants who are generating it. 
The loop of self-corrective and channeling feedback between the individuals and the 
collective rhythm is thus continual and minutely pervasive. It engages everyone who 
participates in it. Crucially, if – by distraction or disinterest, say – someone falls out of its 
autocorrective loop, he tautologically falls out of sync and is therefore no longer engaged 
in the system – which is, after all, phenomenologically defined by the synchrony itself 
and by nothing else (Lakens 2011). 
 The existence of immanent authority, then, does not mean enslavement in terms of 
the choice to participate. As anyone can report, it is perfectly easy to stop clapping during 
a song, or to sit down for a break while others keep dancing. But when one does step out 
of the rhythm, one by definition exits the active system through which participants are 
engaged in the mutual production of synchrony. If enough people exit the system or lose 
interest, the synchrony of course dissipates into nothing, and group’s immanent authority 
evaporates with it (although the social effects of synchrony, such as increased empathy, 
can persist for hours). Such authority is paradoxically fragile, therefore, and vulnerable to 
shifts in its constituents’ commitments or interest. In this way it is oddly insubstantial, 
like a reflection. But when it is assented to, its dictates are determinative. The brute fact is 
that stable synchrony can only be produced by people who are, at least at first, mutually 
coupled – and after synchrony appears, those people must either remain mutually coupled 
or, if mean-field models are accurate, entrained and subordinate to the collective average 
rhythm. In consequence, entering into synchrony cannot help but demand the ceding of 
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personal authority over the rhythm, and over one’s own body. One chooses whether or 
not to join in; assent is conditional. But given that one has assented, one’s authority over 
period, phase, and rhythm are freely signed away, transferred to the emergent harmony of 
which each assenting individual’s acts are both producer and product. 
 In generating this kind of immanent authority, then, synchrony gestures toward 
what Seligman et al. (2008) have described as the basic action of ritual: the participatory 
creation of subjunctive or imaginal worlds. This ability to collectively generate novel 
states of affairs or agreed-upon realities that objectively do not exist before collaborative 
mental effort brings them forth is perhaps one of the defining features of humanity – 
particularly in its aspect as homo religiosus (Bellah 2011; Durkheim 1912/2008; 
Rappaport 1999). The relationships between social authority, individual agency, and 
participatory engagement in social regimes such as religions or nations are tremendously 
complex and fraught. With the postulation of immanent authority as the active connective 
tissue which is generated by, yet also guides and leads, collective rhythm, these 
relationships are directly evoked in our investigation of the dynamics of human 
synchrony.
4.3. Coda: Cognitivist and Dynamical Models of Synchrony
Following the discussion of authority in synchrony, it is fitting to punctuate this chapter 
by briefly returning to the clash between cognitivist and dynamical models of 
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sensorimotor social interactions. Evoking tensions of authority and agency, the cognitivist 
heuristic focuses on individuals and their autonomous information processes, while 
dynamical models emphasize collectives and their interactional influence over 
individuals (Repp 2005; Schmidt et al. 2011).17 For their part, dynamics advocates claim 
that their models parsimoniously overcome many of the intrinsic problems of 
representationalist or cognitivist “black box” theories, including obscurity and circular 
definitions of concepts such as internal models (Schmidt et al. 2011). Many also vaunt 
the domain-general nature of their posited mechanisms, suggesting that because 
dynamical models function equally well for describing groups of inanimate oscillators or 
human rhythmic synchrony, the cognitivist concern with internal mental modeling is 
unnecessary. Richardson et al., for instance, argue that rhythmic interpersonal 
coordination is “the result of the lawful relations that exist between the subcomponents of 
perceptual-motor systems, rather than a specific anatomical or neural mechanism” (2007, 
p. 869).18 On the other hand, many cognitive scientists criticize dynamical theories for 
being vague, failing to make useful predictions, and suffering from a sort of enthusiastic 
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17 This cleavage is a proxy example of the broader tension between embodied and representationalist 
schools within cognitive science generally, a debate we will not investigate at further depth here (Varela, 
Thompson, & Rosch 1991).
18 Cf. Shockley, Richardson, and Dale: “(C)ognition is not assigned a primary status and the phenomena in 
question are characterized in terms of broader physical principles…the dynamics of the coordinative 
structure emerge from the constraints imposed upon the coordinated units.” (2009, p. 313-14).
trendiness (Wagenmakers, van der Mass, & Farrell 2012).19 Nevertheless, despite these 
methodological and theoretical tensions, there is substantial overlap in methods, theory, 
and even authors between the neurocognitive and coordination dynamics research 
programs (e.g., Kelso 2012; Tognoli et al. 2007; Guionnet et al. 2012). The two 
perspectives are thus not necessarily irreconcilably opposed, and may indeed be 
complementary in some regards (Repp 2005).
 Appropriately, I will conclude this chapter with a hypothesis regarding the 
suppression of the autonomous self during synchrony that draws on both cognitive and 
dynamic models, and thus may illustrate some of these complementary possibilities. As 
discussed above, coordination dynamics researchers using mean-field models postulate 
that, during synchrony, participants become entrained to the global dynamics of the 
coupled system, rather than to the particular actions of neighbors (e.g., Haken, Kelso, & 
Bunz 1985; Kelso 2012; Laroche, Berardi, & Brangier 2014). Moreover, as we saw in 
Chapter Two, neurocognitive data suggest that the brain uses sensorimotor predictions, 
particularly in the form of forward and inverse models of planned and observed motor 
acts, to anticipate the consequences of actions and calibrate adaptive responses (e.g., 
Hurley 2008). It is generally thought that observed motor acts must be isomorphic in 
order to produce the “blurring” effect by which the brain is tricked into tagging the 
93
19 The brilliant title of Wagenmakers et al.’s (2012) paper summarizes neatly the problem of breathless, 
jargon-happy enthusiasm endemic to systems theories across many fields: “Abstract Concepts Require 
Concrete Models: Why Cognitive Scientists Have Not Yet Embraced Nonlinearly Coupled, Dynamical, 
Self-Organized Critical, Synergistic, Scale-Free, Exquisitely Context-Sensitive, Interaction-Dominant, 
Multifractal, Interdependent Brain-Body-Niche Systems.” 
observed act as self-caused, a process called “prediction matching” (Hove 2008). 
However, recall that, during synchrony, the phase-locked rhythm itself becomes 
particularly salient as a low-dimensional collective behavior that characterizes the group 
(Lakens 2011). It is plausible, then, that during synchrony, when the rhythm itself 
becomes the most salient feature of behavior, the brain’s internal criteria for prediction 
matching may become narrowed to focus on the single variable specified by the order 
parameter of the system: namely, the relative period and phase of the rhythm. The 
consequence would be that prediction matching could occur even when gross motor acts 
are different – as long as they are producing the same rhythm, which the brain both 
predicts and finds precisely matching its predictions. Hence, if the period and phase of 
the rhythm are the determinators of the collective order and thus the salient features of 
everyone’s behavior, the brain could experience prediction matching no matter by which 
sensory modality the rhythm arrives.
 By way of example, consider a drummer who, while slapping out the time with 
her hands, simultaneously sees a dancer move his right foot. The dancer moves his foot 
precisely when the collective rhythm dictates a downbeat, which is also precisely when 
the drummer slaps with, say, her left hand. Hove (2008) postulates that “self-other 
blurring” should result from clean correspondence between internal sensory predictions 
and externally perceived acts (prediction matching), because precise temporal and 
morphological matching is one of the brain’s clearest cues that an observed act is self-
caused. However, the possibility that participants in synchrony become predictively 
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attuned to the period and phase of the rhythm itself to the exclusion of other input factors 
raises the possibility that, despite the gross morphological distinctions between these two 
motor acts, the drummer may nevertheless experience this “self-other blurring” based on 
the sheer temporal matching between her own drumming and the dancer’s footwork.
 If corroborated, this hypothesis would enable coordination dynamics theories to 
apply to many more ecologically valid scenarios than would models of synchrony that 
insist on strict somatic and motor isomorphism between performers. For instance, the 
drummer/dancer example above is drawn from Radcliffe-Brown’s (1922) description of 
the Andaman Islanders’ village dance, in which men and women perform different roles, 
with men doing a shuffle-dance and women generally sitting on the ground slapping their 
thighs in rhythm. If each participant’s internal predictive coding apparatus is keyed into 
the rhythm itself – the global behavior most usefully captured by a system-wide order 
parameter when participants are modeled as coupled oscillators – then (to shift the 
example’s perspective) a dancing man who glances at the line of drumming women may 
experience significant levels of motor prediction matching, leading to affective self-other 
blurring, despite the gross differences in the actual motor acts being performed by men 
and women respectively. Since the great majority of ecologically valid examples of group 
synchrony feature some level of morphological distinction between the periodic acts 
performed by human participant-oscillators (such as dancing in time but with different 
steps, drummer/dancer role specialization, or playing different instruments during a jam 
session), such a finding would greatly enhance the applicability and usefulness of the 
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models surveyed in this chapter and in the relevant literature. I am not aware of any 
specific tests of this hypothesis, but a number of studies have shown clearly that pure 
auditory rhythm is easily processed as a social signal (e.g., Launay, Dean, & Bailes 
2014), while the tapping literature (e.g, Fairhurst, Janata, & Keller 2014) demonstrates 
that auditory cues are quite sufficient to drive social synchronization dynamics. Given the 
extent to which the collective rhythm is described by coupled-oscillator models as 
dominating (even “enslaving”) the individual behavior of participants, it seems a prima 
facie reasonable prediction that mutual conformity to a shared rhythm could engender 
self-other blurring even when participants use different motor acts to produce the beat. In 
real life, the collective rhythm is often the only thing that tangibly unites the participants.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RITUALIZATION AND STRUCTURE
1. Introduction
In the second paragraph of the American Declaration of Independence, readers are treated 
to one of history’s most powerful expressions of the Enlightenment values of equality and 
autonomy: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.” 
Jefferson’s prose still stirs two centuries later, and most modern readers emphatically 
agree with the egalitarian sentiment it expresses. This chapter, however, takes as its 
starting point the uncomfortable truth that Jefferson’s noble vision is not reality, but an 
ideal. Objectively, people are not equal, at least not in terms of quantitative outcomes in 
spheres such as economics, academics, politics, athletics, wealth, talent, or happiness (not  
to mention luck). These hierarchical distinctions are, we will see, in fact inevitable under 
the competitive dynamics of evolution, inasmuch as individual members of any 
community must, as co-residents of the same niche, conflict in their fitness or personal 
mandates – even as they collaborate to produce the shared goods of society (e.g. Turner 
1969; Boehm 1999). Jefferson’s quote, then, highlights a rupture between ideals and 
reality: we often desire equality, but we cannot realistically get it. 
 Far from being unique to post-Enlightenment Western societies, this tension is 
ubiquitous across cultures, particularly at the interpersonal (as opposed to systemic or 
organizational) level (Boehm 1999). The negative emotional and practical consequences 
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of being socially dominated are severe (e.g., Marmot et al. 1997), and it is likely due to a 
desire to mitigate these consequences that most small-scale groups (including peer groups 
in complex societies) work to internally suppress the most extreme forms of hierarchy at 
the interpersonal level (e.g., Cashdan 1980; A. Fiske 1991). In this context, I will argue 
that many expressions of our egalitarian impulses take the form of what Victor Turner 
(1969, 1974) calls communitas, a social mode – often produced through ritual – in which 
the competition and strife that characterizes ordinary life in structural hierarchy is 
temporarily abandoned, giving rise to the possibility of undifferentiated social unity. 
Communitas thus makes possible the experience of social equality in all societies, but 
only at transient intervals. It is, indeed, inextricable from structure and hierarchy, and 
structure must always reestablish itself following the appearance of communitas (Turner 
1974). The ideal of equality and unity is, then, not a pipe dream – it can be and is 
regularly made manifest – but it can never be permanently established. 
 This unresolvable tension opens the door to ritual and ritualization. Theorists of 
ritual have long claimed that, across societies, people respond to a persistent gap between 
ideals (e.g., equality) and recalcitrant reality (e.g., ubiquitous inequality) by practicing 
rituals whose psychosocial purpose is the shared negotiation of the affective tension 
between how things ought to be and how they actually are (Seligman et al. 2008; Smith 
1992). This process is, of course, particularly effective when the ritual tangibly realizes 
the very ideals it is meant to uphold (Bell 1992). Consider, then, synchrony represents 
equality and unity by in fact being those very things. As the previous two chapters have 
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argued, the basic cognitive and dynamical features of rhythmic group synchrony tend 
automatically to elide subjective self-other boundaries and suppress ranking distinctions 
among co-participants. These features suggest that, even at the basic levels of 
neurophysiology and behavior, synchrony produces a tangible but temporary state of 
irrefutable, experienced social equality – thus physically enacting a moral ideal of 
“equality/unity.” As such, I will argue that synchrony constitutes a robust, cross-cultural 
ritual tool for negotiating tensions that have to do with hierarchy, equality, and unity.
 What implications does this heuristic have for the concept of ritual and for 
religious studies? Anthropologist Roy Rappaport (1999) has argued that this “cozying 
up” between signifier and signified is a crucial feature of all human ritual. Following this 
line of reasoning, I will argue that synchrony as a ritualized act is profoundly illustrative 
of Rappaport’s claim that ritual relies more on tautological demonstrations than on 
semiotically arbitrary symbols (Peirce & Hoopes 1991). After all, synchrony cannot be 
anything other than what it is – namely, people moving or acting together in time, 
according to a shared rhythm which unites their motor behavior and expressions into a 
dynamic expression of corporate unison. This chapter, then, will constitute an 
investigation of the tension-ridden relationship between hierarchy, communitas, and 
synchrony, with particular attention paid to synchrony as an example of ritualized 
signaling in light of Rappaport’s system. For this discussion, I will draw especially on 
Christopher Boehm’s (1999) discussion of the ethology and evolution of human social 
hierarchies and on the anthropologies of Rappaport (1999) and Victor Turner (1969; 
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1974). These theorists’ works will form the girders of a systematic argument that, in 
nearly every human group, the profound tensions between varying ideals of equality and 
the reality of inequality are soothed and reconciled particularly through ritual that 
includes synchrony as an enacted demonstration of the ideal of unity and equality. 
2. Human Ethology and Social Hierarchies
Ethnographic, ethological, and political data are in agreement: it is in fact emphatically 
not self-evident that all men (or all people) are “equal.” The plain fact is that, everywhere 
our species is found, Homo sapiens forms some variety of hierarchies and ranks – a 
behavior we share with other primates and, in fact, with most of the animal kingdom 
(e.g., Boehm 1999; Kraus, Tan, & Tannenbaum 2013; Mazur 2005). From holding eye 
contact with a potential rival (or comrade – they are often the same) to the lifelong 
negotiation of the stresses of authority and deference in relation to children, work 
colleagues, political rivals, or romantic partners, ranking – determining the proper order 
of “dominance and deference” (Mazur 2005) – is as basic to human social behavior as 
laughing or shared meals.
 The matter is made more complex, to be sure, by the symbolic and ritualized 
means by which humans go about working out our complex pecking orders (Rohde 
2001). Mazur (2005) compellingly describes the sheer politeness that characterizes much 
human ranking – politeness that takes into account the expectations that apply to broader 
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social roles (elders and professionals receive deference; children usually don’t), 
socioeconomic class, and even physical location. We may act deferentially to a friend 
when visiting at her house – putting her in the high-status position – and be deferred to 
when friends visit us at ours. A crucial feature of our species-typical ranking behavior is, 
then, the subtlety by which humans accomplish much of our rank ordering (Mazur 2005). 
This subtlety can make it seem as if ranking is a relatively insignificant portion of human 
affairs, but it is anything but (Hawley 1999).
2.1. Varieties of Hierarchy
A typology of hierarchies will help us tabulate this omnipresence of inequality in human 
life. Mazur (2005) describes three distinct versions of social hierarchy, the first of which, 
a “dominance hierarchy,” is analogous to a pecking order in an animal group. 
Operationally identical to what social psychologists term “sociometric social 
status” (Jiang & Cillessen 2005), dominance status in Mazur’s schema is in-person and 
small-scale, and it emerges from the competitive dyadic interactions of group members. 
In most nonhuman animals these competitive interactions are “agonistic,” or hostile with 
the potential for physical altercation (Huhman 2006). But in humans they may be 
negotiated through varying layers of social protocols, rendering the competition less overt  
or even eliminating the strictly competitive aspect entirely from particular interactions, as 
when a young man defers voluntarily to an elder out of respect (Mazur 2005). 
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Nevertheless, the basic motivator for competition still obtains: that is, in nearly every 
group, higher-ranked people get more of what they want, just as in a chimpanzee group 
the dominant male secures preferential access to mates and food. Dominance hierarchies 
thus entail “a fairly persistent, unequal ranking of members in terms of power, influence, 
and access to valued prerogatives” (Mazur 2005, p. 7). 
 Mazur further defines “official hierarchies,” which are larger in scale than in-
person dominance hierarchies and supported by formal social or organizational structures. 
This is an essentially Weberian category, best exemplified by the formal authority 
wielded by structural superiors in complex organizations such as bureaucracies. Finally, 
“socioeconomic hierarchies” form the meta-structure of large-scale social hierarchies, 
sorting entire classes of people by occupational prestige, income, education, and political 
influence. One’s position across different hierarchies is often convergent; a physician is 
typically high on the socioeconomic ladder, she often holds significant official authority 
in her workplace, and among casual acquaintances she may be the recipient of others’ 
deference due to her social and occupational status (e.g., Kraus, Tan, & Tannenbaum 
2013).1
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1 Of course, high position in one level of hierarchy cannot guarantee high position in others. Our 
hypothetical doctor could be high-ranked socioeconomically and in her work setting, but relatively low-
ranked in her personal circle of professional friends (all of whom share her equivalent socioeconomic and 
organizational ranks). Since it is typically dyadic relationships that give rise to the emergent structure of an 
in-person dominance or sociometric hierarchy, any given combination of personalities, body sizes, gender, 
etc., can produce a completely different relative ordering of individuals (Mazur 2005). The convergence 
across levels of hierarchy toward equivalent statuses is therefore only probabilistic, not deterministic, and 
highly influenced by context.
2.2. Social Competition and Defeat: Why Humans Resent being Dominated 
Having thus far conflated dominance hierarchies with sociometric hierarchies, I should 
now distinguish them conceptually. Henrich and Gil-White (2001) have argued 
convincingly that interpersonal hierarchies may be based either on dominance or prestige. 
A dominance hierarchy is based on true agonistic competition: intimidating, bullying, or 
outmaneuvering others. This sort of agonistic dynamic characterizes male chimpanzee or 
baboon hierarchies, in which rank promotion is based on competitive (often ritualized) 
pairwise interactions (Boehm 1999). A prestige hierarchy, on the other hand, is based on 
esteem and conferred respect; those with high status are typically those who are seen as 
the most generous, competent, socially skilled, patient, self-sacrificial, or prosocial, and 
others freely defer to them and accept their leadership accordingly (see also Boehm 1999; 
Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich 2010). Because it parses important distinctions relevant for this 
discussion, I will accept Henrich’s and Gil-White’s (2001) usage and will reserve the 
term “dominance hierarchy” for agonistic, competitive social status arrangements in 
small-scale settings. In place of what Mazur (2005) terms “dominance hierarchy,” I will 
instead use the general term “sociometric hierarchy,” which refers simply to the in-
person, local-level structure of relative social status in interpersonal groups, no matter 
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how those relative ranks are achieved (Anderson et al. 2012). Thus, both dominance and 
prestige hierarchies are subtypes of the general category of sociometric hierarchy.2 
 This more fine-grained typology captures crucial affective tensions in people’s 
experience of interpersonal status networks, between the beneficial and socially 
destructive aspects of hierarchy (e.g., Anderson & Willer 2014). Prestige hierarchies are, 
for instance, beneficial for a variety of social and problem-solving purposes (e.g., Willer 
et al. 2012). Indeed, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) postulate that prestige hierarchies 
play a key role in human evolution, facilitating the transfer of important information 
through social networks via preferential mimicry of “popular” or high-status paragons. 
This benign aspect of esteem-based hierarchies enables high-prestige individuals to serve 
as living storehouses for information, knowledge, and skills, thereby benefiting the 
groups or communities in which they live (Henrich & Gil-White 2001). There is little 
doubt that, for subordinates, such prestige hierarchies are subjectively preferable to their 
dominance-based counterparts. Prestige hierarchies afford greater personal autonomy 
and, since higher-ups maintain their status through social protocols and expertise rather 
than dominance tactics, subordinates in such hierarchies face lower chances of being 
coercively or physically dominated (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich 2010). 
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2 Willer et al. make an analogous distinction between “power inequalities” and “status hierarchies,” in 
which “(p)ower inequalities are coercive, based on relative control over resources, whereas status 
hierarchies are based on collectively endorsed conceptions of merit” (2012, p. 355). While this social 
psychological typology is useful, I see no particular merits above Henrich’s and Gil-White’s (2001) 
formulation, and indeed the latter offers an evolutionary framework I find more appropriate for the current 
investigation. 
 However, prestige hierarchies are no exception to the rule that high status offers 
disproportionate benefits to its incumbents – and, thus, ample opportunities for socially 
and psychologically disruptive emotions such as envy, scorn, and selfish ambition 
(Anderson & Willer 2014; S. Fiske 2010; Kim & Glomb 2014). In terms of access to 
valued resources and prerogatives – including autonomy, respect, mates, and information 
– high rank is high rank (Hawley 1999). For instance, high-prestige leaders tend to 
receive gifts and deference from subordinates (McNamara and Trumbull 2007). High-
status people enjoy greater levels of cortical dopamine type 2/3 binding, suggesting that 
they may be more responsive to positive stimuli (Martinez et al. 2011). And 
tautologically, since they are central to their own social networks, high-status people also 
benefit from greater social support and social capital (Ibid.). 
 Meanwhile, the drawbacks of low status can be dramatic. At the psychological 
level, low sociometric status globally predicts low subjective well-being (Anderson et al. 
2012).3 At the physiological stratum, socially subordinated humans and other social 
animals exhibit a well-documented social defeat response that triggers reduced affect, 
disrupted circadian function, suppressed activity, and other behavioral and affective 
symptoms characteristic of depression (Denmark et al. 2010; Huhman 2006). It has been 
hypothesized that this social defeat response may play an etiological role in some forms 
of clinical depression and other psychosocial disorders (Rohde 2001). Moreover, social 
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3 Importantly, to assess subjects’ sociometric status, Anderson et al. used survey items that did not invoke 
dominance or being dominated, but only inquired about being “respected” or having influence in their peer 
groups, workplace, or families (2012). Low social status need not arise from being bullied or dominated in 
order to provoke aversive emotional responses.
subordination – particularly when long-term or chronic – appears to boost individuals’ 
odds of all-cause mortality and physical morbidity (Marmot et al. 1997). Finally, holding 
power and social status has been shown to predict reduced empathizing, less social 
awareness, reduced helping, and more instrumental treatment of lower-status others (S. 
Fiske 2010; Lammers et al. 2012; Miyamoto & Ji 2011). Being on the receiving end of 
such dismissiveness is clearly not pleasant (Boehm 1999). Even well-deserved 
sociometric status – such as that awarded in a benign prestige-based hierarchy – can thus 
motivate competitive instincts that generate hostility and suspicion, as one of Richard 
Lee’s informants among the rigorously egalitarian !Kung San confirms:
When a young man kills much meat, he comes to think of himself as a 
chief or big man, and he thinks of the rest of us as his servants or inferiors. 
We can’t accept this. 
Lee 1979, p. 246
  Although not all of these examples are strictly limited to prestige hierarchies 
(Marmot et al.’s work, conducted among British civil servants, is most directly applicable 
to organizational and socioeconomic hierarchies in Mazur’s terms), they collectively 
demonstrate that there are numerous ways in which low social status takes a serious toll 
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on the subordinated and thereby inspires resentment.4 Indeed, from a biological 
perspective there is a literal fitness cost to being low-ranked; in general, the higher up the 
social ladder a person is, the better are her current overall odds for survival and a thriving 
progeny (Ellis 1995; Gurven & von Rueden 2006). Boehm (1999) draws on this logic to 
explicitly argue that social hierarchies emerge, at the most fundamental level, from the 
competitive striving that sorts individuals by relative fitness indicators.5 Our affective 
states, meanwhile, are powerfully influenced by fitness-related information, serving as 
instantaneous feedback regarding our probable chances of biological success (Neuberg, 
Kenrick, & Schaller 2011; Rohde 2001). For hypersocial humans – dependent on each 
other for nearly all our basic material needs – social acceptance and esteem are crucial for 
survival, and therefore social marginality is an emotionally devastating prospect (Emery, 
Clayton, & Frith 2008). Social subordination or social defeat, then, is severely distressing 
in part because it is a warning indicator of genuine biological threat, since one’s position 
in the social hierarchy is a rough instantaneous index – a first derivative, as it were – of 
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4 Hence the entire tradition of Marxist and critical theory, as well as countless political revolutions.
5 It should be noted that “fitness” is not a unitary concept. There is no “most fit” set of human phenotypes. 
What Boehm means is simply that individuals of the same species who occupy the same socio-physical 
niche will be in competition with each other for the resources which that niche offers, and the relative 
success each individual experiences will correlate with her position in the social hierarchy that emerges 
from that competition. Thus, “human political nature…is inextricably involved with maximization of 
fitness” (Boehm 1999, p. 41; see also Hawley 1999).
our likely fitness (Björkqvist 2001; Gilbert et al. 2002; Price et al. 1994).6 In sum, then, it 
is no surprise that – at baseline, across cultures and eras – humans intensely dislike being 
interpersonally dominated. Clearly, there is a real cost to being low-status, and hence a 
suite of compelling motivations to avoid subordination – even in many otherwise benign 
prestige hierarchies.7
2.3. Reverse Dominance Hierarchy
High social status at any level, including even high prestige status, thus offers rewards 
that can – and do – motivate competitive striving (Hawkes, O’Connell, & Jones 2001). 
Ethnographic records support this claim, offering plentiful accounts of leaders (typically, 
but not always, young men) who, upon achieving a certain level of interpersonal prestige 
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6 It should not be necessary to point out that this does not mean that every person of high status will have 
more children than every person of low status, or that my point is somehow refuted by the relatively low 
fertility rates of the high socioeconomic classes in developed countries compared with lower or working 
classes (particularly since evidence suggests that lower fertility enables higher investment in each child in 
wealthy milieus; see Mace 2008). The point is not that high social status guarantees Darwinian success. 
Nothing guarantees Darwinian success. The point is instead that, as animals whose intrinsic motivations are 
profoundly influenced by biological and evolutionary contingencies as well as by culture and context, we 
generally receive affective rewards from achieving ends that are probabilistically related to fitness. High 
status is one of those ends. Evolution and evolutionarily derived motivations (such as instincts) operate, as 
always, in terms of likelihoods, not particularities. Thus “biology” does not determine social behavior or 
motivations, but is clearly highly relevant for it (Mazur 2005).
7 This summary by Kraus, Tan, and Tannenbaum could just as accurately be applied to humans: “Rank is a 
fundamental process in mammalian social life. Among nonhuman animals, rank is well defined in display 
behavior… is negotiated in contests for social dominance, and has important outcomes for health and well-
being… In stable hierarchies within nonhuman species, low-ranking individuals tend to have reduced 
access to group resources and to show higher levels of chronic stress, measured by levels of blood plasma 
glucocorticoids. In contrast, high-ranking nonhumans tend to enjoy…increased reproductive 
opportunities” (2013, p. 82).
through legitimate means such as hunting skill or generosity, become drunk with power, 
and start attempting to actively dominate others – to usurp more than their share of social 
influence and the benefits that accrue with it (Boehm 1999; Lee 1979). Every local 
community of friends, tribespeople, or colleagues with egalitarian aspirations is thus 
obliged to be vigilant against this threat, and to sanction – through mockery, disapproval, 
or more forceful means – against domineering individuals (Cashdan 1980; Woodburn 
1983, 2005). 
 The clearest conceptual articulation of this state of affairs is found in reverse 
dominance hierarchy theory (Boehm 1999). In propounding this theory, Boehm argues 
that political egalitarianism, characteristic of many forager societies, is a difficult, high-
energy state that must be endlessly worked for and guarded by moral communities that 
are highly motivated to avoid despotism. As surveyed above, humans share with our 
nearest phylogenic relatives (chimpanzees and bonobos) a despotic default social form, in 
which privileges and prerogatives are typically jealously guarded by dominant 
individuals at the expense of lower-ranked subordinates (Ibid.). Boehm’s pivotal claim is 
that, in most forager and many tribal cultures, the lower-ranked subordinates “gang up” to 
invert this despotic structure, effectively blocking the would-be alpha individuals from 
achieving total dominance over their compatriots. The group is still “hierarchical,” but 
the power of dominance now issues from the rank-and-file to keep the would-be tyrants 
in check. These “reverse dominance hierarchies” operate by strongly sanctioning against 
the domineering behavior of aspiring alpha individuals, and by maintaining strict norms 
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against self-aggrandizement, bossing others, taking too much credit, or generally acting 
superior. For example, Cashdan writes that the !Kung San people
are in fact typified by strong and continual socialization against hoarding 
(i.e., toward economic equality) and against displays of arrogance and 
authority (i.e., toward social and political equality). … scorn (is) a 
mechanism that prevents any tendency on the part of a good hunter or 
provider to become arrogant and think of himself as a “big man.”
1980, p. 116
In extreme cases, these sanctions can take the form of physical punishment, ostracism, or 
even execution, but in many cases such social pressure and scorn is sufficient (Bellah 
2011; Boehm 1999; Mazur 2005). In Boehm’s formulation, by participating in the 
maintenance of these reverse dominance hierarchies, inhabitants of egalitarian societies 
make the willing sacrifice of their own (usually small) chances of someday becoming the 
group’s dominant “alpha” in exchange for the relative guarantee of not being dominated 
themselves. 
 Thus, the sheer resentment that being dominated incurs among Homo sapiens has, 
throughout much of our cultural and evolutionary history, led to a unique and delicate 
tradeoff balance, in which would-be upstarts are pulled down by group effort before they 
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can establish a foothold on despotic supremacy. In complex societies, this tendency is 
eclipsed, leading to economic competition and institutionalized inequality (Woodburn 
1983). Indeed, due to our despotic evolutionary heritage, “once the egalitarian ethos has 
atrophied or disappeared, the necessary guidance mechanism is lacking…(and) an 
orthodox hierarchy is likely to form quite readily” (Boehm 1999, p. 123). Crucially, 
however, even in these unabashedly hierarchical societies (such as our own), local, in-
person social dynamics still tend toward egalitarian preferences. Unlike foragers, we 
may be content to be ruled by a king or governed by Congress, but amongst our 
immediate friends and neighbors we generally “want to create and maintain relationships 
of kindness, of deference and responsibility, and of equality” (A. Fiske 1991, p. 308). 
While most of us accept direct orders from bosses, few of us would tolerate as much from 
a friend. Even in formal or professional settings, direct orders can rankle if expressed too 
presumptuously; thus, most languages have some sort of polite imperative linguistic form 
(such as “please,” “bitte,” “s’il te plaît,” etc.) that enables directives to take the form of 
requests – preserving, in a fictive or subjunctive sense, the autonomy of the receiver, and 
thus his equal standing with the issuer of the request (Seligman et al. 2008). And while 
these ideals of fairness may arise from a positive passion for egalitarianism per se, the 
more powerful motivation is generally the simple desire to avoid the deeply aversive 
experience of social defeat (Boehm 1999).
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3. Ritual, Hierarchy, and Differentiation
The foregoing suggests that preventing the appearance of oppressive, in-person 
dominance hierarchies takes concerted effort, requires persistence, but is realistically 
never completed. Social inequality arises from basic competitive dynamics intrinsic to 
group life, and then society must either legitimate or suppress it, or both (Boehm 1999). 
Either way, inequality is inescapable on a general level because of the strong motivations 
each individual faces to maximize social status and avoid being subordinated. Thus, in 
attempting to generate local egalitarianism, human groups everywhere contend with a 
powerful entropy that pulls the social system toward a hierarchical state which must be 
effortfully resisted and/or symbolically engaged (e.g., Geertz 1977).
 Indeed, since it cannot be fully escaped, this ubiquitous inequality is inevitably 
reflected in the social and kinship structures of societies. Thus, according to Victor 
Turner, determinate social structure of any kind logically implies differentiation, as well 
as some level of hierarchy (1969; 1974).8 In modern professional terms, for example, a 
teacher’s very function is determined in part by the authority he has over students, and by  
the authority administrators have over him; an office worker’s job title, compensation, 
and duties reflect her level on the corporate ladder. Even in a small-scale culture with 
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8 Here, I am not using the term “structure” in Lévi-Strauss’s (1962/1966) sense of a sort of mental 
substratum of oppositional concepts and ideas that underlies the symbolic content of culture. Instead, I 
mean by structure what Turner described as “the statuses and roles” recognized within a society, arranged 
“as a differentiated, segmented system” in which “(t)he individual is segmentalized into roles which he 
plays” (1974, p. 237).
aggressively egalitarian social norms, elders typically have precedence over younger 
people, parents over children, and (in many societies) men over women – particularly 
within the household unit (Boehm 1999).
 Importantly, these statuses and roles which comprise the structural web of a 
society are typically aimed at the fulfillment of practical, economic, and survival- or 
fitness-oriented ends. In traditional contexts, for instance, one’s social role, or what 
Turner (1969) calls “status incumbency,” often implicates one’s reproductive status – pre-
reproductive children occupy one status incumbency, and reproductive adults (including 
married individuals as well as other adults who are ready to marry or have aged past 
reproduction) occupy another (see also Van Gennep 1960). Of note is the fact that 
reproductive maturity is typically accompanied by a normative expectation of material 
contribution to society, such as food production (Boehm 1999). There may also be 
specialized roles such as healer (e.g., Katz 1982), which entail both privileges and 
responsibilities and afford prominence. The functions of recognized roles, then, are 
largely practical: a wife bears and cares for children, a farmer grows food, etc. In 
Turner’s words, societies have “to mobilize resources,” and
(t)o mobilize resources also means to mobilize people. This implies social 
organization. …a system for the production and distribution of resources 
contains within it the seeds of structural segmentation and hierarchy.
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1969, p. 135-136
However, as discussed above, hierarchical distinctions cannot help but imply 
competition. Although this competitive dynamic may be formally or ritually downplayed, 
higher status invariably comes with valued, survival- and fitness-relevant prerogatives. 
Thus, as Turner (1969, 1974) and others (e.g., Buber 1970; Seligman et al. 2008) have 
pointed out, structural differentiation and ends-based social organization are inextricable 
from competition. The social arena under which structure obtains is, axiomatically, the 
arena of competitive striving, and competitive dynamics are inextricable from practical 
social structure (e.g., Turner 1969, p. 179).9
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9 For instance, the differential social roles assigned in most cultures to men and women are often a 
manifestation of reproductive and strategic competition (Diamond 1998). As Jared Diamond reminds us, 
one of the “fundamental causes of human misery” is the fact that “behavior that is in the male’s genetic 
interests may not necessarily be in the interests of his female co-parent, and vice versa.’ (1998, p. 19). 
Hence, if men manage to hierarchically subordinate women within the household (as they often do), then 
they can be expected to manipulate the terms of that hierarchy to favor their own reproductive interests. 
Quantitative ethnographic research bears out this expectation. The use of menstrual huts in indigenous 
Dogon African religion may be a religiously legitimated stratagem for men to prevent cuckoldry: by 
banishing women to the huts for each menses, men keep tabs on their wives’ reproductive cycles in a public 
fashion and thus bar other men from having access to them at fertile times (Strassmann et al. 2011). This 
instance of religious patriarchy exemplifies the tight relationship between gender roles, hierarchy, and 
competition for a biologically salient good (reproduction). Since what is strategically best for women is not 
always what is strategically best for men, the hierarchical distinction between the sexes – that is, social 
structure as instantiated in marriage – cannot help but instantiate competition between them.
3.1. Ritual Engagement with Inevitable Inequality
And so we arrive at a paradox. With caveats, people throughout human history tend to 
strongly resist being interpersonally dominated, and for this reason appear to have a 
cross-cultural preference for egalitarian behavior norms in local (in-person, peer-based) 
contexts. But the exigencies of group living and the need to procure goods for survival 
and reproduction essentially guarantee that real-life societies must everywhere generate 
social structures that not only include inequality but are even functionally predicated on 
it. How best to confront and grapple with such an apparently unresolvable tension? 
 The answer, as I indicated above, is ritual. In opposition to facile stereotypes that 
portray ritual as nothing but empty, rote posturing, theorists such as J.Z. Smith (1992) and 
Catherine Bell (1992) have observed that societies commonly use ritual not simply to 
propitiate spirits, mark important events, or to express of a kind of dumb cultural inertia 
but – ubiquitously – to negotiate the yawning gaps between cultural ideals and 
implacable reality. That is, in J.Z. Smith’s words, “(r)itual is a means of performing the 
way things ought to be in conscious tension to the way things are” (1992, p. 109). To be 
sure, this does not mean that ritual is nothing but an expression of exasperated moral 
defeat. Instead, ritual is a means of expressing and enacting valued states which the 
objective world is felt somehow to resist, but not wholly to veto. The Christian Eucharist, 
for instance, posits – and, in its physical instantiation, putatively enacts – a sacred unison 
of its partakers in the Body of Christ, which is understood to be not only the bread or 
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wafer but the church itself: a whole corporate entity of which all individuals are but 
members. Naturally, however, the real-life Christian Church is not famous for its 
harmonious unity, particularly in its ever-fissioning Protestant forms; nor is any single 
church ever free of interpersonal tensions, rivalries, resentments, or smoldering emotions 
ready to boil over. Neither the universal Church nor the church writ small are, then, 
internally especially peaceful, nor are they free of the disruptive “worldly” pathologies 
the Christian ethos aspires to heal. Thus the need for ritual. With ritual, the sort of unity 
and harmony posited by the Christian ethos is seen (at least transiently) to be, in fact, 
possible. Ritual is not a meaningless series of actions, nor a meek cry of protest against 
an impassive universe. It is a versatile workman’s tool for carefully, continually crafting 
and repairing what Seligman et al. (2008) call the “subjunctive” features of social reality: 
the imaginal scaffolding that gives moral structure to the amoral world.
 In this way, ideals and reality are brought closer together, so that the steady 
practitioner of ritual can begin to see the world as if through the lens of the persistently 
enacted ideal (Geertz 1977). This shift in interpretive habits can lead to a qualitatively 
different experience of the same primary facts. An outsider to the church – say, an 
anticlerical polemicist in the hoary mold of Richard Dawkins or, better, Bertrand Russell 
– sees so plainly the hypocrisy and the moral failings of the Christian community that the 
stated ideals and moral postulates its leaders expound seem to be, quite simply, falsified. 
The church is no more unified or internally pacific or ethically laudable than the secular 
community beyond its walls; it directs its worship at a being that is apparently 
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empirically unverifiable, at best a Feuerbachian projection; and so the entire enterprise is 
seen as self-evidently bankrupt. But an insider who practices regularly, attends mass, 
partakes of the Eucharist, and repeats the Lord’s Prayer each Sunday 10 encounters the 
same social and cognitive facts through an inculcated heuristic which so alters their 
meaning that they can become evidence in favor of nearly the opposite conclusions. 
Namely, the ritual of the Eucharist itself is proof that the Body of Christ is substantive 
and tangible; the singing of hymns is concrete experiential testimony to the internal 
harmony of the congregation. What Geertz called “an aura of utter factuality” is thereby 
generated through the performance of ritual acts that seem not only to reference but to 
actually evoke their posited ideals (1977, p. 112). Over time, the cosmologically “really 
real” may in this way come to be actually identified with the ritualized sphere, while the 
everyday or mundane world is conversely experienced as a somewhat discordant or 
imperfect version of what the ritual has made manifest.11 Thus, for the regular 
practitioner, the undeniable imperfections of the workaday relationships that comprise the 
actual community are not a falsification of the community’s moral ideals, but rather a 
practical reminder of them. For the ritualist, the awful gap between immediate reality and 
the ritual points back to the ritual, which – having powerfully identified “fact with value” 
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10 An act typically performed in near-precise synchrony, I might add, with other parishioners sitting nearby 
in the pews.
11 Cf. Rappaport: “(t)he orders of society, like the order of the universe in general, tend to degenerate into 
disorder. … Liturgy preserves the conventions it encodes inviolate in defiance of the vagaries of ordinary 
practice, thereby providing them with existence independent of, and insulated against, the statistical 
averages which characterize behavior. That “everyone does it” exonerates no one. For people of the Book 
adultery would remain a sin even if every married person indulged in it” (1999, p. 129-130; emphasis 
original).
– is the true arbiter of ontology (Geertz 1977, p. 127). For the cynic, on the other hand, 
the same gap merely casts further doubt on what already seemed doubtful.12
 The ritual enactment of religious or moral ideals is, then, a kind of practice of 
shoring up the imaginal realm, much as resurfacing and repairing a city’s roads is a 
never-ending habit of maintenance that shores up its physical substructure. As such, the 
content of rituals is illocutionary, not descriptive: a pastor saying “man and wife” is not 
noting how things objectively are but is creating them, is imposing the subjunctive on the 
real (e.g., Austin 1975; Rappaport 1999). Church congregations recite their creeds not in 
order to simply reiterate their objective beliefs like a shopping list, but to assert them, in 
a real way, against the acid facts of the world which can eat away at faith each week. 
Similarly, the repetitive prostration of Muslim salat prayer, the dramatic kneeling and 
bowing, is a daily assertion of submission before Allah, in plain recognition of the fact 
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12 My discussion here is, of course, significantly drawn from Clifford Geertz’s (1977) comparison of ethos 
and worldview, which – loosely speaking – are in Geertz’s formulation analogous to ideals and reality, or 
moral directives and the objective universe respectively (see also Bell 1992). According to Geertz, religious 
rituals and religious symbols serve to render moral ideals plausible by demonstrating their fit with the 
objective world, and to render the objective world morally compelling by infusing it convincingly with 
symbols of ideals. Thus, in referring above to the “Christian ethos,” I  mean “ethos” specifically in Geertz’s 
sense: as a fount of moral orientation which then must be made tangible through practice and engagement 
with symbols that “formulate a basic congruence between a particular style of life and a specific…
metaphysic, and in so doing sustain each with the borrowed authority of the other” (1977, p. 90). Despite 
the importance of this typology for the immediate discussion, I have found Geertz’s characteristic focus on 
semiotic religious symbols somewhat less thematically well-suited to my topic – that is, somatic 
ritualization in the form of synchrony – than Rappaport’s (1999) peculiar emphasis on semiotic index or 
Turner’s (1969) processual functionalism. Thus, having relied on Geertz’s diagnosis of the basic problem 
facing moral communities, I find myself having built my theoretical superstructure using the work of others 
in the Durkheimian or functionalist tradition. I take solace in the fact that Rappaport’s and Turner’s work 
explicitly avoids succumbing to Geertz’s main midcentury charge against functionalism, namely its 
putative inability to account for religion’s destructive potential or for social change rather than static 
structure (e.g., Geertz 1977, p. 142-144).
that in their daily lives people often do not submit. And in Judaism, the yearly Passover 
seder is a feast of remembrance, of overcoming the exile from God in a diasporic world 
which encourages forgetting and constitutes exile (see, e.g., Prothero 2010). What is 
asserted in ritual – its symbolic and enacted content – is thus a floodlight that illuminates 
precisely the anti-ideal features of the world which motivate and necessitate its practice.13
3.2. Communitas Subjunctively Levels Structure 
The problems identified prior to ritual are therefore reflected in inverse in ritual’s form 
and content, as a function of its “exemplary, model-displaying character” (Turner 1969, p. 
117). As such, the ritualized response to inescapable interpersonal inequality should 
evoke a morally ideal state of egalitarian unity, in which no one suffers from domination 
or defeat in the humiliating arena of competitive fracturing. And indeed, an important 
subset of ritual behaviors in different cultures aims at exactly this end: rituals that enact 
what Victor Turner dubbed communitas, or “society as an unstructured or rudimentarily 
structured and relatively undifferentiated …communion of equal individuals” (1969, p. 
96). Broadly, Turner’s anthropological theory posits that societies ritually manage the 
inherent tensions that arise from competitive striving within structure by facilitating 
profound experiences of relative equality and homogeneity in which communitas 
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13 Again, cf. Rappaport’s claim that “the more highly motivated people are to violate a convention or the 
more consequential its violation is deemed to be, the more likely it is to be established in liturgy than in 
daily practice” (1999, p. 128). 
transiently replaces structure. Communitas is particularly generated in religious rituals of 
what Turner (1969) and Van Gennep (1960) call “liminality” (from the Latin limen, or 
“threshold”) during which former rank identities and roles are formally set aside in order 
to prepare the way for the assumption of a new role and rank. The paradigmatic example 
is a rite of passage (Van Gennep 1960), during the performance of which the initiates are, 
for instance, no longer children but not yet women or men. Having already set aside their 
former role but not yet having stepped into the new one, initiates are temporarily vacated 
of all status and removed from structure. 
 In the contemporary United States, the most compelling analog for this kind of 
initiation ritual is military basic training, during which new recruits are systematically 
stripped of marks of individuation through uniform haircuts, grooming, and dress; 
subjected to intense physical discipline; and assigned a homogenous effective rank (i.e., 
private). The entire boot camp experience is liminal in Turner’s sense; recruits have left 
behind their civilian status at the onset of basic training, but they cannot be called soldiers 
until its completion. And of course new recruits conduct a great deal of sustained 
synchronous march or drill, leading to profound experiences of self-other boundary loss 
and espirit de corps which attenuates former identities and ostensibly replaces them with 
a gelled experience of unity with fellow recruits (McNeill 1995). Compare these practices 
with tribal initiation rites where, marking the transition from childhood to adult status, 
initiates may
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wear only a strip of clothing, or even go naked, to demonstrate that as 
liminal beings they have no status, property, insignia, secular clothing 
indicating a rank or role…. Their behavior is normally passive or humble; 
they must obey their instructors implicitly.…Among themselves, 
neophytes tend to develop an intense comradeship and egalitarianism. 
Secular distinctions of rank and status disappear or are homogenized.
Turner 1969, p. 9514
When social structure is thus stripped away, leaving only homogenized individuals, a sort 
of fellow-feeling is invoked that acknowledges mutual identity and shared, fundamental 
encounter at the level of bodies – even, as the case may be, in the midst of intense strain 
or deprivation. 
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14 An interesting exception to the homogenization of rank during liminal transitions proves the rule. In the 
U.S. Army, recruits with special qualifications (such as two years’ worth of JROTC training or a completed 
bachelor’s degree) may enlist at a higher pay grade than private E-1, the lowest possible rank, and will thus 
technically outrank most other recruits in their platoon. Nevertheless, during boot camp all recruits’ 
uniforms lack any rank insignia (showing only an empty Velcro patch where insignia would go), and all 
trainees – including specialists, who share a pay grade with junior noncommissioned officers – are referred 
to simply as “private” and treated identically in terms of rank (U.S. Army Regulation 601-210, 2011). The 
ritualized imposition of homogeneity thus entails the total leveling of effective ranking structures even 
when those structures still obtain externally to the ritualized space. I might also add that, in poetic terms, 
the image of an empty Velcro patch on the chest of new recruits’ fatigues is a powerful icon of Turnerian 
liminality. 
3.3. Liminality and “Good” Parties
Since “communitas emerges where structure is not” (Turner 1969, p. 126), the mutual 
recognition described immediately above arises wherever the roles and obligations of 
structural status are transiently banished, whether through ritualized or secular means. 
Hence communitas may also emerge in utterly mundane settings such as “a ‘good’ party 
as distinct from ‘stiff’ party” (Turner 1974, p. 242), or during a chat over the fence with a 
neighbor. What characterizes experiences of communitas across differing modes (secular 
or sacred) and emotional valences (positive or negative) is the temporary abandonment of 
status distinctions and attenuated awareness of role and rank. At a “good” party we may 
share a bottle of champagne with a tech millionaire or chat on a sofa with a struggling 
college dropout, but in either case those statuses will be far from our minds as we carry 
on and have a good time. At a bad or stiff party we often cannot help but see others in 
terms of their roles – which, moreover, may be roles we disapprove of, are intimidated 
by, or have no way of connecting with. (This may be why office holiday parties have a 
reputation for being dicey affairs.) 
3.4. An Odd but Indissoluble Marriage: Communitas and Authority
Theoretically, communitas and structure often cyclically supersede each other, as in the 
yearly wheel of holidays and celebrations that characterize religious life in so many 
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cultures. Indeed, Turner defines society as a dialectical interplay between structure on the 
one hand and the two key components of communitas, anti-structure and liminality, on 
the other (Turner 1974). Durkheim similarly notes that
“During ordinary days, utilitarian and individual occupations are 
uppermost in people’s minds. Each one devotes himself to his personal 
task. …On holidays, these preoccupations are forcibly eclipsed; …What 
then occupies their thoughts are common beliefs, common traditions, the 
memories of great ancestors, the collective ideal of which they are the 
incarnation. …at this time society is more alive, more active, and 
consequently more real than in ordinary times.”
1912/2008, p. 258-25915
However, this cyclical characterization is idealized. In real life communitas and structure 
are often superimposed on each other instantaneously, a fact that sheds vital light on the 
paradoxical role of power or status in producing experiences of non-status and 
antistructure. For instance, during an American university commencement ceremony the 
graduates are dressed identically, with school colors dominating the sea of robes and 
mortarboards, so that for both observers and participants the graduates seated en masse 
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15Note that here ontological primacy is again imputed to the ritual, as opposed to mundane, sphere.
during convocation evoke undifferentiated homogeneity. Yet significant structural 
elements coexist alongside these classic markers of liminality; graduates may wear 
distinctive cords, for instance, that signify their academic standing (summa cum laude, 
etc.), subtly marking ranks of prestige within the landscape of scholars. Moreover, the 
entire affair is enabled and organized by hierarchical powers, from the university 
president or chancellor down to department heads and professors whose grades are the 
currency of success that secures the privilege of graduating. 
 Similarly, for initiates in the African bush, the bubble of local communitas which 
is imposed by nakedness, shared physical deprivation, and the temporary evacuation of 
status is only made possible through the force of authority wielded by elders who 
instantiate the voice of tradition. For young U.S. Army recruits, the ragged fellow-feeling 
that emerges from eight weeks of being treated as fungible atoms or cells in a 
homogenous unit is underwritten by the entire hierarchical mass of the military 
establishment, which orchestrates a liminal space within which recruits may be 
essentially “raw material,” nonfunctional and occupying no status, while all around them 
the great machine of the military carries on and supports them. Ritual communitas and 
authority are, therefore, very often co-actors, with the authority of a tradition or 
establishment serving as the agent of subsidy for the ritual participants’ short trip into 
liminality.
 This crucial role of authority or legitimate hierarchy in carving out the container 
which holds communitas recalls, of course, the previous chapter’s discussion of hierarchy 
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and coordination dynamics in synchrony. According to the model there proposed, 
participants in synchrony (such as recruits marching in cadence) enter a state of mutual 
equality only by virtue of submitting themselves to a higher authority, which is typically 
immanent in the group. For marching army recruits, there are then at least two layers of 
authority to which the individual directly submits: 1:) the formal ranking authority of the 
military hierarchy, personified in the platoon sergeant or lieutenant who gives orders and 
initiates the march; and 2:) the immanent authority of the platoon or squad itself as a 
collective whole which feeds back to constrain and dictate the rhythmic motions of 
participants’ bodies. Thus the collective, hypnotic, status-erasing espirit de corps which 
arises from synchronous march (McNeill 1995) is subsidized by status itself. Thus we are 
witness once again to the inescapability of hierarchy, in the face of which the purpose of 
ritual or synchrony is not to obviate hierarchy but to negotiate it, to manage its tensions – 
to transiently enact ideals (equality, statuslessness, total unity) which in the final analysis 
are not oppositional to hierarchy but functional complements of it. By following the 
rhythm of the collective, participants in synchrony demonstrate broader submission even 
as they throw off the shackles of everyday distinctions in rank. 
4. Synchrony, Indexes, and Ritualization
We move now to conclude our discussion of human hierarchy and ritual with a return to 
the social mechanics of synchrony. As discussed in Chapter Two, when people dance or 
125
march in synchrony, their motor systems are tautologically engaged in time-locked, in-
phase unison. As I emphasized in Chapter Three and in the introduction to this chapter, 
synchrony thus communicates unity and equality by in fact being those very things. This 
claim is principally informed by the work of Roy Rappaport (1999), who has argued, 
compellingly and at length, that the defining characteristic of ritual is that it indexes, 
rather than merely symbolizes, participants’ acceptance of the relationships and 
arrangements it refers to. That is, participation in a ritual by its very nature is the public 
acceptance of the conventions or ideals invoked by the ritual. Specifically, Rappaport 
draws on the American philosopher and semiotician Charles S. Peirce to distinguish 
between symbols, icons, and indices (Peirce & Hoopes 1991). A symbol is a sign which is 
linked with its referent only through arbitrary convention. Most words are symbols in this 
sense; for instance, the French word chien has no intrinsic connection with a real-world 
dog, as is easily evidenced by the profound diversity of equivalent terms worldwide 
(“dog” in English; gae in Korean; Hund in German; etc.). An icon, meanwhile, is a sign 
that in some way resembles its referent; a photograph or a drawing of a dog is an icon of 
dogness. Finally, an index is a sign that is somehow intrinsically, causally related to its 
referent. Dog hair on the furniture is an index that a dog is or has recently been present. 
 In Rappaport’s anthropology, the crucial difference between symbolic and 
indexical communications is that the former can be falsified, while the latter cannot, or at 
least not very easily (1999). After all, it is perfectly possible to state verbally “this is a 
dog” while pointing at a flowerpot. More consequentially, one can verbally assure a 
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person “I value our mutual friendship” while slipping a love note to that person’s wife. In 
this way, symbols are intrinsically “further away,” at a distance, from the real-world 
things and relationships they putatively refer to. Symbols glide across the surface of 
reality, touching it only barely, their existence sustained by interlocking webs of mutual, 
arbitrary significance produced collectively by human minds rather than by grounding in 
the physical substratum of things (see, e.g., Wittgenstein 1953/2009). Indexes, on the 
other hand, cannot be separated from the substratum. If there is dog hair on the sofa, there 
has probably been a dog in the room.
 Therefore – as indicated above – in Rappaport’s schema it is the participation in 
ritual which cannot be faked, and which is an indexical sign of the participant’s 
acceptance of the conventions in which the ritual is grounded. If you are at the altar in 
line to receive communion, then quite obviously you aren’t anywhere else. If you try to 
claim that you are at the altar when you are actually curled up on your living room sofa 
watching football, no one will be fooled. Ritual participation – the sheer act of showing 
up and carrying out the forms of the rite – is therefore indexical of, at the very least, a 
minimal commitment to or acceptance of the obligatory structures of the religion or 
community. Of course, Rappaport is careful to point out that this minimal commitment 
may be entered into with grave internal misgivings, and distinguishes between “belief” 
and “acceptance” accordingly. Belief is an internal propositional state, public evidence 
for which is difficult or impossible to ascertain. Acceptance, however, is public, inasmuch 
as abiding by the strictures of convention tautologically is the same as the acceptance of 
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those conventions. You might not believe any of what the pastor says each week, but if 
you show up and take communion anyway, there is no way around the fact that you have 
accepted that claim that your church makes on your time, attention, and behavior, and 
therefore tacitly also the moral ideals or standards evoked by that ritual act. Indeed, this 
potential for discrepancy is the cornerstone of Rappaport’s system; by discriminating 
between private, internal states and public, external acts, ritual enables a clean flow of 
interpretable signals – in an ultimately ethological sense – through a human community. 
After all, private beliefs are very hard to assess, not least because they are often 
expressed in words. But public actions are much more difficult to mistake or to fake, and 
so in terms of their ramifications for social meanings it is actions that carry the most 
weight.16 
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16 A counterfactual thought experiment illustrates the truth of this claim: imagine meeting a man whom you 
hate, but who extends his hand politely for a greeting. There is suddenly a conflict between your internal 
sentiments and the external obligation of social ritual in Erving Goffman’s (1967) sense. In most cases, the 
obligation wins: you inwardly sigh, but you return the handshake gamely. To modern, Holden Caulfield-
like sensibilities – hyper-attuned to whiffs of insincerity – this submission to ritual propriety constitutes, 
perhaps, a vague moral disappointment (see Seligman et al. 2008). But now imagine not shaking the man’s 
hand, in full view of others. This would be a big deal. Eyebrows would raise, and quick mental 
reassessments of your character would immediately commence. The unmistakeable social signal of refusing 
to shake someone’s hand is, then, such a serious breach of etiquette that, by virtue of its seriousness, it 
illuminates how important it is to fulfill even tacit ritual expectations – at least if we want to be accepted by 
the community which upholds them. In other words, shaking a disliked acquaintance’s hand is an index that 
the norms of etiquette hold at least enough sway, in your eyes, to enforce certain kinds of acts over and 
beyond your internal reservations. Thus when we see other people participating in rituals of any kind, we 
can assume that, at minimum, whatever obligations called for that participation are still respected by those 
participants. It is when we imagine basic rituals going unfulfilled that we realize how foundational the 
rituals are.
4.1. Canonical Content vs. Ethological Ritualization
To be sure, however, religious rituals are not merely actions, but also reference religious 
concepts and ideals; these “canonical” referents are too abstract to be strictly indexed by 
simple ritual participation (Rappaport 1999). They include theological concepts, 
mythologies, scriptural narratives, and eschatologies. Loosely speaking, as Alcorta and 
Sosis (2005) argue, it is these abstract canonical referents which separate human and 
religious ritual from the wide variety of animal rituals, which are universally indexical 
and immediate. Animals may have ritual, but humans have religious ritual – and it is 
religious symbols and concepts that differentiate the latter. 
 Therefore, to apply Rappaport’s and Turner’s theories appropriately to synchrony 
qua synchrony – that is, synchrony absent any symbolic content, focusing solely on the 
essential neurocognitive, motor, and dynamic characteristics of humans behaving as a 
network of organic coupled oscillators – I will refer to synchrony in terms of 
ritualization, rather than ritual proper. After all, as Lukes (1975) and many others have 
pointed out, the definition of “ritual” is nothing if not problematic. Turner’s definition, 
for instance, specifies “beliefs in mystical beings or powers” (1969, p. 19), whereas 
Goffman (1967) describes nearly every form of enacted social convention (such as 
shaking hands) as “ritual.” But “ritualization” is a more determinate concept, rooted in 
the study of animal behavior and more reliably applicable to acts which fall under the 
indexical side of Rappaport’s schema but which may lack canonical content. 
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Ethologically speaking, the key feature of ritualization is the exaggeration or highlighting 
of acts for their communicative rather than practical functions. Ritualized acts are 
therefore “either elaborated or simplified…to attract attention” (J.W. Smith 1979, pp. 
57-58). Among animals, most ritualized acts are genetically grounded and instinctual. An 
example could be mating rites among birds, in which, say, preening gestures have 
become decoupled from their original function and now specifically serve a ritualized 
signaling purpose (e.g., Maynard Smith & Harper 2003). Among humans – who have 
much more labile capacities for improvised social signaling (Smith 1979) – ritualization 
occurs when 
certain social actions strategically distinguish themselves in relation to 
other actions…(such that) ritualization is a way of acting that is designed 
and orchestrated to distinguish and privilege what is being done in 
comparison to other, usually more quotidian, activities.
Bell 1992, p. 74 
For example, an exaggerated strut by a tennis player before a match could be a ritualized 
signal of confidence, with a tacit goal of intimidating the opponent. 
 In all cases, ritualization occurs when actions which could serve other purposes 
are specifically and patently highlighted for signaling and/or communication. The clearest 
and most widespread strategies for highlighting acts in this way are, in Bell’s terms, 
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“formality, fixity, and repetition” (1992, p. 90-92). Similarly, Alcorta and Sosis identify 
“formality, patterning, sequencing and repetition” as basic features of ritualized displays 
that “focus attention, enhance memory, and promote associational learning” (2005, p. 10). 
We can therefore identify an act as ritualized or communicative if the form and manner of 
the act seem to be actor’s focus; if the act is patterned or repeated; and if the form of the 
act is stable over repetitions.17
 What I would like to suggest is that Rappaport’s characterization of ritual as 
index, and the predictions and interpretations which arise from this characterization, are 
most particularly applicable to ritualized acts as defined above. Ritualized acts are 
publicly visible, refer only to immediate social realities, and often contain no strictly 
abstract content. It is difficult to lie using ritualization; if you don’t really believe in your 
skills, it will be quite difficult to convincingly swagger before the tennis match (false 
swaggers are pretty easy to identify). Because the motions and rhythms of synchrony 
must be sufficiently exaggerated to be perceptible and copyable, and because the only 
way for a group of people to attain synchrony is for individual participants’ rhythmic 
signals to be picked up on and passed along from person to person until unison is 
achieved across the group, synchrony tautologically meets the above criteria for 
ritualization: it comprises a series of clearly highlighted, repetitive acts that are 
distinguished from everyday acts and are clearly communicative rather than strictly 
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17 Consider (to pick an example) the act of folding up a U.S. flag: the motions are certainly precise, formal, 
and invariant, conducted the same way each time they are carried out. The act is thus clearly meant to be 
witnessed and interpreted, and the precision and exaggeration (that is, formality) of the motions 
differentiate flag-folding in a public setting from, say, folding towels or shirts.
practical in nature. As such, then, synchrony is a uniquely compelling form of ritualized 
behavior that is logically impossible to fake, inasmuch as participation in synchrony is 
identical to acceptance of the immanent authority of the rhythmic unity.
 Moreover, given synchrony’s neurophysiological and dynamic effects as outlined 
in Chapters Two and Three, synchrony is a true index, in Rappaport’s sense, of 
immediate social unison and equality.18 Since the dynamics of synchrony work best when 
no one dominates (Fairhurst et al. 2014; Keller, Novembre, & Hove 2014), very high-
quality synchrony is inevitably an experience of some level of internal leaderlessness – 
that is, the leveling of hierarchy, and the letting fall of roles, rank, and distinction. This is 
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18 Rappaport described “True Indices” as those in which “a sign is the effect of a cause” and as such 
“cannot help but indicate that cause and as such cannot help but be true” (1999, p. 65). Rappaport further 
distinguished between natural and constructed (that is, conventional) indices, defining natural indices as 
those which naturally arise from a cause-effect relationship (such as the relationship between dark clouds 
and impending rain) and defining constructed indices as those which have been manipulated by convention 
to “indicate whatever they do indicate,” such as a knock on the door to indicate company (Ibid.) 
Importantly, a knock on the door is not merely a symbol or an icon, because it does not arbitrarily evoke the 
idea of somebody being at the door. Somebody must actually be there in order for there to be a knock. But 
it is an artifact of social convention that knocking at the door is what we do when we want to announce our 
presence. We could do something else to the same effect. Of these two categories, I think synchrony is 
more properly an example of a natural index: rhythmic movement per se is not rooted in convention, 
because it is a pan-human capacity that is used across all or nearly all cultures. Its effect is inextricable 
from its presence: if you see two people marching in sync, their motor systems tautologically are time-
locked in unison, with all the neurocognitive and dynamical implications we have already discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three. However, Rappaport furthermore argues that natural indices are more diffuse than 
constructed ones – that is, they are linked to what they indicate, but fairly loosely. Dark clouds index the 
probability of rain, but not the certainty of it. Dog hair on a couch indicates that a dog was probably 
recently there, but again someone could have tracked the hair in from outside. Similarly, synchrony in one 
sense indexes self-other blurring and hierarchical leveling, but of course other factors will always impinge 
on how far these processes actually go. A true index must not be infallible in order to count as such. As an 
index of neurocognitively mediated social leveling and experienced unity, synchrony is probabilistic, but 
still a true index. As an index of the acceptance of a group’s immanent authority, however, synchrony’s 
semiotic function is much tighter – both sign and referent are publicly visible. In this capacity the index is 
less diffuse than Rappaport suggests for most natural indices, although – since I cannot see how it would 
constitute a constructed index – a natural index is undoubtedly what it is.
true whether the synchrony takes the form of repeating the Lord’s Prayer in unison at 
church or “dancing in the streets” during a festival (Ehrenreich 2006). That is, the 
symbolic content of the setting is not vital to synchrony’s base-level effects on social 
cognition. As such, synchrony is a ritualized act that can take many symbolic forms, but 
which always tends by its very nature toward being what Rappaport called a “natural 
index” of Turnerian communitas – even in settings that are explicitly underwritten by 
formal authority (see footnote). The pastor may lead the congregation in reciting the 
prayer, and is physically situated in front of and vertically above the pews, just as the 
lieutenant marches to the right and the platoon sergeant to the left of the columns of 
soldiers. But during the march, the rhythm and cadence become the dominant features of 
the unit, submerging individual and rank into a formless trance (McNeill 1995).19 
Similarly, during the Lord’s Prayer, the well-known meter of recitation, set in motion by 
the pastor, outstrips any one person’s authority and becomes regularized across the 
congregation. 
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19 In an in-person interview, Capt. Kenneth Harris of the Boston University ROTC fully agreed with this 
description of what goes on during cadence drill, describing it as a “deadening effect” that does, indeed, 
blend individuals into one. Indeed, Capt. Harris indicated that one of the uses of cadence drilling is for 
leaders to practice emerging effortfully from the rank-leveling, unifying trance of synchronous march. Even 
as the platoon sergeant is affected by the neurophysiological influences of synchrony, including self-other 
blurring and rank leveling, she must be prepared to reestablish herself as an individual with a rank and role 
at a moment’s notice (Harris 2015). Again, hierarchy and communitas work as complements in tension with 
each other, not as incompatible opposites.
4.2. Submission and Cybernetics
It bears stating that Rappaport (1999) takes a cybernetic view of ritual, stressing its role 
as an information-gating mechanism that prevents private, variable, and inchoate states 
from sloshing through the social system willy-nilly and wreaking havoc where they are 
not needed. According to Rappaport, rituals – and, I would argue, ritualized acts – boost 
the social signal-to-noise ratio by clarifying and highlighting only those states which are 
significant enough to motivate participation in them:
(F)luctuations in variables internal to private systems – individuals – are 
either unobserved or ignored in the public system except insofar as they 
are expressed in a binary summarization indicated by either participation 
or non-participation (in ritual).
1999, p. 224
Here, too, synchrony suits Rappaport’s model perhaps better than some of the more 
symbolically complex rituals which underlie his original analysis. Synchrony is clearly 
participatory. Since, as we discussed in Chapter Three, it is synchrony that in fact 
generates the transient social identity of a group by reducing its salient degrees of 
freedom to only one rhythmic pulse, participation tautologically constitutes membership 
in that temporary group. Therefore group membership becomes a matter of plain index, 
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something everyone can see and hear. You either are participating or you aren’t. You 
either are paying enough clear attention to the motor expressions of others to mimic their 
rhythms or you aren’t.
 And finally, you are either willing to submit yourself to the emergent rhythm of 
the group or you aren’t. Informed by the Turnerian concept of communitas, we can thus 
posit that participation in synchrony is a motor index of anti-hierarchical social 
intentions in the present moment. Look at a newspaper clipping or online image of 
President Barack Obama dancing, and the truth of this statement will become apparent. 
When the president is standing ramrod-straight in the front of a room, microphone 
adjusted and the seal of the office of the president looming behind him, the hierarchical 
difference between him and the audience is magnified. But if a shoulder juts out, a 
rhythm is picked up on, and the president begins to move his body to the same beat as the 
people around him, suddenly that hierarchical chasm narrows, and the personal 
dimensions of the setting become more salient.20
 This claim highlights a tension that underlies much of this chapter’s discussion 
and the broader investigation as a whole: leader-follower distinctions and hierarchy are 
usually felt to be less personal, less intimate, than egalitarian relations (e.g., Lammers et 
al. 2012). In light of the fact that people desire both intimacy and social efficacy – both 
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20 This observation suggests an empirical test: subjects shown photographs or videos of leaders engaged in 
various activities ought to rate the hierarchical distance between leaders and others as less substantial when 
those activities involve synchronous motion such as dance, prayer or pledge recitation, or cadence 
marching. This effect would likely be moderated by signs of affect (smiles, etc.), physical location, 
uniforms, and so forth. But these other factors controlled for, sheer motor unison ought to produce third-
party assessments of reduced hierarchical differentiation (compare, e.g., Lakens 2011).
the invigorating freedom of communitas and the necessary, economic practicality of 
structure – this tension is essentially unresolvable, but must instead be managed using a 
Geertzian weaving together of ideals and reality that depends ultimately on ritual, or the 
physical enactment of ideal states. We cannot ever have pure liberated equality (in the 
final chapter we will discuss what sorts of unpleasant things happen when we try), and so 
we must continually renew our experiential awareness of its potential realization through 
ritualized expressions of equality and unity. These expressions, I argue, will very often, 
across cultures and eras, feature synchrony, which is itself not a ritual but a ritualized act 
that can be adapted for nearly any symbolic context – but which always instantiates 
somatic unity and hierarchical leveling at the physiological level.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I have underplayed the effects of synchrony on unity, while focusing on 
its effects on hierarchy. But the two imply each other: hierarchy is a form of disunity 
(Turner 1969), and inasmuch as human societies and indeed human history are 
characterized by the “groupish” ability to socially unify (Haidt 2012), the hierarchical 
organization that inevitably arises in groups produces a sort of permanent tension against 
our tendency to bond which must be managed, negotiated, and contained. The tension is 
not actually oppositional; boundaries between and within groups, which themselves 
enable “groupish” functioning within those boundaries, are in fact a function of hierarchy 
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or authority. The reason we cannot simply drive into Mexico without stopping and 
showing our passports is due to the authority of the Mexican government which 
maintains border controls (or the U.S. government on the return trip). Hierarchy similarly  
maintains the distinctions between units and subunits in a corporation; without the 
authority of the corporate leadership to enforce and guarantee the maintenance of 
organizational structure, divisions and units would become meaningless. Thus, by 
flattening hierarchy, synchrony simultaneously enables unity across boundaries 
(Seligman et al. 2008). Unity implies nondifferentiation, and this is what synchrony, 
within the bounds of its operation as orchestrated by a supervening authority, somatically 
produces.
 Continuing this line of extrapolation, I am wary of having potentially elicited the 
impression that ritual and ritualization are strictly agents against hierarchy – that 
hierarchy is the undesired entropic state against which ritual must continually struggle by 
evoking happy-go-lucky equalitarian relations and social unity. This is simply false. 
Ritualized behavior supports hierarchy as well as undermining it. Indeed, hierarchy is 
always being threatened with an entropy of its own (as anyone who has ever taught high 
school knows), and the the most perfunctory survey of political history shows that state 
and religious rites of all kinds are used to legitimate and prop up power (Bell 1992). The 
point in this chapter is not that ritual works to maintain ideal equality against hierarchy, 
but that a particular form of ritualized behavior, synchrony, is an enactive expression of 
equality and unity which is most particularly useful for situations in which those ideals 
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obtain or are salient. Ritual works to uphold and make real ideals of all kinds; legitimate 
authority and hierarchy are in fact among the most ubiquitous of the ideals that ritual and 
ritualization are used to uphold (Bell 1992; Rappaport 1999; Seligman et al. 2008). 
 Thus, ritual and ritualization are tools that can be used to shore up and produce 
nearly any subjunctive social reality. What we are interested in here, though, is the 
particular reality of liminal equality and social unity which is dialectically counterposed 
against practical and inevitable hierarchy. As we have discussed, evolution cannot help 
but entail competition; further, this competition cannot help but be instantiated in 
interpersonal settings where sociometric hierarchies inevitably form, even when actively 
or symbolically downplayed. To bluntly summarize again a point I made above, the 
inequality that obtains within any group of people is simply tautological when considered 
in light of the fact of evolution, and therefore is intrinsic and insoluble. The engine of 
biological diversity and adaptation is, by definition, differential success of phenotypes 
and individuals. Therefore, no matter how benign and understated our hierarchies, no 
matter how firmly we suppress domineering behavior among our successful peers or 
restrain it with social politesse, there will always be a gap between any moral ideal of 
equality and the reality of things. To achieve the apparently universal desideratum of the 
felt sense of personal equality, we must therefore endlessly struggle against a brute fact 
that contravenes our moral preferences. This presents an unresolvable tension to which 
ritual is the solution. Or put more precisely, it presents a tension for which ritualized 
synchrony is the constructive palliative: the somatic, cognitive, and communicative tool 
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that only temporarily resolves the unresolvable whenever it is used, and therefore must be 
used in perpetuity, at intervals – its internal rhythms reflected in the unceasing cycles of 
ritual in which it is embedded.
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CHAPTER FIVE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF GROUP FUNCTION
1. Background
As interest in synchrony has grown, much has been made of its potential role in the 
evolutionary origins of human sociality and religion (Bellah 2011; Haidt 2012; Reddish, 
Bulbulia, & Fischer 2014; Wiltersmuth & Heath 2009). William McNeill argued that 
synchrony was pivotal for the evolutionary development of human culture itself (1995). 
He posited that prehistoric religion relied on synchrony to such an extent that “the 
rhythmic, muscular aspect of religious ritual retained far greater importance than written 
records reveal” (1995, p. 47). Barbara Ehrenreich (2006) similarly concluded that many 
historical and world religions featured rhythm and dance more centrally than 
contemporary records suggest. More recently, Robert Bellah (2011) has drawn on Merlin 
Donald’s (1993) theory of the stages of human cognition to argue that the human capacity 
for synchrony was foundational for achieving mimetic culture, which in turn laid the 
groundwork for language and symbolic (or “theoretic”) knowledge shared in 
communities. Moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2012) has implicated synchrony in 
“conservative” social modes that emphasize group bonding and tight reciprocal 
obligations between group members. 
 These evolutionary and historical assertions are at least conceptually supported by 
a growing body of social psychological literature on synchrony, which we have 
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previously surveyed in Chapter 1. To briefly recapitulate some recent examples, 
Wiltermuth’s and Heath’s groundbreaking 2009 finding that rhythmic synchrony predicts 
subsequent trust and cooperation has been widely cited as evidence that rhythm and 
synchrony played a role in the evolution of in-group altruism and religious cohesion (e.g., 
Haidt 2012; Kesebir 2011; McKay & Whitehouse 2015; Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer 
2014). In their empirical study showing that intentional synchrony produced greater 
cooperative effects than incidental synchrony, Reddish, Fischer, and Bulbulia (2013) 
theorized that synchrony and “collectivist values” mutually strengthen one another in 
traditionalist societies. Similarly, Cohen et al. (2010) found that rowing in synchrony 
increased participants’ pain thresholds, hypothesizing that synchronized exercise may 
comprise an evolutionary foundation of group bonding and ingroup altruism. Kesibir 
cited empirical work by Wiltermuth and Heath (2009) and Kirschner and Tomasello 
(2010) to argue that “synchronous activity may be an ancient group-bonding activity” 
that unites individuals into functional wholes analogous to organisms (2012, p. 238).1
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1 I do not intend here to endorse group selectionist accounts of human evolution or religion (e.g., Haidt 
2012; D.S. Wilson 2002). Whether group selection is relevant for understanding human social, cognitive, 
and religious evolution is an important theoretical question, but one that is, I think, outside the scope of this 
dissertation. My claim in the context of this chapter is simply that current models in social and evolutionary 
psychology propose that synchrony’s adaptive functions are to strengthen social ties and group functioning. 
These models could largely accommodate either group selectionist or gene-centered explanatory 
frameworks. The adaptive benefits of synchrony are thus social and group-oriented, regardless of the 
mathematics of the manner in which those benefits originally arose.
1.1. Coordination in Human Groups
However, group bonding is not the only adaptive problem that human societies need to 
solve. They also need to coordinate their activities and make group-level decisions, such 
as where to move camp or when to set out on a large-game hunt (Van Vugt 2006). They 
need to be able to collaborate on tasks involving requiring complementary coordination, 
such as raising a barn or fighting a collective enemy (Valdesolo, Ouyang, & DeSteno 
2010). They need to facilitate effective transmission of cultural information and skills to 
younger generations (Henrich & Gil-White 2001). And in order to achieve any of these 
desiderata, they must somehow mitigate the inevitable tensions and conflicts that arise in 
any group, whether due to outright status conflict (Bendersky & Hays 2012), 
disagreements about procedure or strategy (Jehn 1995), mismatch between members’ 
motivations and their roles (Josephs et al. 2006), or incompetent leadership (Van Vugt 
2006). In short, it is necessary but not remotely sufficient to bond group members to one 
another if you want your community to thrive, or even survive. Human community life 
requires more than cooperation and effervescence. It also demands coordination, 
decision-making, the selection of appropriate shared goals, and the negotiation of very 
real internal conflicts that may be invulnerable to mere “bonding.” Thus, the problem of 
joint action extends beyond mere social motor coordination (Sebanz, Bekkering, & 
Knoblich 2006; Schmidt et al. 2011). At these times life is “a real fight,” in William 
James’s (1905) words, and as such it is not about getting people to like each other, or 
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even to trust or sacrifice for one another (Seligman 2008; see also Bulbulia 2010). It is 
about figuring out what needs to happen. For such purposes, mere group bonding is 
insufficient (Valdesolo, Ouyang, & DeSteno 2010).
1.2. The Role of Leadership in Group Coordination
It is here – for coordination, decision-making, and goal-oriented group effort – that 
leadership can be adaptive (Henrich & Gil-White 2001; Ronay et al. 2012; Willer 2009). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) argue that prestige 
hierarchies adaptively facilitate the flow of information and skills through groups. 
Importantly, such information transfer would be crippled in the absence of highly 
connected “nodes” – that is, high-prestige individuals who serve as focal points for 
others’ attention and as repositories for knowledge. Along similar lines, King, Johnson, 
and Van Vugt argue that leadership “represents a simple solution to the problem of 
collective action” (2009, p. 914). Van Vugt even posits that hierarchies and leadership 
may have “evolved specifically for the purpose of solving coordination problems” (2006, 
p. 359).
 Laboratory results in empirical psychology and management science provide 
appreciable support for such claims. For instance, Ronay et al. (2012) found that subjects 
in groups performed better on a complex task requiring interpersonal coordination (see 
Study Methods, below) when their groups were hierarchical than when they were flat. 
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Specifically, groups in which all members had been primed to think of themselves as 
equally high- or low-status performed more poorly than groups with three different 
“levels” of priming. However, this effect was not found for a procedurally independent 
task that did not depend on intensive interpersonal coordination. The authors also 
replicated this pattern in groups that were differentiated by prenatal testosterone exposure 
levels – as indicated by 2:4 digit ratios – in line with claims that prenatal testosterone 
significantly predicts power-seeking tendencies in adults (e.g., Mazur 2005). As 
predicted, groups composed of high-, medium-, and low-testosterone individuals 
outperformed groups that were homogenous in regards to testosterone exposure. 
 Bendersky and Hays (2012) similarly found that clear hierarchical structure 
predicted good group performance on a collaborative task. Mediation analysis showed 
that ambiguous hierarchy prompted status conflict – that is, competition among 
individuals over leadership – and that these status conflicts impeded information flow, 
thus hampering group performance. With stabler, more clearly defined hierarchies, status 
antagonism was suppressed, and information flowed more readily. Further supporting this 
body of results, Halevy et al. (2012) found that National Basketball Association teams 
with greater differences in salary between the best-paid and the lowest-paid players 
performed better on average than teams whose remunerative structures were more 
egalitarian. Interestingly, however, this same effect has not been found among baseball 
teams (Bloom 1999). Halevy et al. explained this discrepancy by pointing out the relative 
procedural independence of baseball versus basketball. While hitters in baseball take their 
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at-bats one at a time – affording their worst and best hitters essentially equal chances to 
hit – in basketball the offensive action is directed toward the one or two best scorers. 
Meanwhile,
defense is even more interdependent in basketball, as defending an 
opponent’s offensive flow requires all five players to constantly coordinate 
their actions and to cover for each other’s mistakes. In baseball, 
interdependence on defense is typically dyadic, with many of a team’s 
nine players being completely uninvolved on any given play. 
2012, p. 400
This supposition is lent credibility by Halevy et al.’s additional findings that playing time 
dispersion and starting lining dispersion also predicted success for basketball teams. That 
is, teams whose managers gave starting lineup spots disproportionately to a few players 
had higher winning percentages than teams whose managers spread around the honor of 
starting more equally. Similarly, teams whose players tended to each play more equal 
amounts of time performed more poorly than teams whose managers awarded 
disproportionately more playing time to a few players. The magnitude of these effects 
was not reduced by including average salary on the team or by average length of contract 
in the path models; thus, it is unlikely that these results were simply the product of some 
teams having a better (and thus better-paid) overall lineup. Hence, for procedurally 
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interdependent, goal-oriented group processes, in which each participant must modulate 
her decisions in real time on the basis of other’ actions, the major problem to be solved is 
not cooperative intent, but coordination. Here, hierarchy shows its benefits.
1.3. Hypotheses: Synchrony, Cooperation, and Coordination
Can synchrony, in its function as a social tool for uniting and binding, influence 
hierarchy’s positive effects on group coordination? This question has remained largely 
unaddressed, inasmuch as most empirical research on synchrony has focused on 
cooperative intent rather than ability. In their 2009 study, Wiltermuth and Heath (2009) 
used a weak-link coordination task and a public goods game as their outcome measures – 
both of which essentially gauge levels of trust. Kokal et al. (2011) measured the effect of 
synchronized drumming on spontaneous helping – specifically, helping a confederate 
pick up pencils she “accidentally” dropped. Kirschner and Tomasello (2010) found that 
musical synchrony predicted spontaneous helping among young children in an analogous 
“accident” scenario. Valdesolo and DeSteno (2011) used a protocol that gauged subjects’ 
willingness to sacrifice their time and energy to help another subject on a difficult packet 
of math problems, while Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer (2014) measured subjects’ 
willingness to take a long survey or donate money to outgroups following synchrony. 
Indeed, even studies with no specific cooperative outcome measures have tended to focus 
on synchrony’s ability to activate generalized prosocial sentiments and cognitions, 
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including feelings of affiliation (Hove & Risen 2009), in-group bonding (Tarr et al. 
2015), recall of personal details about synchrony partners (Macrae et al. 2008; Miles 
2010), and subjective measures of likeability (Launay, Dean, & Bailes 2014).
 A handful of synchrony studies have, however, attempted to examine more 
complex social coordination. Reddish, Fischer, and Bulbulia (2013) used a stag hunt 
game in their second and third studies, finding that synchrony predicted greater levels of 
mutually beneficial coordination.2 Kischner and Tomasello (2010) also found that 
children were more likely to help one another in a task that required fine-grained 
temporal coordination following synchrony. Thus, synchrony can apparently not only 
induce prosocial motivations and reduce selfish defection, but can also stimulate 
coordination that is reciprocally advantageous.
 However, can synchrony actually improve coordination ability? To my 
knowledge, only one study has thus far addressed this question. Valdesolo, Ouyang, and 
DeSteno (2010) found that participating in synchrony enhanced dyad members’ 
subsequent ability to physically coordinate moving a ball through a wooden labyrinth, 
with each participant holding one end of the board. Thus, synchrony may enhance 
perceptual acuity in regards to social tasks, making it possible that synchrony not only 
boosts motivation and willingness to cooperate, but also the ability to coordinate. 
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2 A stag hunt dilemma does not pit motivated defection against prosocial cooperation, as for example the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma does, but instead requires each participant to determine whether other participants plan 
to commit to action plan A or B. Plan A is universally more advantageous for all participants, but it only 
pays off if everyone chooses it. Plan B is a guaranteed but smaller payout. Thus there is no “selfish” motive 
to take advantage of other participants, but only a question of risky coordination (Bulbulia 2010).
Valdesolo, Ouyang, & DeSteno concluded that while “it is tempting to conclude that the 
adaptive function of coordinated action lies solely in its ability to induce a collective 
spirit,” in fact synchrony may have additional effects beyond “binding individuals 
together into adaptive units of reciprocal exchange” (2010, p. 693). 
 Plausibly, synchrony could also enhance coordination by mitigating intragroup 
status tensions. Bendersky and Hays (2012) list three strategies by which team members 
compete for status: claiming higher competence, asserting dominance, and devaluing or 
denigrating the contributions of others. These strategies seem to be verbal examples of 
aggressive or agonistic dominance behavior (Henrich & Gil-White 2001; Mazur 2005). 
Since it likely blurs self-other boundaries and inspires prosociality, synchrony may 
suppress or soothe the competitive motivations that drive such dominance-seeking 
behavior, leading to more harmonious, less agonistic interactions. According to 
Bendersky and Hays, then, this reduction in intragroup status competition should predict 
better information-sharing and more effective coordination. In addition, a steeper, more 
stable hierarchy can facilitate more efficient decision-making by channeling information 
and decisions to central (high-ranked) contributors, who then make executive choices on 
behalf of the whole group (Halevy et al. 2012; Ronay et al. 2012). Thus, there is an a 
priori reason to posit that synchrony will benefit group function by minimizing internal 
competition. 
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H1: Synchrony will facilitate group coordination on a procedurally interdependent task 
by reducing interpersonal friction and status competition, thus enabling better 
information sharing and executive decision-making.
This hypothesis, while plausible, may not capture all the relevant factors in the 
synchrony-group coordination dynamic. Bendersky and Hays (2012) offer reason to 
expect that, by contrast, synchrony may actually reduce team effectiveness in a tightly 
coordinated task. In their study, high levels of cooperativeness negatively impacted group 
performance. Although cooperativeness benefited information-sharing among subjects, 
the authors postulated that it may also have impeded healthy task-related conflict – that 
is, it may have suppressed productive debate by “producing groupthink” (2012, p. 336). 
Thus, a certain amount of differentiation and disagreement may be necessary for 
accomplishing procedurally interdependent tasks – as implied, for example, by Turner’s 
model of differentiated, economically productive social structure (1969, 1974). 
Moreover, if synchrony in fact levels hierarchies and produces undifferentiated 
communitas, as I have argued in Chapters Three and Four, synchrony may impede group 
performance by interfering with several of the purported benefits of hierarchy: the 
efficient allocation of labor, streamlined decision-making, and the establishment of clear 
functional roles within the group (Ronay et al. 2012). We can therefore advance a second, 
opposed hypothesis:
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H2: Synchrony will interfere with group function on a procedurally interdependent task 
by leveling status hierarchies, thus sowing confusion about roles and strategies, stymying 
information flow, and possibly suppressing productive disagreements.
The respective mediation pathways predicted by these two hypotheses are quite distinct. 
H1 predicts that synchrony will suppress status conflict, leaving the group hierarchy 
intact and functional. This retention of functional hierarchy will, in turn, facilitate 
information-sharing patterns and efficient distribution of labor. H2, by contrast, predicts 
that synchrony will flatten the hierarchy, and that information-sharing and efficiency will 
suffer as a result. If synchrony predicts better performance on a group task, then we 
should therefore expect to find clear evidence of leadership structures and high-quality 
interpersonal coordination. If synchrony predicts worse performance, then we should 
expect fewer signs of hierarchy and leadership, and poorer interpersonal coordination. 
Patterns of data that do not fit either of these two pathways (for example: synchrony 
predicts better performance but reduced hierarchy) will be unaccounted for. Finally, it is 
possible that synchrony will have no effect on group coordination or task performance. 
This, too, would indicate that the present theory may be flawed.
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2. Study Methods
With the goal of empirically discriminating between H1 and H2, my research team 
designed a single protocol assigning groups of research subjects to synchrony or 
asynchrony rhythm manipulations, and measuring their performance on a procedurally 
interdependent task.3 A two-factor between-group design featured a Synchrony 
(experimental) condition and Asynchrony (control) condition and performance on a group 
task as the dependent variable. Survey questionnaires and implicit measures of cognitive/
perceptual style provided data for subsequent mediation analysis. These surveys, in 
addition to lab notes taken during experimental sessions, were intended to enable us to 
discriminate between group dynamics predicted by H1 and H2 respectively.
2.1. Participants and Condition Assignment
All participants were recruited from the Boston University Psychology 101 pool using the 
university’s SONA system during the academic year 2014-2015 (BU IRB Study Protocol 
#3640E). Subjects were randomly assorted into groups of three, with no regard to 
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3 For this study, our lab team consisted of Catherine Caldwell-Harris of the Boston University Department 
of Psychology; several undergraduate and master’s interns and research assistants; and myself. Dr. 
Caldwell-Harris served as PI. I led the design of experimental manipulations and protocol. Interns formally 
carried out the majority of actual lab sessions, although I was present for or led approximately half the total 
sessions (c. 12 out of 21). 
gender.4 Sixty-nine subjects were initially recruited; six were withdrawn from analysis 
due to insufficient English skills. Of the 63 remaining subjects, 26 were male and 36 
were female; demographic data were missing for one subject. All subjects were 18 or 
over. All subjects read and verbally agreed to a standard informed consent, and were 
compensated with course credit. Due to persistent problems with no-shows, we were 
obliged to recruit four subjects for each lab session in order to ensure that three subjects 
would actually be available.5 If all four subjects showed up, the first to arrive was taken 
aside, tactfully dismissed, and awarded full credit for participation. 
 Before arriving in the lab, subjects were randomly assigned to either a Synchrony 
or Asynchrony condition. Assignment to condition was made automatically on the basis 
of the order subjects signed up for participation. Individual lab sessions alternated 
sequentially between experimental (Synchrony) and control (Asynchrony) conditions on 
a predetermined schedule; subjects simply signed up for discrete lab timeslots using the 
SONA website, which offered no information about condition. Upon arriving in the lab, 
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4 Subjects were primarily native English-speaking Americans. Data on ethnicity were not gathered; in 
future studies it will be important to include ethnicity and other demographic factors in order to control for 
cultural influences on social functioning (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan 2010). However, we did include 
one item asking whether subjects were native or non-native (but fluent) English-speakers. In data analysis, 
individuals’ native language status was not correlated with their groups’ scores on the collaborative task (p 
= .13; see below for details on the group task); nor was it correlated with experimenters’ subjective 
assessment of good interpersonal collaboration (p = .74). I do not have reason to think, therefore, that 
ethno-linguistic background significantly influenced outcomes, although future studies will need to explore 
this possibility more thoroughly. 
5 Yet another excellent reason why empirical psychology should move away from using teenagers as 
research subjects.
subjects thus participated in whichever condition had been scheduled for that lab 
timeslot. Neither the experimenters nor subjects exercised control over these assignments.
2.2. Materials, Measures, and Tasks
2.2.1. Power Priming
Subjects sat at three desks obliquely facing each other. After agreeing to the informed 
consent, all three subjects, regardless of condition, wrote for five minutes about a time in 
their lives when they felt powerful or were in charge of others. The purpose of this task, 
taken from Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee (2003), was to prime subjects with self-
perceptions of high status and interpersonal power. In Ronay et al. (2012), this priming 
manipulation was used to divide groups of subjects into different strata, with some 
subjects recounting high-power incidents and others recalling low-power experiences or 
memories of social defeat. In the current study, by contrast, all subjects were given the 
same (high-power) priming exercise, with the objective of creating conditions ripe for 
status conflict (Bendersky & Hays 2012) between equally power-motivated subjects. 
Because all subjects were asked to recount high-power experiences, no manipulation 
check was practical.6
153
6 I now consider this exercise to be a likely flaw in our study design, since it may have interfered with our 
attempts to create crisply defined status hierarchies. See Section 4, “Discussion.”
2.2.2. Ranking Exercise
In their groups of three, subjects then competed on a word-finding game based on the 
game Boggle™ (Ronay et al. 2012). Each subject was given an identical printout of a 4x4 
grid of random letters in which words could be found by connecting letters in any 
direction. Subjects were given a short demonstration and overview of the rules, and then 
were given three minutes to compete to find the most words in their grids. Longer words 
counted for more points. At the end of three minutes, the timer sounded and subjects were 
directed to put down their pens, following which an experimenter then recorded scores 
and verbally announced the winner. 
 Immediately after this exercise, the two “losers” were required to each compose 
an original sentence using only the words they respectively found in their identical grids 
(prepositions, articles, and similar basic words could be added as needed). The 
“winner” (henceforth “Leader”) then judged the two sentences on the basis of objective 
criteria such as grammar, complexity, and coherence, as well as subjective criteria such as 
aesthetic appeal and creativity. Upon selecting the “better” sentence, the winner 
verbalized his or her choice using a standardized script (“I like your sentence better!”). 
The purpose of this exercise was to solidify the “Leader’s” role as a high-status arbiter of 
decisions relevant to the group, and to tacitly produce a graduated rank hierarchy 
involving all three group members (the Leader at the top, the writer of the “better” 
sentence in the middle, and the writer of the “worse” sentence at the bottom).
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 As a ranking manipulation check, subjects then completed a version of the Triad 
Task (Ji, Zhang, & Nisbett 2004). In this task, subjects pair words from groups of three 
possible selections (e.g., “Rabbit,” “Carrot,” and “Monkey”). Each selection offers one 
potential “instrumental” or holistic/relational pairing, based on concrete associations (i.e., 
rabbits eat carrots), and one “categorical” or analytic pairing, based on abstract category 
relationships (i.e., monkeys and rabbits are both members of the category “animal”). 
Previous research (Ji, Zhang, & Nisbett 2004; Talhelm et al. 2014) has found that a 
higher proportion of categorical answers indicates an abstract, analytical reasoning style, 
while a higher proportion of instrumental answers indicates a holistic and concrete style. 
In addition, people who have been manipulated to feel powerful tend to reason more 
analytically and abstractly than low-power subordinates (Miyamoto & Ji 2011).7 We 
therefore hypothesized that “winners” would on average produce more analytical pairings 
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7 Specifically, Miyamoto and Ji found that subjects who carried out high-power priming task subsequently 
made more categorical pairings in the Triad Task than subjects who carried out a low-power priming task. 
The priming tasks used were similar to those described above; specifically, the high-power task required 
subjects to recall and write down two memories of times when they influenced other people, while the low-
power task required subjects to write about two memories of times when they were forced to adjust to the 
demands of others. Low-power subjects also made more relational pairings in the Triad Task than high-
power subjects. In a separate study in the same paper, these effects were replicated for trait socio-economic 
status and education attainment; in a large (N > 1,200) sample, subjects who had higher education made 
more categorical pairings than those with less education, and those with higher incomes made more 
categorical pairings than those with lower incomes. These effects were partly mediated by increased sense 
of personal agency – both education and income predicted a more robust sense of personal agency and 
autonomy, which then predicted more categorical and fewer holistic pairings on the Triad Task. 
Interestingly, in a third study in the same paper, primed low-power subjects used more verbs to describe 
other students, while primed high-power subjects used more adjectives (Miyamoto & Ji 2011). Under the 
Linguistic Category Model (Semin & Fiedler 1988) the use of adjectives reflects a more analytical 
orientation, because they reference only traits internal to the target (Jane is musical). Verbs, however, 
reference a more holistic processing style, because they reference actions that involve context (Jane plays 
in a jazz band). That each of these studies produced parallel results using different samples, including both 
state (induced) and trait (long-term) measures of social power, suggests that power and status are in fact 
predictors of analytical cognitive style.
for the Triad Task than losers. Because we implemented two Triad Tasks in each 
experimental session – one prior to the synchrony/asynchrony rhythm manipulation and 
one immediately after – the initial, pre-rhythm task will be referred to as Triad 1. This 
manipulation check is naturally valid only at the statistical level; if winners’ average 
Triad 1 responses were significantly higher than the other participants’ average Triad 1 
responses, this would suggest that our ranking manipulation was broadly successful.
2.2.3. Synchrony Manipulation
For the rhythm manipulation in both the Synchrony and Asynchrony conditions, subjects 
were each given 12-ounce steel weights (plumb bobs) suspended on twine, which they 
held in their right hands while swinging in time to a metronome beat. For the Synchrony 
condition, subjects swung their weights in precise synchrony with each other, guided by a 
single metronome. The metronome was placed directly in front of the group and was set 
to 1 Hz. To facilitate synchronization, subjects stood side-by-side in a single line, roughly 
two feet apart.8 Subjects were explicitly instructed to keep in precise time with each other 
and with the metronome. To keep the ranking structure tacitly salient, the “Leader” (the 
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8 In piloting, we discovered that subjects encountered intractable difficulties when attempting to 
synchronize their weights while standing in a triangle formation facing inward, due to confusingly 
intersecting planes of motion. Recall from Chapter One that synchrony and mimicry are facilitated better 
by direct spatial correspondence than by actual isomorphism; that is, it is much more natural and automatic 
to mimic a mirror image, despite the fact that it is technically the other person’s left hand that mirrors one’s 
own right hand, than it is to mimic an exact inverse translation of one’s body plan (LaFrance 1982). We 
therefore determined that members of Synchrony groups could most easily and accurately map each other’s 
pendulum motions onto their own bodies if standing in a single plane, facing forward. 
winner of the Word-Finding Game) was placed in the middle position, directly in front of 
the metronome, although he/she was not explicitly instructed to lead the synchrony 
exercise.
 In the Asynchrony condition, subjects were each given their own metronome and 
a set of headphones, and were instructed to stand facing away from each other in an 
outward-facing triangle in order to block any visual cues between subjects. The 
metronomes were set to 1 Hz, .92 Hz, and 1.08 Hz (60 bps, 55 bps, and 65 bps 
respectively). This ensured that, if they followed the beat of their own metronomes, 
subjects would not sync with the other two subjects. 
 In both experimental and control conditions, subjects swung their weights for 90 
seconds. This interval duration roughly matches the length of manipulations in Reddish, 
Bulbulia, & Fischer (2014). Since the physical motions, rhythm, and duration were 
identical, the only difference between the conditions was whether or not the subjects were 
synchronized. Following the rhythm exercise, subjects were re-seated and instructed to 
complete another version of the Triad Task (Triad 2) as a manipulation check to 
determine the immediate effect, if any, of synchrony/asynchrony on subjective sense of 
power or rank. 
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2.2.4. Group Sentence Composition Task
The primary outcome measure for this study was each group’s score on a collaborative 
Sentence Composition Task, modified from Ronay et al. (2012). The goal of the exercise 
is to work together to compose sentences as a group. In Ronay et al.’s original task, 
subjects search individually for words in unique 4x4 Boggle™ grids, then combine their 
individual word lists to compose novel sentences, using at least one word from each 
group member’s list. The number of grammatically correct sentences produced is the 
group’s score. This task is heavily procedurally interdependent in that it requires input 
from each participant at every stage; moreover, each subject’s suggestion for each new 
sentence depends heavily on the words suggested by the other team members. Thus, 
negotiation and strategic coordination are vital for success. 
 Anticipating that our main effect may be subtle, we wanted a higher variability in 
possible scores in order to more precisely capture small differences between groups. The 
simplest way to increase variability was simply to increase complexity and difficulty of 
the task. We also aimed to increase the highest likely score to 50 points or higher (from c. 
10 points in Ronay et al. 2012). Following advice from the original study’s first author 
(R. Ronay, personal communication, 2014), we therefore modified the task protocol to 
include the following stipulations: 1:) more complex and longer sentences would be 
awarded more points; 2:) adding words not found on any participant’s grid would be 
possible but would cost one point; 3:) the length of the task would be increased to 20 
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minutes from five; and 4:) teams could decide to request a fourth grid if desired, but then 
must also assign one team member to find words in it, and would have to turn in one of 
the original grids. As before, prepositions, articles, and similar basic words could be 
added as needed (i.e., they were “free”). Each of these additional rules increased the 
possible score the group could achieve, but also enhanced the need for smooth 
coordination and decision-making between team members. For instance, teams would 
need to decide whether to try for a higher number of shorter sentences, or to invest more 
time in crafting longer sentences. The decision would need to be made at the group level, 
through discussion and collaborative strategizing. With these modifications, we hoped to 
produce a wider spread of possible scores and thereby enable more fine-grained 
discrimination between groups.
2.2.5. Questionnaires
Following the Sentence Composition Task, subjects individually filled out four short 
surveys of four 7-point Likert scale items each. The first two questionnaires measured 
relational conflict and task-related or procedural conflict (Jehn 1995). The relational 
conflict scale consisted of the items “In the group sentence-composition game, how much 
friction was there between members of your group?”; “To what extent were personality 
conflicts evident in your group?”; “How much tension was there in your group in 
general?”; and “How much emotional conflict was there between members of your 
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group?” The measure of task-related conflict included the items “During the sentence-
composition game, how often did members of your group disagree about opinions 
regarding how things should be done?”; “How frequently were there conflicts about ideas 
in your group?”; “How much conflict was there about the work you did in your group?”; 
and “To what extent were there differences of opinion in your group?”9
 The third survey, taken from Bendersky and Hays (2012), measured status 
conflict. High scores on this survey would indicate that group processes were disrupted 
by members trying to upstage, dominate, or gain precedence over one another. Items 
included “During the group sentence-composition game, my group members frequently 
took sides (i.e., formed coalitions) during conflicts;” “My group members experienced 
conflicts due to members trying to assert their dominance;” “My group members 
competed for influence;” and “My group members disagreed about the relative value of 
members’ contributions.” 
 A fourth survey on group affect was modified from Wiltermuth and Heath (2009). 
Reddish, Fischer, and Bulbulia (2013) categorized the first three items as measuring 
entitativity (“How much did you feel you were on the same team as the other 
participants?”); perceived similarity (“How similar are you to the other participants?”), 
and trust (“How much did you trust the other participants in your group?”). We also 
included a fourth, individual affect item from Wiltermuth and Heath: “How happy are 
you right now?” Finally, a short demographics survey asked about gender, first language, 
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9 The wording of these items was modified very slightly from Jehn (1995) for context. as was the status 
conflict scale (Bendersky & Hays 2012).
nationality, and familial and current religiosity. Following the surveys, subjects were 
debriefed and dismissed.
3. Results
3.1. Ranking
For clarity, in the following sections I will refer to the winners of the word-finding game 
as “Leaders,” the second-ranked subjects as “Seconds,” and the last-ranked subjects as 
“Followers.” Thus, every group comprised one Leader, one Second, and one Follower. 
Gender did not predict rank on the whole (p = .79) or scores on the word-finding task (p 
= .28). Gender did not predict Triad 1 scores (p = .13), in contradiction to findings that 
women tend to think more holistically and men more analytically (e.g., Witkin & 
Goodenough 1977). 
 According to Miyamoto and Ji (2011), a subjective sense of being a leader or 
being powerful should positively correlate with more analytic or categorical scores (in 
this case, higher scores) on the Triad Task. However, rank showed no overall correlation 
with initial Triad (Triad 1) responses (p = .84), nor did Leaders’ initial Triad responses 
individually differ from Seconds’ responses (Leader M = 1.80, SD = 3.19; Second M = 
3.06, SD = 3.07; p = .23) or from Followers’ responses (M = 1.94, SD = 2.29; p = .86). 
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As expected (because it preceded the Synchrony/Asynchrony manipulation), there was no 
difference in average Triad 1 scores between conditions (p = .78).
 Further extrapolating from Miyamoto & Ji (2011), if group synchrony affected 
participants’ sense of position in the hierarchy, then we should notice differences in pre- 
and post-rhythm Triad scores between Synchrony and Asynchrony condition. Overall, 
there was a marginally significant trend for subjects in the Synchrony condition to 
become more holistic, and subjects in the Asynchrony condition to become more 
categorical, following the rhythm exercises (Synchrony M = -.19, SD 1.60; Asynchrony 
M = +.63, SD = 2.00; p = 0.10, equal variances assumed). Nonetheless, across ranks, 
there was no significant difference in average Triad 2 scores between conditions (p = .
20). Within ranks, condition did not predict any change in Leaders’ Triad 1 and Triad 2 
scores (p = .97), nor was it correlated with changes in Followers’ scores (p = .20). 
However, condition did significantly predict an average decline between Seconds’ Triad 1 
and Triad 2 scores, such that Seconds were more likely to show declines in their Triad 
scores (that is, to answer more holistically) after participating in group synchrony than 
after asynchronous, individual motion (p = .03; R2 = .30). 
 Within conditions, there was no significant difference in Triad 2 scores between 
Leaders and Seconds in the Synchrony condition (Leader M = 3.00, SD 3.53; Second M 
= 1.25, SD 1.58; p = .22) or in the Asynchrony condition (Leader M = 2.27, SD = 2.57; 
Second M = 4.00, SD = 3.66; p = .24). Across conditions, Leaders’ Triad 2 scores did not 
differ between the Synchrony vs. Asynchrony conditions (Leadersync M = 3.00, SD = 
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3.54; Leaderasync M = 2.27; SD = 2.57; p = .60). However, Synchrony condition did 
marginally predict lower Triad 2 scores among Seconds (Secondsync M = 1.25, SD = 1.58; 
Secondasync M = 4, SD = 3.66; p = .06). 
 Overall, then, Triad Task check gave us little evidence that the initial ranking 
manipulations functioned as intended; indeed, Seconds’ average Triad 1 scores (3.06, SD 
= 3.12) were on average more analytic (higher) than those of the Leaders (1.80; SD = 
2.59), although this difference was not significant (p = .19). However, there was some 
indication that the Synchrony manipulation preferentially affected the Triad 2 responses 
of Seconds. This link was unexpected and may be spurious, particularly given multiple 
comparisons. However, exploratory results from the conflict surveys further suggest that 
synchrony manipulations may have uniquely impacted Seconds, as discussed below.
3.2. Sentence Composition Task
Methodologically, our modifications to Ronay et al’s (2012) Sentence Composition Task 
to raise the task score ceiling were successful; the overall mean group score was 54.95, 
with a standard deviation of 15.99. There was a main effect of condition on group task 
outcome at the trend level (Synchrony M = 48.00, SD = 10.51; Asynchrony M = 61.27, 
SD = 17.88; p = .06; R2  = .18; equal variances assumed). Contrary to H1, groups in the 
Synchrony condition had lower scores, on average, than groups in the Asynchrony 
condition (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Group Sentence Composition Task Outcomes by Condition. Control 
(Asynchrony) groups scored approx. 12 points higher, on average, than experimental 
(Synchrony) groups.
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3.2.1. Qualitative Behavior Variables
During experimental sessions, experimenters took qualitative lab notes, focusing on 
observable aspects of participants’ behavior such as interpersonal information-sharing, 
disagreements, apparent affect, and silence. For analysis, these notes were coded into 
discrete variables and then rated independently by two research assistants. Two 
observational variables were analyzed at the group level: Strong Coordination and Poor 
Coordination. Strong Coordination referred to group members’ sharing information, 
making compromises, accepting or building on one another’s suggestions, or arriving 
smoothly at solutions to dilemmas such as when to request the fourth word grid. Poor 
Coordination included mentions of stonewalling, ignoring each others’ suggestions, and 
lengthy disagreement about roles or strategy. For Strong Coordination, the two 
assistants’ separate ratings achieved an interrater reliability of .83. For Poor Coordination, 
interrater reliability was .88. Because the reliabilities were good, I averaged the two 
raters’ scores for each variable, producing a single variable for Strong Coordination and 
another for Poor Coordination. 
 Strong Coordination was associated with higher scores on the Sentence 
Composition Task (p = .01; R2  = .39). Moreover, Strong Coordination was positively 
correlated with Asynchrony condition (p = .05; R2 = .34; equal variances not assumed). 
Thus, participation in group synchrony predicted fewer instances of observable high-
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quality coordination, which then predicted lower group scores. A multiple regression 
model including both condition and Strong Coordination was significant, and explained 
more of the variance than either Strong Coordination or condition alone (p = .02; R2  = .
48). However, neither variable retained unique significance in the combined model 
(condition p = .16; Strong Coordination p = .14), suggesting that the effect of condition 
on group outcomes was not linearly mediated by coordination (see Table 1). Condition 
did not predict Poor Coordination (p = .26), nor was Poor Coordination significantly 
associated with group scores (p = .12). 
Table 1: Multiple Regression Model Including both Strong Coordination and 
Condition. Dependent variable: group sentence composition task score.
R2 Adj. R2 F Sig. (p)
MODEL SUMMARY 0.48 0.40 5.60 0.02
β t r(partial) Sig. (p)
VARIABLES
Condition -0.38 -1.50 -0.40 0.16
Strong Coordination 0.40 1.57 0.41 0.14
166
3.3. Affect and Conflict Questionnaires
All surveys showed good scale reliability (Survey 1 α = .85; Survey 2 α = .87; Survey 3 α 
= .83; Survey 4 α = .80). At the individual level, Synchrony condition correlated with 
higher levels of reported relational conflict (Synchrony M = 1.67, SD = .96; Asynchrony 
M = 1.24, SD = .39; p = .03; equal variances not assumed). Synchrony condition also 
strongly predicted more task conflict (Synchrony M = 2.27, SD = .20; Asynchrony M = 
1.52, SD = .57; p < .01). Contrary to expectations (e.g., Bendersky & Hays 2012), 
condition was not associated with status conflict (p =.17), nor did it predict responses to 
the social affect scale (survey 4) (p = .89). 
 At the group level, I averaged subjects’ questionnaire responses, providing a 
single data point for each survey for every group. The same patterns held (see Figures 3 
and 4): groups in the Synchrony condition showed higher average levels of relational 
conflict (p = .03; R2 = .23 equal variances not assumed) and much higher levels of task 
conflict (p < .01; R2 = .31; equal variances assumed). There were no significant 
differences between Synchrony and Asynchrony groups in status conflict (p =.14) or 
affect (p = .84). Of note, more relational conflict marginally predicted lower group scores 
(p = .06; R2 = .17), but more task conflict did not (p = .65; R2 = .01). 
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Figure 3: Group Mean Relational Conflict by Condition. Experimental (Synchrony) 
groups reported more relational conflict than control (Asynchrony) groups.
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Figure 4: Group Mean Task Conflict by Condition. Experimental (Synchrony) groups 
reported more task conflict than control (Asynchrony) groups.
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3.4. Exploratory Findings
Following initial data analysis, I conducted several additional exploratory analyses to 
determine whether, in line with predictions drawn from Bendersky and Hays (2012), any 
factors interacted significantly with status conflict. One interesting, if tenuous, 
relationship emerged between rank, Triad scores, and status conflict: specifically, 
Seconds who became more holistic after synchrony predicted status conflict in the rest of 
their groups. Specifically, a decline in Seconds’ Triad scores after synchrony was 
correlated with higher group average experiences of intragroup status conflict (p = .02; 
R2  = .36). That is, members of groups whose Seconds showed a post-synchrony decline 
in Triad scores – and thus, according to Miyamoto & Ji (2011), possibly a subjective 
decrease in sense of power – were more likely to experience status conflict in their 
interactions. This relationship is only suggestive, and may be spurious, since it only 
appeared after multiple comparisons. Still, it may offer heuristic value. Why would status 
conflict be connected to Seconds?
 Because the synchrony manipulation appeared to have several distinct, if subtle, 
effects centered on Seconds, I chose to further examine the impact of Seconds on group 
performance. Multiple comparisons led to the discovery that there was a significant 
confound between Second gender and condition – women were, by fluke, much more 
likely to be assigned the Second role in the Asynchrony condition than in the Synchrony 
condition (p = .02). Female Second gender significantly predicted higher Sentence 
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Composition scores at the group level (p = .05; R2 = .20). Thus, both Second gender and 
condition predicted my main outcome measure, but Second gender achieved true 
significance while condition did not quite. Moreover, the two were highly confounded 
with each other. Groups with a female Second had higher Sentence Composition scores, 
while groups in the Asynchrony condition were, by fluke, more likely to have female 
Seconds.
 Again, these analyses were wholly exploratory, conducted with an eye toward 
identifying possible unanticipated effects for future study and analysis design. These 
relationships could very well be random statistical noise; however, there is at least some 
reason for caution in drawing this conclusion. In our lab notes, and in my subjective 
observation, it often seemed during experimental sessions as if Seconds were playing an 
outsized role in the group processes. It could be that we inadvertently structured the 
Second role to be more central to group processes than we intended; it is possible that 
females were also somehow better able to facilitate group communication in the Second 
role. If so, groups in the Asynchrony condition had an unanticipated advantage. However, 
the unanticipated finding that synchrony significantly – and uniquely among ranks – 
predicted decreases in Seconds’ Triad scores tentatively weighs against this hypothesis, 
inasmuch as lower Triad scores may indicate a reduced sense of status (Miyamoto & Ji 
2011). Moreover, declines in Seconds’ Triad scores were marginally associated with 
group task scores independently of condition (p = .08; R2 = .20). Since pre- and post-
synchrony conditions obviously had the same ratio of males to females, this effect cannot 
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be due to gender. In light of the fact that lowered Triad scores among Seconds following 
synchrony also predicted greater group status conflict, synchrony may have had negative 
effects on group functioning even with Second gender accounted for. Although they are 
suggestive here, more comprehensive investigation of these relationships will have to 
await future study using protocols specifically designed to test them.
4. Discussion
In light of the above results, I believe it is justified to reject H1. Synchrony condition was 
not associated with better group functioning on the Sentence Composition Task, nor did 
Synchrony condition predict more positive self-reports of interpersonal interactions. 
Indeed, groups in the Synchrony condition had lower average scores on the collaborative 
task than groups in the Asynchrony condition, although this effect only reached marginal 
significance. Synchrony condition also predicted higher ratings of relational and task 
conflict; moreover, experimenter ratings of good-quality group coordination were 
significantly higher in the Asynchrony condition. At the very least, synchrony did not 
ameliorate interpersonal friction, nor did it facilitate group decision-making. In sum, it 
appears that synchrony failed to increase group coordination ability as measured by these 
outcomes.
 In contrast, these results offer tentative support for H2. Synchrony was associated 
with higher self-reports of relational and task conflict, lower experimenter ratings of 
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interpersonal coordination, and marginally worse outcomes on the group task. Moreover, 
there was a statistical trend for Synchrony condition to predict a decrease in scores on the 
Triad 2 compared to the Triad 1 task, a pattern that was particularly apparent for Seconds 
(for whom it reached significance). Recalling that a decline in Triad scores may imply a 
transient increase in holistic/relational thinking – and therefore a reduction in subjective 
sense of power or rank – Synchrony condition may have led to a lowered individual sense 
of power. This suggestion should be taken with a good deal of skepticism, since it was 
only a statistical trend. Still, the body of evidence nonetheless converges on reduced 
group functioning and poorer coordination in Synchrony compared to Asynchrony 
groups. Even for nonsignificant results, the trends line up similarly; for instance, groups 
in the Synchrony condition reported higher mean levels of status conflict (M = 1.52) than 
Asynchrony groups (M = 1.24, p = .14).
4.1. Status Conflict, Task Conflict, and Synchrony
Bendersky and Hays (2012) found that group interdependent task outcomes were 
improved by a combination of high task conflict and low status conflict. In contrast to 
these expectations, task conflict was not a predictor of good coordination when status 
conflict was controlled for (Β = -.19, p = .85), and indeed positively tracked other forms 
of conflict (R relational conflict = .56, p < .01; R status conflict = .52, p = .02). Since group 
synchrony was positively correlated with both task conflict and relational conflict, and 
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both these forms of conflict were associated with lower group scores (marginally in the 
case of relational conflict, nonsignificantly in the case of task conflict), my results do not 
support Bendersky’s and Hays’s model: increased task conflict was not related to better 
task outcomes. Nor did group synchrony reduce status conflict; indeed, groups in the 
Synchrony condition had higher average status conflict levels than groups in the 
Asynchrony condition, though this difference was nonsignificant. Synchrony thus did not 
improve group task outcomes by suppressing status conflict or by facilitating productive 
disagreements.
4.2. Limitations
This study has numerous limitations that caution against excessive confidence in my 
interpretations. Overall, it is uncertain whether we successfully created a salient 
hierarchy. Triad 1 scores indicated no significant differences between individuals of 
different ranks, contrary to Miyamoto’s and Ji’s (2011) findings. This failure to replicate 
their results suggest that our ranking manipulation may have been too subtle to achieve 
significant subject differences in sense of power. While many Leaders seemed 
subjectively pleased to be singled out as the winners of the initial Word-Finding Game, 
and many Seconds were observed to smile or act pleased at being chosen as the composer 
of the better sentence, it was not clear in experimental observation that Leaders were 
more likely than the other two group members to actually take the lead during the 
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Sentence Composition Task. Indeed, it subjectively appeared as if the Seconds might be 
playing a more central role. This suggestion is tentatively supported by the unexpectedly 
strong effect synchrony manipulation had on the Triad Task scores of Seconds, and the 
fact that declines in Seconds’ Triad scores marginally predicted lower group task scores.10
 It could be that the Second in most groups was in fact a more “natural” choice for 
leading and coordinating the collaborative sentence-writing task than the nominal 
“Leader,” because he or she had previously gotten experience competing with the 
Follower on a similar task, whereas the Leader had not. Moreover, the Second was 
chosen internally to the group, via the Leader’s selection of the winning sentence. It may 
be that this internally derived character of the Second rank better matches the 
ecologically valid models of social status as an emergent feature of social dynamics 
internal to groups (Mazur 2005). Being “promoted” to the Second role may have thus 
inadvertently acted to increase those subjects’ sense of status, possibly setting up role 
ambiguity between Leaders and Seconds. Interestingly, declines in Seconds’ Triad scores 
also predicted more status conflict in groups; this effect was largely driven by Leaders (p 
= .01, R2 = .39). We may, then, have unintentionally produced a conflated ranking 
system. Synchrony may have helped destabilize this system, allowing status conflicts to 
175
10 Additionally, we failed to include survey items to ascertain whether students knew each other prior to the 
study; thus, if any students had already formed relevant status relationships outside the laboratory, these 
probably would have remained in effect during the study. Informally, it did not seem that most students 
knew each other, since we did not often have to remind students not to talk to each other while waiting for 
the study to begin – that is, students tended to keep to themselves rather than interact, even without our 
prompting.
arise. Nevertheless, synchrony itself did not predict status conflict, so this possibility 
must remain conjectural.
 Another issue with our ranking manipulation was the decision to prime all 
subjects to feel high-powered (high-status) at the study’s outset. This manipulation was 
intended to create conditions ripe for status conflict. However, we probably just made it 
more difficult to parse out salient, distinctive ranks between subjects. When attempting to 
generate conditions for status conflict in future studies, it will be better to, for instance, 
select only subjects with high 4:2 digit ratios (Ronay et al. 2012). Additionally, for the 
purpose of studying synchrony’s effects on hierarchy it may be more useful to use power 
priming manipulations after the establishment of rank, to reinforce and strengthen status 
differences which could then be muted (or enhanced) by synchrony.
 Gender proved to be largely unrelated to study outcomes – except for the case of 
Seconds and gender. Groups whose Seconds were female had significantly higher group 
task scores, but gender assignment and condition were highly conflated. If indeed 
Seconds often emerged as the de facto “leaders” of the groups during the Sentence 
Composition Tasks – as I have suggested may be the case – and if for some reason gender 
affected Seconds’ performance, then the main effect of Synchrony condition on group 
task outcomes may be spurious. Considering the strong relationship between biological 
sex, hormones, and status-seeking behavior across cultures (Mazur 2005), future studies 
would do well to restrict groups to one gender in order to simplify analyses and 
interpretation.
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 Finally, our synchrony manipulation is novel. We have not validated it against 
previous outcome measures, such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma or other common-goods 
games. It is thus possible that a different synchrony manipulation would produce more 
clearly interpretable results. Moreover, there were two issues with the dynamics of our 
manipulation that may have suppressed its effectiveness. First, our subjects collectively 
synced to the beat of a visible metronome set to one beat per second. However, as we 
have seen, Konvalinka et al. (2010) found that people sync more easily to other people 
than to metronomes; indeed, the invariability of metronome beats may interfere with the 
human propensity to maintain sync by constant, mutual correction and updating 
according to nonrandom patterns.11 Additionally, Schmidt, Carello, and Turvey (1990) 
found that the in-phase attractor is most stable for gross motor movements at 1.4 Hz, 
which is 40% faster than we set our metronomes. Better results may be obtained by using 
metronomes to initiate a rhythm at 1.4 Hz and allowing subjects to maintain the rhythm 
among themselves after stabilizing the rhythm (that is, turning the metronome off after 
subjects have achieved the rhythm).
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11 Specifically, syncing appears to be facilitated by 1/f patterns, or “pink noise,” in which trial-to-trial 
correlations are probabilistically correlated rather than random or deterministic. For human synchrony, a 1/f 
pattern obtains when the periodic timing of one’s partners varies with each beat (unlike a metronome), not 
nonrandomly (unlike a random number generator), such that the prediction error margin of Beat 1 
probabilistically influences the subsequent errors of Beat 2, Beat 3, etc., with long-range correlations 
maintaining structure over time (Torre & Wagenmakers 2009).
5. Conclusion
Ronay et al. remind us that “(w)hen a clear hierarchy is absent, competition, conflict, and 
a lack of clear role differentiation undermine group coordination and 
performance” (2012, p. 670). In light of the present findings, it appears that synchrony 
may have similar unwanted effects. These results do not support definitive conclusions 
about the impact of rhythmic synchrony on hierarchy per se. However, they do indicate 
that synchrony certainly does not enhance interpersonal coordination on a procedurally 
interdependent group task, and indeed may hinder it in substantive ways. Interpersonal 
and task-related conflict was more apparent in the Synchrony condition, and Synchrony 
condition group scores were marginally lower. What evidence could be gathered from 
Triad results modestly suggested that, if anything, group synchrony somewhat flattened 
hierarchies that may have been tacitly (and unintendedly) headed by Seconds. I thus 
reject Hypothesis 1 – that synchrony benefits group coordination by reducing status 
tensions and increasing interpersonal harmony – and consider Hypothesis 2 – that 
synchrony hampers group coordination by flattening hierarchy, crimping information 
flow, and reducing productive disagreements – tentatively, though not conclusively, 
supported. 
 These results call into question the assumption that synchrony’s effects on group 
functioning are largely positive. They also do not support extrapolating from Valdesolo, 
Ouyang, and DeSteno (2010) to claim that synchrony benefits interpersonal coordination 
178
in joint intellectual tasks. Instead, synchrony may be suited to increasing espirit de corps, 
and to generating a sense of unity and trust within groups – but not necessarily to 
enabling structural differentiation and leadership. This suggestion is relevant because in 
order to function well, communities need both to inspire feelings of unity and belonging 
and to enforce functional differentiation between members for accomplishing coordinated 
goals. Synchrony’s adaptiveness, then, is almost certainly contextually dependent. 
Dancing together at the end of a harvest season might bring the community together and 
inspire joy; dancing together in the midst of the working day might impede the work. 
Indeed, A. Fiske (1991) reported that Moose (Mossi) villagers in Burkina Faso 
consciously chose to work in ways that enabled synchronous motion – for instance, in 
well-digging – but that these methods were highly inefficient compared with more 
individualistic strategies, leading to irksome water shortages each growing season. The 
people preferred unity to functional efficiency. This example, while touching, 
demonstrates the real-world tension between synchrony/unity and goal-oriented, 
differentiated coordination.
 Nonetheless, it is possible that synchrony may render people more docile and 
amenable to authority if a hierarchy is somehow retained internally or imposed from 
without. In a recent pair of studies, Wiltermuth (2012a,b) reported that group synchrony 
increased subjects’ willingness to acquiesce to destructive or antisocial suggestions. In 
the military, drill is used not merely as a means to inspire unity, but to inculcate 
unquestioning obedience, since “when (drill) is carried out men tend to lose their 
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individuality and are unified into a group under obedience to orders” (U.S. Army Field 
Manual 3-21.5, 2003, p. 10-1). Indeed, if my model of immanent authority in Chapter 
Three is accurate, synchrony may inculcate feelings of implicit obedience to an emergent, 
undifferentiated whole. This generalized lability may then offer a convenient opportunity 
for hierarchical authorities willing to step in and take advantage of it, for either good or 
ill. However, such authorities would likely need either to resist the internal pressure to 
melt into the collective (Harris 2015), or would need to step in from an external position. 
Thus, authority and differentiated structure are probably in inherent tension with 
synchrony within the bounds of any social unit.
5.1. Implications
I would like to conclude this chapter by zooming out and expanding our scope of 
analysis. In social and evolutionary psychology, as well as in anthropological accounts, 
synchrony is often seen as a crucial instrument for the adaptive production of group-level 
harmony and cohesion; thus, the phenomenon of synchrony appears to lend itself to 
functionalist models of society that strongly emphasize interpersonal bonding (Haidt 
2012; McKay & Whitehouse 2015; Radcliffe-Brown 1922; Wiltermuth & Heath 2009). 
However, the foregoing results suggest that such straightforward interpretations are 
oversimplified. Models that highlight synchrony or group rhythm as a social tool that 
enhances group functioning should be tempered by a realistic acknowledgment that 
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synchrony may level the very social structures and hierarchies that are the foundations of 
most functionalist theories of society. Indeed, as a likely producer of Turnerian 
communitas, synchrony may countervail against coordination and consolidation of effort 
toward common purposes and the specialized differentiation of roles. This tension can be 
productive, as in military cadence drilling – in which the unifying and leveling effects of 
group synchrony are leveraged for arousing espirit de corps and for training in role 
differentiation and leadership in the face of contravening pressures (Harris 2015). Or it 
may undercut group goals if used in inappropriate contexts, as suggested by the present 
study. In either case, synchrony may subvert structure just as well as supporting 
generalized cohesion.
 This subversion can include, of course, the subversion of malign structure. 
Indeed, synchrony and communitas are often described as being deployed as 
revolutionary weapons against perceived injustice – that is, against hierarchical social 
structures that have lost their moral authority (Turner 1974). Having identified synchrony 
as a form of ritualization in the previous chapter, I am thus conversely led to propose that 
synchrony may be conceptually opposed to ritualism in the present one. Ritualism, in the 
sense of formal adherence to rite and propriety, is often seen by theorists as legitimizing 
power structures, while more ecstatic – including musical or rhythmic – forms of 
ritualized behavior are often construed as expressions of dissent or antistructural 
sentiment (Bell 1992). For instance, Seligman et al. suggest that rhythm – in the form of 
music – is essentially oppositional to “rite,” or legitimizing ritual: 
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Music unites and ritual divides…(Music) creates us as emotional beings 
and leaves all of us in the same state. Ritual, however, creates 
distinctions…Both music and ritual create worlds, but music shapes our 
inner emotional lives in ways that make us resemble each other, while 
ritual shapes the social and natural universe in ways that clarify our 
differences.
2008, p. 172 
As an example, a presidential swearing-in ceremony highlights the new distinction 
between the incoming head of state and the electoral populace that cast the votes. 
Similarly, a bar mitzvah emphasizes the break between childhood and impending 
majority. The conventions of social ritual legitimate and reinforce distinctions between 
social roles; for instance, in Korea a junior employee may not drink directly in front of 
superiors, and so he turns away to hold his hand in front of his glass when taking a sip. At 
the same time, he uses honorific titles and pronouns to refer to his bosses and other 
higher-ups, the informal polite grammar with the waitress, and informal grammar and 
pronouns with a younger friend, whom by convention he calls “tongsaeng,” or “little 
brother.” Each of these determinate expectations of social ritual conveys information 
about the different roles of the respective interlocutors. In this way, as Seligman et al. 
point out, ritual clarifies how we differ from one another within the social scheme. Thus, 
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when we feel impelled to rebel against that scheme, we are obliged to reject the ritual 
forms that support it – a process that often entails emphasizing social unity, communitas, 
and effervescent expressions of equality. Mary Douglas (1970), for example, has pointed 
out that the subversive or revolutionary impulse often expresses itself in extreme anti-
ritualism, in the sense of the systematic rejection of social conventions and the rites that 
legitimate power structures. In place of these legitimating rites, revolutionaries turn 
instead to motifs of undifferentiated effervescence (Turner 1974). The dancing and 
(sometimes extreme) sartorial informality of a music festival such as Woodstock or 
Bonnaroo is one example. In general, according to Douglas, revolutionists “find 
themselves behaving like revivalists in the effervescent stage of a new religion” (1970, p. 
154). In turn, this social effervescence implies a sense of “mass” and “undifferentiated 
human solidarity” within which specialized roles and hierarchical distinctions are 
anathema (Ibid.). In this way, synchrony functions as a ritualized evocation of unity and 
equalitarian relations that, in its extremities, can undermine ritualism.
 Given the social, cognitive, and motor effects of synchrony, and in light of the 
results of the present experiment, synchrony would seem, then, to exhibit some thematic 
affinity with what Douglas called the “idiom of revolt” (1970, p. 153). This observation 
calls into question the simplicity of claims that synchrony unifies society into a functional 
“superorganism” (Kesebir 2012). This thematic affinity between synchrony and anti-
ritualism has, of course, crucial implications for our interpretations of the functions of 
synchrony. Organisms, after all, are not undifferentiated masses. They are organismic: 
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they are integrated, dynamic structures comprising sundry, striving parts. Functionality, 
purposive action, and internally driven goal direction are characteristics of organisms, but 
not of masses. A fish swims toward food only because it is complexly internally 
differentiated – it has digestive organs, sense organs, a nervous system, and fins. Each of 
these constituents plays its own unique role in enabling the goal-oriented action of the 
animal. A pile of rice cannot do anything purposive, because it is not an organism. Its 
component rice grains, all identical, offer no affordances to each other for mutual 
integration. The pile is just an assemblage. Goal-directed behavior in a system depends 
on that system being functionally internally differentiated. Ritualized behavior that 
generates masses out of individuals may therefore be in basic tension with coordinated 
joint action – that is, with organismic purposiveness.
 In the present chapter, I have presented an empirical study suggesting that 
synchrony does not benefit organismic, goal-directed group functions that depend on 
coordination and differentiation, and may indeed hinder them. It may, then, be possible to 
unite too fully – to  become one at the expense of practical function. In the final chapter, 
we will examine this complicated relationship between synchrony, ritual, and social 
function at greater depth, in light of these facts.
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CHAPTER SIX: COMPLEMENTARY COORDINATION AND HUMAN 
BOUNDARIES
1. Identity vs. Complementarity
The time has come to summarize the findings and claims of my investigation and to posit 
what they might mean for our broader understanding of its subject matter and, if not too 
ambitious, religion at large. To do this, I will shift course. Rather than merely tying up the 
basic claims I have made, I will show what they imply for the dynamics of human society  
and religion, using the informative lens of ritual vs. sincerity from Seligman et al.’s 
Ritual and Its Consequences (2008), and its influential predecessor typology ritual vs. 
anti-ritualism so usefully articulated by Mary Douglas in her book Natural Symbols 
(1970). This heuristic flows naturally from the previous chapter’s suggestion that 
synchrony may not be an ideally adaptive strategy for accomplishing collective tasks that 
require complementary coordination. Specifically, my findings suggested that too much 
unity within a cooperating group – what Roy Rappaport (1999) called social 
“hypercoherence” – can actually impede collective practical efforts to accomplish a 
complex goal, efforts which would be better served by a level of differentiation and even 
hierarchy that could facilitate division of labor and executive decision-making. In turn, 
this reduced effectiveness in achieving goals may obstruct the formation of strong social 
bonds. Such a suggestion calls for an investigation of the distinction between social 
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strategies that evoke unity and differentiation respectively, particularly in regards to 
ritual. As we will see, “sincerity” and “ritual,” in Seligman et al.’s terms, are two such 
strategies.
 First things first. The preceding five chapters have, in their varying ways, circled 
around and outlined the contours of a vital theme that is implicit in both neurocognitive 
and dynamical treatments of synchrony. This is the distinction between identity and 
complementarity in social relations – specifically in regards to motor and other concrete 
social acts. Synchrony, in this framework, is a mode of forging identity – it marshals 
innate somatosensory mimicry responses and time-locked rhythmic unison to produce 
bodies whose periodic actions are uniform, and thereby blurs the boundaries between self 
and other. In synchrony, we experience others as “mirrors” of ourselves. We are 
bombarded with visual and auditory motor cues of sameness, of identity. 
 Complementary coordination (Type Four within the typology of joint action 
presented in Chapter One) is, obviously, quite different. Circularly defined, it is a mode 
of complementarity: it depends on distinct and different actions performed either 
simultaneously or out-of-phase, as in turn-taking during a conversation or division of 
labor in a collaboration. Complementarity, in a social sense, is the intricate interaction of 
distinct social others who may be collaborating for the sake of a shared goal, who may 
hold different relative ranks, or who may simply be treating one another as unique and 
separate individuals on the basis of the differentiated social context in which they are 
operating. They are not mirroring each other, nor are their actions in precise synchrony; 
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instead their behavior may be characterized by turn-taking, complementary rather than 
mirrored motor acts, or distinct bodily postures (Dale et al. 2014; Tiedens & Fragale 
2003). It is a mode of difference.
 These two modes – identity and complementarity – are reflective of distinct social 
contingencies and suited for different, but important, social purposes. This can be stated 
in terms of ritual. Identity is a phenomenological feature, indeed a basic descriptive 
characteristic, of Turnerian communitas – the breaking down of everyday social 
categories in favor of an effervescent period of social unity and non-differentiation. 
During communitas and communal liminal experiences, personalities are universalized, 
stripped of identified traits, made to blend together (Turner 1969). As we have seen 
exemplified in the hierarchical leveling of U.S. Army recruits and Ndembu tribal 
initiates, rank and role are evacuated in communitas. The everyday identifiers of status 
and identity as regards other people in the cohort are emptied out, leaving only the basic 
substrate of shared, physiological humanity at the level of which individuals become 
essentially fungible atoms. Synchrony, clearly, is one prime example of a social act that 
tends toward producing such fungibility and sameness: when each person’s rhythmic 
actions are identical with those of his fellows in an ongoing round of repeated, 
simultaneous cycles, any one person is no different, in terms of motor behavior, from any 
other. As I have argued previously, synchrony is, then, a conceptual affine of communitas, 
which is the uniting of otherwise separate members of society into experienced oneness. 
Turner posits that periodic experience of this social unity is utterly vital for 
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“oxygenating” the social body and for reinvigorating members’ conceptions of 
themselves as belonging to a subsuming group (1974, p. 267).
  Meanwhile, complementarity (as we are discussing it here) is a somatosensory 
analog of Turnerian structure: in a complementary interaction, roles are distinguished and 
defined, contributions are discriminate and determinate, reactions are differentiated. 
Status is very often salient; as we saw in Chapter One, for instance, the innate tendency to 
mimic social others is replaced by automatic motor complementarity in the context of 
status-relevant postures and behaviors (Tiedens & Fragale 2003). Thus, social 
differentiation is often vertical as well as horizontal. Importantly, both horizontal and 
vertical role differentiation are frequently practically useful when it comes to 
coordinating joint, goal-directed action, as we have reviewed in Chapter Five (e.g., 
Ronay et al. 2012; see also Tiedens, Unzueta, & Young 2007). This practicality of role 
differentiation furthers the analog with Turnerian structure, which, as we saw in Chapter 
Four, serves practical social and material purposes. As Dale et al. put it, “Cultural 
practices dwell upon and stabilize complementary distribution of work, to make (such) 
challenging task(s) as the sailing of a warship or the construction of huge buildings 
possible” (2014, p. 79). 
 It is at this juncture, though, that we come upon a paradox. Complementarity 
entails mutually delineated individuals, while the mode of identity – exemplified by 
synchrony – blends participants into undifferentiated unity. Yet it is nevertheless the 
mode of identity which is most clearly a correlate of and grounding for the experience 
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and the ethic or ideal of individualism. After all, self-other merging – such as that 
produced by synchrony – ensures that the self is experienced roughly as a unitary entity. 
What I do, you also do, and therefore we feel as one (Paladino et al. 2010). But the 
presence of other people is a logical precondition for interpersonal relating. Insofar as 
participants in ecstatic dance are united to the point of feeling merged, the logical 
grounds for the possibility of relating amongst each other are obscured. That is, bringing 
people together in total unity does not necessarily bring them into relation with one 
another – since relationships depend on social boundaries which can be crossed and 
recrossed (Seligman & Weller 2012).
 I call this observation a paradox because, if true, it would seem to contradict the 
claim, nearly ubiquitous in the relevant literature, that the effects of synchrony and music 
straightforwardly engender “social cohesion” or are correlates or engines of collectivism 
(e.g., Cirelli et al. 2014, p. 1009; McNeill 1995). Indeed, the argument that synchrony or 
“muscular bonding” are basic tools for producing (Wiltermuth 2012) or augmenting 
(Reddish, Bulbulia, & Fischer 2013) collectivist social values is so widespread that it 
functions nearly as an axiom. Jonathan Haidt (2012), for example, recommends 
synchrony as a tool to make social groups more “hivish” or densely interdependent, 
implicitly connecting synchrony with social conservatism (with which he also associates 
a “hivish” or collectivistic mentality). Polemically, Ehrenreich (2006) argues that 
collective dance historically undergirded the collectivism and social cohesion that was 
once common around the world until – she laments – it was so widely eclipsed by our 
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current condition of post-Protestant capitalist individualism. For Ehrenreich, dance 
creates social cohesion by enabling Turnerian communitas, but the modern world suffers 
from endemic social isolation because capitalist and hierarchical powers frown on 
communitas-producing expressions of “collective joy” such as communal dance. On a 
darker note, popular opinion also associates synchrony with displays of mass conformity, 
such as the Nuremberg rallies in Nazi Germany (Wiltermuth & Heath 2009). 
Synchronous bodily motion is thus commonly described as being a producer of 
collectivistic or even anti-individualist effects. The communitas that synchrony creates 
can be used for good or ill. But either way, it achieves its effects, according to accepted 
wisdom, by gluing people together.
 My present point is that such equations of synchrony-derived communitas and 
sociality as such are mistaken.1 Indeed, communitas itself is not, in fact, the epitome of 
sociability, despite its etymology. Setting aside synchrony and considering communitas in 
general, numerous theorists of ritual and religion have noted “fascinating correlations…
between this conversion to the perspective of communitas and the assertion of 
individuality” (Turner 1969, p. 117). To take one example, Glastonbury New Agers in 
rural England both are expressly committed to the ideals of communitas (including 
radical equality and communal living) and rate as highly individualistic in their social 
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1 Turner himself would take such a claim as self-evident. Nevertheless, as fields increasingly distant from 
cultural anthropology take up questions of the ritual tools of human sociability, there has, I think I have 
demonstrated, been a tendency to wave hands a bit when it comes to the actual determinate features of 
Turnerian communitas – such that the concept has slid somewhat from describing a liminal or leveling 
phenomenon to referring to human bonding tout court. In part, it is this tendency that I am contesting.
ethos (Prince & Riches 2000). Rave (electronic dance music) subculture is extraordinarily 
individualistic (B. Wilson 2006) yet it strongly emphasizes communitas values – and, of 
course, literally centers on synchronous dancing. Similarly, as discussed at the end of 
Chapter Five, Douglas points out that anti-establishment movements typically seek both 
“the experience of mass, of undifferentiated human solidarity” and simultaneously “to 
enhance the sense of individual worth, human warmth and spontaneity” (1970, p. 154; 
emphasis mine). There appears, then, to be both logical and ethnographic grounds for 
suggesting that the social modes which most powerfully unify people and equalize them, 
eclipsing or downplaying formal differences in immediate terms – such as synchrony, 
collective effervescence, or communitas2 – paradoxically shade into denatured 
individualism, not collectivism, at their extremes. As such, the relationship between 
synchrony and strong community ties is not as straightforward as contemporary 
researchers have argued.3 This point, as we will see, is crucial in its implications for the 
larger discussion of ritual and ritualization.
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2 This apparent conflation of distinct concepts is not unwarranted. For instance, Seligman et al. argue that 
“something similar is at the core of …Émile Durkheim’s idea of the effervescence of the sacred, Max 
Weber’s idea of pure charisma, and Victor Turner’s concept of communitas” (2008, p. 109). And I have 
shown in the preceding chapters (particularly Chapter Four) that synchrony is an almost ideal type example 
of the ritualized generation of communitas. 
3 Haidt, Seder, and Kesebir, for instance, write that “Ecstatic group rituals” are an example of “the 
extraordinary measures many groups take to create and maintain cohesiveness.” (2008, p. S139-S140).
2. Ritual, Anti-Ritualism, and Sincerity
At the end of the previous chapter, I gestured toward Seligman et al.’s (2008) argument 
that ritual is opposed to and distinct from music and thus from effervescence, and 
suggested that synchrony is better considered an example of the latter than the former. 
This is true despite the obvious fact that synchrony is a prime example of human 
ritualization – behavioral processes that are primarily communicative and exaggerated for 
the purpose of calling attention to social facts and relations. In other words, although 
ritualism implies ritualized behavior, the inverse is not necessarily true. One can ritualize 
without partaking in ritualism. 
 Clearly, definitions are in order. Here, I take “ritualism” to mean essentially an 
affirming stance toward the performance of socially or conventionally mandated practices 
whose purpose is signaling or generating social postulates. I am invoking this term to 
connote the habitual and durational character of a chronic attitude toward ritual, rather 
than a mere instance of a ritual act. Ritual itself, is, I think, best defined by Roy 
Rappaport, who called it “the performance of more or less invariant sequences of formal 
acts and utterances not entirely encoded by the performers” (1999, p. 24). Of course, all 
definitions are problematic, especially in religious studies; moreover, as I pointed out in 
Chapter Four, ritualization is a cleaner and more determinate – thus more conceptually 
satisfying – category than ritual overall. However, Rappaport’s definition of ritual serves 
my present purposes adequately and allows for a useful discrimination between ritual and 
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ritualization. Namely, while nearly any act can be ritualized – the exaggerated opening of 
a car door, the conspicuous highlighting of one vocable over others during conversation – 
ritual properly so-called entails a significantly higher degree of cultural constraint and 
prescription. There is only so much fooling around you can do to individualize your 
Passover seder before other people won’t recognize it as a seder anymore. While 
ritualization, then, is a social tool for setting one action off from others in order to 
highlight its message – a way of marking boundaries in the social and semiotic landscape 
– ritual proper is an instance of marking the very boundaries that one’s society or religion 
normatively marks. Ritualization can say “look at this action I am exaggerating!” but 
ritual says “Now it is Advent.” Ritualization can be idiosyncratic. Ritual cannot. It is 
encoded by others than ourselves. Ritualism, therefore, is the habit of marking the 
normative, non-idiosyncratic boundaries that one’s culture prescribes for us. It is the 
positive acceptance of the authoritative dictates of a ritual culture.4
 As such, ritualism is synonymous with what Seligman et al. (2008) call the “ritual 
mode”: a habitual acceptance of ritual practice and its entailments. Seligman et al. 
contrast the ritual mode with the mode of sincerity, and it is this latter mode that most 
concerns us in this chapter. Sincerity, for these authors, does not simply mean honesty or 
earnest authenticity or pure intentions, although none of these concepts is irrelevant. It is 
instead the very opposition to ritualism, the habitual assumption that the outward forms 
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4 Note that I am not including in this dimension the common pejorative connotation by which “ritualism” is 
a rote or slavish adherence to meaningless rite. Such a negative gloss on ritualism would, itself, be an 
indicator of an anti-ritual perspective, as we will see.
of ritual are empty, vacant of significance, and an impediment to true communication and 
genuine experience – experience that is and can only be sourced internally within the 
individual. 
 Protestantism – particularly in its Reformed varieties – is the paradigmatic 
example of the sincere mode at work in religion. The Catholic Church of the 16th century 
was, both in stereotype and in fact, opulent with saints and icons, overflowing with 
venerations, pilgrimages, feast days, relics, mysteries, and Sacraments. But Protestant 
Calvinism and Zwinglianism5 spurned much of this inheritance of ritual convention, to 
varying extents stripping down Christianity to seeming basics such as the Bible, plain 
hymns, communion (offered less frequently than in Catholicism), and baptism. 
Anabaptist denominations later carried this purifying program even further. Reformed 
churches and their descendants were thus deeply iconoclastic, rejecting nearly all images 
(including removing the image of Christ from the crucifix) and excising the varied folk 
traditions of lay Catholicism – particularly the veneration of saints – even as 
Protestantism at large transitioned worship into the vernacular and made the Bible 
accessible to lay worshipers through translation. Similarly, while Catholicism taught that 
Christ was present in literal substance in the bread and wine of the Eucharistic host in the 
doctrine of transubstantiation, Reformed theologies of all varieties insisted that such a 
doctrine – and its Greek philosophical underpinnings – was not grounded in Scripture. 
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5 Ulrich (Huldrych) Zwingli was a 16th-century Swiss theologian and contemporary of John Calvin who is 
generally regarded as having taken the purifying and iconoclastic impulses of the Reformation even further 
than did Calvin.
Generally, Reformed theologians argued that communion was merely a commemoration, 
a symbol or metaphorical signification only, or that if there was a “real presence” of 
Christ in the host it was spiritual or non-corporeal only. Finally, Protestantism’s doctrine 
of solo fides stipulates that believers are saved by faith alone, not by “works.” That is, 
ritual practice is ineffectual, practically speaking, for achieving salvation. Only an inner 
faith that cannot be effected by external acts can ensure one’s future heavenly estate. 
 In this way, the Reformed branches of Western Christianity illustrate several of 
the most important features of Seligman et al.’s mode of sincerity. Namely, 1:) they are 
iconoclastic, rejecting outward forms, practices, and images; 2:) they are individualistic, 
inasmuch as each believer’s own personal faith is her route to salvation; 3:) they are 
inwardly oriented, since faith is an inner affirmation, not an external act; 4:) they are 
universalistic, inasmuch as they claim to reject idiosyncratic and “idolatrous” practices 
and affirm only those essential doctrines and practices that are properly common to all 
Christians; and 5:) they are cognitively discursive and rationalist rather than enactive or 
associative, since their emphasis is on the verbal word of scripture and the literal 
affirmation of abstract propositions about religious matters – particularly belief in 
Christ’s salvific atonement. 
 Fascinatingly, similar traits tend to cluster together wherever they are found. Mary 
Douglas (1970) emphasized that the forward progress of civilization is not, as has often 
been assumed, marked by increasing rationalism, rejection of hoary senseless ritual, and 
Enlightenment-style individualism. Instead, these traits are found in tandem with one 
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another across history wherever an anti-ritual sensibility is ascendant. Douglas’s concept 
of anti-ritualism, functionally synonymous with Seligman et al.’s sincerity, is thus a 
marker of socially diffuse societies or of resistance to established norms and authority 
structures.6 People become resistant to ritual when they come to resent the societal setup 
that it reflects and legitimizes (see, e.g., Bell 1992, Turner 1974) – but also whenever 
their socio-ecological environment encourages diffuse social relations. Thus, according to 
Douglas, both modern, Western counterculture mavens and Mbuti pygmies of central 
Africa share a notably anti-ritual outlook, with diffuse social roles, relatively little 
organized ritual behavior, and an emphasis on individual freedom, authenticity, and 
autonomy. For the Mbuti, this orientation is enabled in part by a lush forest environment 
that supports hunter-gatherer egalitarian nomadism, as well as a symbiotic relationship 
with sedentary Bantu villagers who, in essence, help subsidize the Mbuti lifestyle by 
providing essential goods in exchange for bush meat and other forest products. Notably, 
the Bantu villagers have a denser and more restrictive social structure than the Mbuti, and 
concomitantly more ritual (Douglas 1970).7 For New Agers in Western societies, 
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6 Douglas’s “grid and group” typology is also well-known, but less useful for the present discussion. And 
candidly, I confess that the precise structure and predictions of grid/group theory elude me. It is not laid out 
systematically in Douglas’s 1970 book, and repeated readings and rereadings have left me still unsure what 
exactly each of the four quadrants of the typology (high grid and low group, low grid and high group, etc.) 
corresponds with. What is important is that Douglas counterposes a clear pro-ritual orientation with an 
equally clear anti-ritual orientation and predicts, I think convincingly, in which sorts of societies and 
contexts one or the other is liable to be found.
7 That is to say, social roles are more differentiated – i.e., complementary in terms of function – among the 
Bantu than among the Mbuti, who “are as free of social categories as they are of bounded 
groups.” (Douglas 1970). Thus, members of Mbuti groups each occupy roughly identical social roles, since 
those roles are mostly undifferentiated. Interestingly, the Mbuti religion is characterized primarily by song 
and dance, not liturgy.
individualism, idealized egalitarianism, and suspicion of authoritative social structures 
such as “organized religion” are both motivated by disillusionment with the values and 
perceived injustices that traditional authority is seen to represent, and enabled by the 
abundant material prosperity of life in a wealthy Western country that makes 
individualism and independence practically feasible.8
 Thus, both Douglas and Seligman et al. assert that a general attitude of anti-
ritualism will tend to correspond with a fairly determinate list of social, epistemic, and 
ethical attitudes that co-occur together across times and cultures. Douglas points out, for 
instance, that “Manicheeism, Protestantism and now the revolt of the New Left, 
historically…all affirm the value of the follower’s inside and of the insides of all his 
fellow members” (1970, p. 50-51).9 Similarly, Seligman et al. note the startling 
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8 In both cases, material subsidy enables (but does not necessitate) individualism and anti-ritualism in part 
because perceived material constraints tend to elevate the subjective salience of the need for practical, 
sustained, regimented collaboration (e.g., Turner 1974). The argument is that complementary coordination 
is called for in order to counter material deprivation, and ritualism is the mode by which coordination and 
differentiation are most clearly supported. Thus, according to Douglas, an important predictor of ritualism 
is a cultural belief that resources are restricted, whereas anti-ritualism is often found in social groups that 
encourage the opposite belief. While in theory these cultural beliefs about the abundance of resources can 
be independent of the actual material situation (culture could easily perpetuate a belief in scarcity where in 
fact there is abundance), in reality they are often correlated: societies in which the practical needs of life are 
secured more easily are, Douglas claims, more likely to express a sincere or anti-ritual mode (1970). This is 
not to imply a thoroughgoing cultural materialism, but only to point out that material and economic 
conditions must be counted among the factors that influence the attitudes of a society, on the whole, toward 
ritual.
9 Manicheeism, or Manichaeism, was a dualistic gnostic religion of the early centuries CE whose prophets 
taught, roughly, that each person was a pure inner soul trapped in a body of evil, foreign matter. This 
privileging of the spiritual and incorporeal and the debasement of matter and physicality, as well as the 
emphasis on the importance of a secret, inner person separate from concrete externalities, are common 
marks of sincerity and anti-ritualism (Seligman et al. 2008).
correlations between post-Protestant liberal modernity and the Chinese anti-Confucian 
philosophy of the philosopher Mozi the 5th century BCE, who
constantly ridiculed ritual as artificial and wasteful. His answer was 
instead that every individual should universalize his feelings of love, thus 
leading to the end of contention. At the same time, he had a strong 
utilitarian streak, arguing that ending ritual and ending strife would both 
free up productive resources, and suggesting pragmatically that any 
doctrine proven beneficial should be adopted. This combination of 
utilitarianism and a sincere love that comes from within sounds strikingly 
modern in some ways, but the underlying reason for the similarity is that 
both Mohism and modernity share a sincere mode of understanding and a 
critique of the ritual mode.
Seligman et al. 2008, p 119
  
Note that this universalizing ethic logically tends to imply a convergence of identity 
between people: any acknowledged differences on the basis of, say, social category or 
rank would encourage differential treatment, which would not be universal. In other 
words, Seligman et al.’s sincerity is an affine of what I call the mode of identity, not 
complementarity. This is a general rule. Thus, rationalism (a preference for explicit, 
reasoned discourse relying on language rather than habit), individualism, and ethical 
198
universalism tend to go hand-in-hand with anti-ritualism, a focus on the internal rather 
than the external, an emphasis on motivations rather than actions, and an egalitarian 
mistrust of socially imposed categories or roles. These associations hold true across eras 
and societies because the above characteristics mutually implicate one another. Historical 
“progress” does not, then, imply some inexorable move toward rationalism and away 
from traditional authority or ritualism. However, as Seligman et al. observe, these traits 
do happen to be characteristic of our current era of secular or liberal modernity.
2.1. Modernity and Sincerity
The current era is not a teleological endpoint for any necessary Spencerian arc of 
progress toward rational enlightenment, but rather one historical manifestation among 
many of the sincere or anti-ritual mode. Nevertheless, it is not controversial to note that 
individualism is ascendant in contemporary Western society to an extent scarcely 
matched elsewhere in history. Concomitantly, discursive rationalism – particularly as 
manifested, for instance, in the cultural preeminence of science – is what adjudicates 
reality for moderns, whereas allegorical, tradition-backed, or associational epistemologies 
tend to be downplayed. For example, inhabitants of liberal modernity trust scientists to 
tell them that black holes really do literally exist, but they are somewhat less enthusiastic 
in taking theologians at their word about, say, the Trinity. This preference makes sense 
inasmuch as the Trinity can be conceived of as a social subjunctive – an “as-if” story 
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about the nature of things that requires a certain amount of socially mandated affirmation 
and ritual substantiation to subjectively confirm. As such, theologizing about the triune 
God it is not a good fit for the sincere anti-ritualism of modernity. Those things that begin 
in shared imagination are flatly discounted by the sincere or anti-ritual mode. Sincerity is 
concerned instead with determining what objectively exists, both inwardly and outwardly, 
rather than relying on shared exercises of the imaginative faculty that creates and 
influences our understandings of things.10
 One telling example of this preference for objectivity is the interesting liberal 
trope that national and cultural borders do not really exist. The assertion that national 
boundaries are objectively unreal, a discrete imposition by humankind on an actually 
indifferent and continuous earth, is widespread in postwar 20th- and 21st-century 
literature, particularly that with a countercultural bent. For instance, the novelist Kurt 
Vonnegut – a paradigmatic literary banner-carrier for the ideals of sincerity if ever there 
was one – has a character in his novel Mother Night confess that
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10 Thus, for instance, the characteristic Calvinistic preoccupation with whether one’s faith is actually 
sincere – and concomitantly with whether one is truly saved or not (Weber 1905/2002). Compare this 
sincere Calvinistic approach to inward personal belief with the ritualism of, say, the Catholicism of Calvin’s 
era, in which whether one was saved depended in part on what one did about it. In a cultural milieu where 
ritual action is assumed to be efficacious, the nature of reality and answers to up-or-down questions (“Do I 
believe?”) depend at least in part on how human beings decide to behave – since behavior is the mode by 
which human imagination impinges on the external world. In a milieu that assumes that ritual is 
meaningless, reality will often tend to be seen as “out there,” beyond human influence, indifferent to human 
perspective and action. That this tendency extends even to internal matters such as personal faith is 
testament to its sweeping power – in a world without ritual, even one’s own mental or propositional stances 
can be matters of essentially objective concern, to be determined rather than effected.
I can't think in terms of boundaries. Those imaginary lines are as unreal to 
me as elves and pixies. I can't believe that they mark the end or the 
beginning of anything of real concern to a human soul.
Vonnegut 1961/2009, p. 133
Note how this denial of socially imposed boundaries easily flows into an ethical 
universalism that insists on the value of shared humanity.11 While this sentiment has 
inspired millions with its idealized imagining of a world without strife (indeed without 
separateness and distinctions, which Turner (1969) cites as the conditions for the 
possibility of strife), it also affords insight into one of the most serious weak spots of the 
mode of sincerity: namely, that a cultural ideal that spurns boundaries and difference is 
ill-equipped to deal effectively with precisely those things when they crop up in the real 
world. As Seligman and Weller (2012) point out, ritualism, by carving up the universe 
into bits and by highlighting some things over others according to subjunctive norms, 
actually enables a fluency with the negotiation of boundaries that is lacking when the 
objective existence of boundaries is denied. On the other hand, “Sincerity, carried to its 
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11 This ethical discomfort with artificially imposed or culturally sourced distinctions is also voiced 
poignantly in John Lennon’s song “Imagine,” with its exhortation for listeners to “Imagine there’s no 
countries/It isn’t hard to do/Nothing to kill or die for/And no religion too.” It is not much of an 
exaggeration to call this song a kind of secular hymn. For instance, it was recently played by the musician 
Davide Martello on the sidewalk outside the Bataclan Theater in Paris following the ISIS terrorist attacks 
there, in a gesture of healing. Bataclan, who felt compelled to “offer a sign of hope” to the survivors, has 
been commended by the European parliament for championing the shared values of Europe (Bucks 2015). 
That a promoter of “common values” should, in the wake of a serious disaster, play a song that imagines 
the end of both countries and religion is a good indicator of the hold which the sincere mode has on the 
contemporary West.
extreme, is the search for wholeness, for overcoming boundaries and positing a unitary, 
undifferentiated, uncorrupted reality. It is a utopian impulse” (p. 96). Hence, when mutual 
identity and all it entails – equality, universality, borderlessness – is an ethical imperative, 
complementary social relations become tricky. Indeed, where the sincere mode 
dominates, “the problem of boundaries no longer has a clear solution” (Seligman et al. 
2008, p. 101).12
2.2. Communitas, the Individual, and Secularism
Synchrony, of course, elides boundaries between participants and serves as an instrument 
of communitas. We have noted above that Seligman et al.’s mode of sincerity and 
Douglas’s anti-ritualism both elevate values that converge closely with those evoked 
during episodes of Turnerian communitas, in which the individual is stripped of 
identifying characteristics and merged in with her fellows – a circumstance that 
transiently inspires universalistic ethical sentiments even as it highlights and encourages 
individualism. A short passage from ritual theorist Ronald Grimes illustrates why this 
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12 For example: the apparent difficulty of Western policymakers in comprehending the motives and values 
at play within Muslim societies, which often are not identical to those of Western liberalism. Seligman et al. 
would posit that a diplomacy that began with a straightforward acknowledgment of deep differences in 
worldview, history, and values would have better chances of success than the West’s current strategies. It’s 
impossible to know whether Seligman et al. are right here, but it seems unlikely that anything could fare 
any worse than the American strategy of assuming that within every Muslim there is a democratic capitalist 
just waiting to break free, if only the West removes whatever dictator is currently in charge.
convergence between universalism and individualism occurs, both in communitas and in 
other, parallel social modes:
Decorum is conventionalized behavior. Convention is a mutual, socially 
reinforced agreement about the form, though not necessarily the meaning, 
of an action.…Decorum is a way of displaying roles, statuses, and 
interpersonal intentions. It is also a way of affirming sociability itself.
Grimes 2010, p. 38; emphases mine
This quote goes to the heart of the various arguments we have been tracing. By accepting 
the authoritative stamp of convention – templates for behavior that are encoded not by 
their performers, but by cultural tradition – people become able to telegraph information 
about who they are and what their role is. Ways of crossing legs, gestures, and even 
clothing or decorations display one’s position within the social landscape in a way that 
mere words cannot. This is the reason for Grimes’s emphasis on the form over the 
discursive meaning of conventions; propositional beliefs about the meaning of rituals are 
often highly idiosyncratic and variable from individual to individual, whereas practical 
agreement is much easier to achieve regarding how the rituals go. 
 For instance, around Christmastime in Boston a portion of residents put up lights 
and other decorations in their yards or windows. If you asked around, you would 
probably get as many different quizzical answers to the question of what the decorations 
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mean as people you interviewed. However, there would be fairly strong convergence 
between the forms taken: lights above all, snowflake decorations, snowmen, occasionally 
nativity scenes. But although expressions of their propositional meaning would vary 
widely, the decorations are absolutely not without social significance. For instance, it 
would be unlikely for bachelor roommates to put up a full Christmas display in their 
apartment window. On the other hand, informally it seems to me that there is a very good 
probability that a family with children would do so, as well as older couples and adults 
who once had families at home. This suggests that one signal that is sent by the setting up 
of Christmas decorations is some version of reproductive or ethological maturity. I do not 
claim that anyone is consciously thinking, “I’m going to tell the world that I’m a 
grownup now!” Once a certain social threshold is crossed or a new identity and role taken 
on, certain things come to simply seem the proper thing to do, without one asking what 
the rational reason is. Of course there is redundancy; if we decide that decorating our 
homes for Christmas is irrational, there are other modes for expressing our social 
maturity and our cultural affiliations. But if the anti-ritual process is allowed to run all the 
way, so that we apply the criterion of rationalism to all our habitual actions, then there 
will be no reliable means for expressing any social role or relationship. The result is 
social atomism. It is the routinized conventions of behavior – which invariably signify 
status and role – that enable communication person to person. If the conventions are 
rejected, then the only fount of expression becomes the internal states of people 
themselves. Without conventional forms to structure them, these internal states drift 
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towards incoherence, since they do not call for particular responses that could establish a 
pattern of determinate relating between interlocutors.13
 This, then, is why “if communitas is maximized, it becomes in a short while its 
own dark shadow” (Turner 1974, p. 268). The ecstatic blending together of persons into a 
whole – so necessary for reawakening affective allegiances and for activating conscious 
awareness of all-important collective identities – sows the seeds of anomie and social 
disconnection if allowed to run to its extremes, because it replaces sociability-affirming 
conventions encoded by a broader culture with boundary-erasing emotive experience 
sourced in the individual. Crucially, when social conventions are shucked aside and 
emphasis is instead put on cultivating inner feelings of bonhomie or togetherness, then 
visible expressions of social commitment will gradually become restricted mostly to 
contexts that actively arouse feelings of communitas – such as group dancing. But we 
can’t dance all the time, and arbitrary conventions, such as Christmas decorations, serve 
to signal our commitments and our acceptance of social codes even when we are not 
actively experiencing communitas or collective effervescence right then and there. 
Communitas, when pushed to extremes, undermines such gap-filling conventions because 
it encourages the assumption that in order to express unity and togetherness we must 
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13 This scenario – absence of social convention – is clearly a hypothetical extreme. My point is to illustrate 
the trajectory upon which the rejection of ritual launches us, not to argue that there is some actual point on 
the continuum at which social roles can completely break down. Here, I intend primarily to support 
Douglas’s (1970) core argument that anti-ritualism tracks diffuseness in social relations, such that 
increasing suspicion of ritual and subjection of conventions to rational interrogation will lead to increasing 
individualism and increasing lack of differentiation in society simultaneously.
actually be experiencing them.14 Such an ideology sees social conventions as suspect, 
preferring instead spontaneous expressions of goodwill. Total and permanent 
communitas, then, would not be Christmas lights twinkling on every house. It would be 
no Christmas lights at all. 
 This point – that the maximization of communitas would tend to track the 
abandonment of cultural and even religious expression – is relevant because, although I 
have pointed out the ways that communitas and sincerity share certain common features, 
one distinction between them is that for Turner communitas is the premier locus of 
religious experience, while for Seligman et al. the sincere mode is dominant in secular 
modernity. This is not to imply that sincerity is intrinsically opposed to religious 
expression or experience; indeed, the sincerity of secular modernity is in large part a 
historical outworking of the Protestant Reformation (Seligman et al. 2008). But but while 
sincerity does not necessarily imply secularism, secular modernity is undoubtedly rife 
with sincerity. How can this be? Again, by casting suspicion on arbitrary social 
conventions, the sincere mode uproots the regenerative structures of particularistic ritual, 
such as (to pick examples) the Catholic Sacraments or traditional Friday fasting. Such 
rituals are arbitrary and imposed by external authority, whereas – like ideological 
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14 This claim may appear to contradict Rappaport’s point, made earlier in Chapter Four, that ritual functions  
precisely because it does not place a gap between the signifier and signified – that is, because it is index and 
not symbol. But as previously emphasized, the indexical nature of ritual is expressed in the binary nature of 
our participation in it: either you do the ritual, or you don’t do it. Rappaport’s point was that participation in 
ritual is an index strictly of one’s acceptance of the social conventions that call for the ritual – not one’s 
immediate feelings or sentiments. Indeed, that is the point: by constituting a buffer between our inner, often 
ambiguous emotions and our external, unambiguous signals, ritual enables us to, for example, credibly 
demonstrate our support for social norms and for sociability itself even at times when we are not feeling 
particularly sociable. This is why ideological communitas and sincerity conceptually oppose it.
communitas – sincerity values honest and immediate expression of authentic personal 
feelings. The sincere mode can therefore work to break apart the patterns of cultural 
transmission that would otherwise authoritatively pass down religious identities and 
practices to new generations. For instance, if your Catholic grandmother fasted on 
Fridays when you were a child, your own fasting as an adult it is likely to activate an 
associated sense of Catholic-ness to which you can append your own loyalties. If, 
between your grandmother’s era and yours, anti-ritual or sincere elements impel the 
church to abandon obligatory fasting and other ritual forms, then you might still “feel” 
Catholic, albeit with a less clear sense for what that means. But without the concrete, 
externally coded ritual actions that forge the tactical links of Catholic identity, ensuing 
generations will be increasingly likely not identify with Catholicism at all – which in fact 
is what the demographic data show (Pew 2011).15 Sincerity applied to religion can 
therefore quite literally function as a cultural solvent, eroding the particularistic behaviors 
that constitute unique religious communities. Thus, if a critical mass of religious sub-
communities within a larger culture become converted to an outlook of ideological 
communitas and sincerity, the result can indeed tend toward secularism. Since religious 
believers tend to be more collectivistic than secularists (Stark 2009), we are left once 
more with the observation that communitas when pushed to extremes can dissolve the 
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15 According to Pew Research (2011), deconversion from Catholicism has sped up in recent decades, with 
many former Catholics blaming a simple (if often gradual) loss of belief in the Church’s teachings as the 
reason for their departure. Notably, fewer than 30% of ex-Catholics cite the sex abuse scandals as a reason 
for deconverting. These data offer corroboration for Douglas’s (1970) argument that the anti-ritual reforms 
of the post-Vatican II church – such as relaxing the traditional ritual obligation of Friday fast – would 
seriously disrupt the processes by which Catholic cultural identity is transmitted between generations.
very institutions whereby collectivism is inculcated – which is exactly Douglas’s (1970) 
point.
3. Complementarity and Social Life 
It is at this point that I return to the broader themes of this dissertation, including the 
relationship of synchrony to authority. As I highlighted near the beginning of this chapter, 
many writers have claimed that synchrony is in some fundamental sense an instrument of 
social cohesion and collectivist values. Ho and colleagues, for instance, write that “group 
drumming…supports the value of collectivism, shared by non-European-based 
cultures” (2011, p. 2). Wiltermuth and Heath (2009) took their study results as evidence 
that synchrony boosts social cohesion. Applying this logic to an industrialized context, 
McNeill noted the Japanese penchant for company-wide calisthenics at the beginning of 
the workday, claiming that 
the Japanese have successfully tapped the emotional solidarity aroused by 
keeping together in time both in military and civil contexts. It is, 
presumably, one of the secrets of their remarkable social cohesion and 
recent economic success.
1995, p. 144
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There thus appears to be broad consensus among researchers that real-world synchrony in 
its myriad forms strengthens a socially collectivist outlook – one in which relationships 
and group loyalty are prioritized, and individual agendas are subordinated to the 
community. In the bio-cultural study of religion, this claim has been used to advance an 
evolutionary hypothesis under which synchrony helped early human societies survive by 
suppressing free-riding (Haidt, Seder, & Kesebir 2008) and establishing strong bonds 
between people who depended on one another materially. Contemporary religions, as 
complex descendants of the original tribal institutions that (we are told) centered on 
synchronous motion, are thought to exhibit this evolutionary continuity through their 
retained use of synchronous ritual such as chanting or praying in unison (Fischer et al. 
2013). Synchrony, the laboratory data show, boosts participants’ willingness to cooperate 
and activates prosocial intentions – therefore synchrony is thought to be a paradigmatic 
instrument for enhancing social life.
 It may appear that I am playing somewhat fast and loose with the arguments of 
researchers in this field, but I do so to highlight an implicit trend in their discussions: 
namely, a serious overemphasis on the mode of identity and an under-emphasis on social 
complementarity. This trend, in turn, bespeaks a liberal-modern prioritization of personal 
affective states over the acceptance of public convention. Synchrony researchers, I am 
claiming, are biased toward sincerity. The result is that the bulk of the scholarly 
conversation about synchrony – a process of ritualization commonly used in religious and 
cultural rites – focuses on how those rites make participants feel rather than investigating 
209
the ways that they actually organize social relations. For instance, although Haidt, Seder, 
and Kesebir (2008) acknowledge that Turnerian communitas is supposed to be in 
dialectical relationship with structure, they give decidedly short shrift to structure in their 
discussion. For them, as for many of the researchers currently writing about synchrony, 
effervescent transcendence above the self is what truly characterizes the “hivish” aspects 
of human psychology.16 This perspective stresses that when we move together in unison, 
we escape our limited selves, and become part of something larger. Of course, in many 
ways, particularly as discussed in Chapter Three, this statement is undeniably accurate. 
Engaged in time-locked synchrony, participants come under the thrall of an immanent 
authority centered on no one individual, and thereby become dynamically bound up with 
one another in a way that blurs the cognitive maintenance of self-other boundaries. As we 
have seen, this reciprocal entrainment inspires a variety of prosocial sentiments and 
urges, including empathy.
 Empathy and prosociality, however, are personal feelings. As such, they reference 
ultimately the interior self and its motives, stretching beyond the realm of Rappaportian 
“acceptance” where ritual allows a divide between internal and external states. Tellingly, 
Cialdini et al. (1997) found that empathy predicted altruistic behavior only through 
perceived oneness, or self-other overlap. That is, the ability of felt empathy to predict 
altruistic behavior (such as, say, picking up pens dropped on the ground) can be 
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16 The two subsections immediately following Haidt, Seder, and Kesebir’s mention of Turnerian 
communitas are entitled “Hives and Emergent Organisms” and “The Benefits of Transcending the Self.” 
This is followed by a final policy section that urges leaders to “Encourage Local Festivals and Dances.” 
There are no sections that urge the maintenance of complementary or ritually based social roles. 
statistically reduced entirely to the inclusion of others in the subjects’ own self-concepts. 
This is identity, not complementarity. In a very real way, empathy could then be described 
as not strictly a social sentiment, but instead a projecting of one’s own identity onto 
others – a dissolving of boundaries rather than their meeting. This does not mean 
empathy is a bad thing. Empathy enables perspective-taking by imaginatively merging 
one’s self with that of the other (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang 2005). This function is vital for 
overcoming the inevitable misunderstandings of life in social environments and for 
inspiring altruistic acts. But could such a process be the cornerstone of social cohesion 
and collectivistic investment? 
 The implicit logic found in, e.g., Haidt, Seder, & Kesebir (2008) would seem to 
suggest that the less a society makes use of synchrony, the less tightly networked and 
more atomized that society will be, and vice-versa. Indeed, Ehrenreich (2006) has made 
this argument explicit. According to these models, synchrony produces empathic 
connection, which then translates to strong social bonds. However, prima facie, it seems 
that this is simply not in fact how things work. I am arguing that this is because a social 
ethos that emphasizes collective effervescence too strongly tends to erode the 
authoritative wiring of convention that connects people by positing social roles, ranks, 
and boundaries which can then be juxtaposed. Instead, the complementariness of 
ritualism is replaced with an infatuation with inner feelings that, in itself, cannot span the 
gap between person and person except under the proper circumstances – that is, precisely 
when people are feeling connected in the moment. (Empathy, for instance, by definition 
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only exists when it is actually being experienced.) This is not mere theorizing. 
Empirically, the expected, fairly tight relationship between extent of synchrony in a 
culture or religion and collectivism simply does not seem to obtain. Hinduism, for 
instance, is highly collectivistic (Chadda & Deb 2013), but Hindu puja is not notable for 
its physical synchrony. Indeed, worship in bhaki Hinduism can appear quite chaotic, with 
fairly little apparent coordination between the many attendees as they go through their 
prayers independently. On the other hand, Protestantism is quite individualistic, as we 
have seen, and historically Protestant countries are among the most individualistic and 
least socially interdependent in the world (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan 2010). And yet 
a substantial portion of nearly every Protestant service comprises congregational singing 
in unison, as well as the synchronized recitation of prayers and creeds. On the extreme 
end, Pentecostalism is famous for its vigorously rhythmic services, complete with plenty 
of in-the-aisles dancing, and yet “Pentecostals are among the most vehemently 
individualistic and independent of American Protestants” (Karabell 2001).
 The most pointed example of what I believe is this orthogonality between the 
amount of synchrony and level of collectivism in a society may be rave culture, which I 
briefly mentioned near the beginning of this chapter. The electronic music subculture in 
North America and Europe meets at raves or “festivals” and is by its very nature almost 
exclusively focused on rhythmic, synchronous bodily motion. In many cases, specific 
individuals only ever see each other in contexts of dancing. Yet the subculture is not 
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particularly socially cohesive, featuring fissile interpersonal relationships (Reynolds 
2013) and a powerful ethos of personal autonomy:
Rave culture has never been, nor ever will be, a coherent social 
movement. …this very lack of cohesiveness is what gives rave its power. 
In the ten years the culture has existed, rave has never made any claims. 
Rave has never chosen sides. Rave has never dictated an ideology. Simply 
put, rave is whatever you (that is, the individual) wants it to be. 
DJ named “Pezboy,” quoted in B. Wilson 2006, p. 147
In rave, then, we have an example of a social community whose rates of participation in 
synchronous motion are sky-high, but whose level of social cohesion is remarkably low. 
To be sure, drug use and other social pathologies surely contribute to the subculture’s 
dysfunctions (Reynolds 2013). The point, however, is that the expected correlation 
between synchrony and social cohesion across different social milieus is not as robust as 
the literature on synchrony implies. Some of the most cohesive and collectivistic societies 
make no more use of synchrony than mainline Protestants (and possibly less), whereas 
some of the most fissile and least cohesive communities in modern society participate in 
synchrony as their very raison d’être. 
 I am not, of course, claiming that the relationship between synchrony and chronic 
social cohesion is negative. I am claiming that it is orthogonal. Nor am I questioning the 
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well-established link between synchrony and prosocial responses. There is no doubt that 
synchrony is an important ingredient in the formation and maintenance of social bonds. 
But as an instance of communitas, synchrony in itself contains the very real potential for 
undermining the complementarity that defines genuinely cohesive societies. 
Cohesiveness is not solely a product of warm feelings about one another, of lowering the 
boundaries between self and other. Indeed, across societies, collectivism tracks not 
amount of dancing, but religious orthodoxy and ritualism, with all the defined social roles 
and crisp boundaries of identity that are entailed in these social forms (Jensen 1998). 
Similarly, tight social cohesion and collectivistic attitudes are predicted by resource 
threats (Hagen & Bryant 2003) and the level of pathogen load in the immediate 
environment (Fincher et al. 2008). Recall, finally, that Douglas (1970) implied that the 
African societies whose religions centered primarily on dance were characterized by 
relatively open social schemas and lack of resource scarcity. In sum, there are better 
predictors of collectivism and tight social cohesion than the prevalence of synchrony. 
These include primarily ritualism and resource motivations, which in turn imply 
structural differentiation and authority ranking, not egalitarian bonhomie.
 In the study results recounted in Chapter Five, recall that reported group conflict 
levels were higher in the synchrony condition than in the asynchrony condition. 
Asynchrony, of course, evokes interpersonal differentiation, whereas synchrony is a form 
of motor identity. While numerous studies have made it clear that synchrony boosts 
participants’ empathy and prosocial motivations, my own results illustrate the point that 
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such inner motives are insufficient in certain contexts to engender positive interpersonal 
dynamics and practically stimulate group cohesion. As discussed in that chapter, 
interpersonal differentiation and leadership structures enable smoother, more responsive 
coordination when the task in question is procedurally interdependent. In such a context, 
it would be expected that excessive self-other overlap would not only reduce group 
effectiveness, but could actually harm group satisfaction, because the collective’s goals – 
which are also its individual members’ goals – would be impeded. 
 Empathy, of course, is celebrated in contemporary psychology, but in the 
experiment recounted in Chapter Five we find a situation in which empathic self-other 
overlap probably had effects directly counter to those desired. The emotive inner state of 
empathy (if it was evoked by synchrony) was not appropriate for the circumstances. If 
indeed the models highlighted in Chapters Two and Three are accurate, the motor 
resonance between the three participants as they swung weights in synchrony was likely 
sufficient to elicit (at least incipient) cortical tagging of each other’s motor acts as self-
caused. Moreover, an immanent authority comprised of the dynamic link between 
subjects and metronome ought to have taken over the the sense of personal agency from 
each individual, leaving him or her feeling transiently subordinated to an impersonal 
force that elided the relative rank differences between participants themselves. The result 
was that the locus of authority for the group was dissolved into a centerless mean spread 
across all individuals roughly equally. I am claiming that both of these effects – 
neurocognitive and dynamical – heightened mutual identity and suppressed 
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complementarity. The task at hand, however, called for complementarity and an authority 
structure to elicit functional coordination; as a consequence, the mode of identity – with 
all its pleasing connotations of empathy – actually predicted lower interpersonal 
satisfaction following the group interactions.
 In this way, I would like to suggest that the experiment from Chapter Five is a 
microcosmic example of what happens when the ritual behavior of a community evokes 
too heavily the ideals of equality and unity. As we saw in Chapter Four, ritual functions to 
activate the tangible reality of cultural ideals. By participating in ritual, people index their 
visible acceptance of the ideals and moral prescriptions those rituals reference. If a 
society values equality, I am proposing that it will be likely to express and make manifest 
that ideal as an irrefutable fact through displays of synchrony. If a society values 
structure, it will be likely to exhibit a higher degree of formal ceremony, with all the rank 
and role differentiation that term commonly connotes (Grimes 2010). Although 
synchrony is a form of ritualizing, communities (such as ravers or Pentecostals) that 
heavily emphasize synchrony will tend to be opposed to ritualism, and to display the 
characteristics of sincerity and ideological communitas. In turn, they will tend to value 
interior affective or propositional states (sincerity) above the role-based fulfillment of 
social obligations, and inward belief over the visible acceptance of norms. Groups such 
as Army platoons or Orthodox Jewish congregations that strongly emphasize both unity 
and structure will tend to juxtapose synchrony with constant and salient reminders of 
rank and role differentiation. Finally, the social cohesion exhibited by any group will be a 
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function of (among other factors) the harmony between its ideals and its determinate 
goals. Rave culture (for instance), though rich in embodied synchrony, may overvalue 
equality and unity as ideals in comparison with its innate need to produce a stable culture 
that can offer continuity and coordinative effectiveness to its members. Jewish Orthodox 
communities, on the other hand, may strike a more adaptive balance, in terms of 
matching their motive to achieve long-term sustainability with their posited ideals.
4. Conclusion: Implications for Living
The previous pages have been a sort of litany of some of the failures, consequences, and 
drawbacks of excessive social unity, effervescence, and anti-ritualism. I do not thereby 
intend to convey the message that social unity is a bad thing, or that anti-ritualism is 
always to be condemned. Clearly, social unity is vital for societal functioning. Just as 
clearly, ritualism is always and everywhere an affirmation of the social structure and the 
social status quo, since “legitimation is one of the most powerful things that ritual does.
…rite commands more surely than brute physical force” (Bell 1992, p. 194). Hence, 
when the time comes to reject an unjust social order, the rituals that substantiate that 
order must often also be rejected (see also Rappaport 1999). Anti-ritualism, then, has its 
moral place. Similarly, the mode of sincerity, in searching for objective truth, valorizing 
the individual, championing universal ethics, and attempting to distill religious traditions 
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to their bright essences, is as much a tool of “oxygenating” social bodies as is 
communitas on a smaller and more transient scale. 
 I emphasize the downsides of these modes here because this dissertation has been 
an investigation of the social effects of synchrony, which neurocognitively and 
dynamically produce something like communitas and its features: in particular, feelings 
of equality and oneness. These, in turn, are themselves ethical fixtures of the mode of 
sincerity and of anti-ritualism. I have conducted this investigation with a particular 
emphasis on the ways that previous understandings of the role of synchrony may be 
incomplete, and this emphasis has taken the form of questioning the comprehensiveness 
of the claim that synchrony benefits human groups and enhances cooperation because it 
bonds people together. I have suggested that harmonious bonding is not enough to ensure 
social thriving, and that instead it is very often the case that complementary social 
affordances must be exploited in order for tactical goals to be met. This emphasis on the 
importance of complementary coordination is an increasingly popular theme in the study 
of coordination dynamics and sensorimotor synchronization (Dale et al. 2014), but it has 
not yet achieved wide recognition among social psychologists or within the cognitive or 
evolutionary study of religion. This dissertation is, in part, an attempt to correct this 
oversight.
 To conclude this investigation, then, I will return to the question of hierarchy and 
authority. Logically, it is impossible to have authority between people if their roles are 
identical. As I have stated throughout this dissertation, hierarchy implies differentiation. 
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As such, any social mode that obscures difference will also tend to elide hierarchical 
structure and, with it, status-based complementary affordances. Anti-ritualism is just such 
a mode, as is sincerity, because “hierarchy is intrinsic to ritual and vice versa” (Bell 1992, 
p. 127). A rejection of ritual is therefore, in a real sense, also a rejection of hierarchy:
ritualized relations are not primarily concerned with ‘social integration’ 
alone, in the Durkheimian sense. Insofar as they establish hierarchical 
social relations, they are also concerned with distinguishing local 
identities, ordering social differences…
Bell 1992, p. 130
At the same time, a mode of ritualization that produces “social integration” can be 
expected to suppress hierarchy. Such a mode is synchrony. Indeed, as I mentioned briefly 
in Chapter One, the suppression of hierarchy may serve as a key factor within a socio-
physiological “melding” function that can unite not only individuals to individuals, but 
groups to groups. See, for example, Radcliffe-Brown’s observation that dance was used 
by Andaman Islanders to reestablish and strengthen relations between neighboring groups 
at intervals:
Each local group lived for the greater part of the year comparatively 
isolated from others. What little solidarity there was between neighbouring 
219
groups therefore tended to become weakened. …The function of dance-
meetings was therefore to bring the two groups into contact and renew the 
social relations between them and in that way to maintain the solidarity 
between them.…the dance serves to unite the two or more groups into one 
body, and to make that unity felt by every individual, so creating for a few 
days a condition of close solidarity.
Radcliffe-Browne 1922, p. 253
Such group-group bonding may, I think, be a universal function of synchrony (Hayden 
1987). Evidence for this claim is found in the fact that the only other complex mammals 
that engage regularly in synchrony appear to be dolphins that dive and surface 
synchronously among members of nested levels of groups (Connor 2007). Specifically, 
the bottlenose dolphins of Shark Bay, Australia, live in “fission-fusion” societies in which 
paired alliances of males also affiliate with larger alliances for the purpose of wooing 
mates. These alliances do not exhibit genetic relatedness above chance expectations, and 
their members often disperse and reassemble again at different levels (an alliance of two 
males might part ways with another two-member alliance, and then meet again later, 
along with several other groups, to form a “superalliance” of fourteen animals). These 
“alliances of alliances” probably require significant cognitive effort to maintain and keep 
track of (Dunbar 2009), and social errors can be costly. In a highly complex society 
characterized by dynamic groupings that may assemble and disassemble in a variety of 
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different combinations, “factors that increase uncertainty about who is allied with whom 
should favour a strong alliance signal like synchrony” (Connor 2007, p. 591). And 
indeed, dolphins in Shark Bay have been regularly recorded surfacing and diving in 
rhythmic group synchrony. They are not as good at synchrony as humans, and they do not 
do it as much, and apparently this behavior has only been reported as occurring in one 
place. But the social circumstances that characterize the place where they do it are very 
familiar. Humans everywhere, of course, have complex nested allegiances, from family to 
local groups to tribe and above. Synchrony may be one important tool for signaling and 
even enacting unifications across social boundaries within fission-fusion contexts. As 
such, it helps generate and maintain “metastability” in human relations, a kind of poised 
balance between the options of closing off and opening boundaries (Kelso 2012). 
 However, when it opens boundaries, ritualized synchrony is likely to render the 
interiors of groups relatively homogenous and leaderless. This homogeneity is a 
necessary concomitant of a modus of merging, but it is probably maladaptive for 
challenges which require fluid, articulate, coordinated response to determinate problems. 
My study results hint as much. Thus we are left with the likelihood that the instinct to 
level authority, to reject hierarchy and to unify people into one – to blend the social 
exterior and the interior together – is the wrong strategy for a host of particular problems. 
Nevertheless, as Mary Douglas pointed out, those who are most sensitive to the problems 
and injustices of authority are often drawn to motifs of unity and the collapse of 
boundaries; it was, after all, not conservatives who mostly drove John Lennon’s album 
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sales. This rejection of authority in the face of the misuses of authority may be more than 
simply a common youthful misjudgment or spasm of idealism. In a cultural milieu 
defined for centuries more by sincerity than by ritual, the calibration for our responses to 
social problems may, it seems to me, have been shifted far enough toward anti-ritualism 
to awaken a positive feedback loop: we reject authority because it is bad, and because we 
reject authority we reflexively reward anti-authoritarians (Silicon Valley techs, say, or 
Wall Street mercenaries) with positions of cultural authority. But they make lousy 
authorities, and so we have more reason to reject authority. 
 Meanwhile, the ideal of unity and universal wholeness continues to exert its 
attraction particularly on those most disaffected by the way things stand. If, as Douglas 
claims and my study results suggest, such an ideology impedes problem-solving when 
allowed to dictate concrete policy rather than serving as a kind of moral polestar, the anti-
ritual mode may have activated a snowball effect or entered an attractor basin in 
contemporary Western society. The less we rely on ritual, the more we respond to the 
unpleasant social vacuum left in the absence of ritual with further recourse to purification 
and attempts to weed out yet more irrational ritual. At the same time, people who 
understand most clearly the savage wages of injustice may be led to activate a behavioral 
melding response that seeks to ameliorate social damage through merging individuals and 
groups, just as a group of Andaman Islanders that has warred with a nearby group will 
invite its former enemies to a dance to seal the end of hostilities. In fact, I would like to 
raise the possibility that this is a fairly common programming bug of human instinct. I am 
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not speaking metaphorically. The left may be reflexively responding to a host of serious 
social problems with an instinctive impetus to open social boundaries. This is an 
appropriate reaction to many situations, but it is maladaptive for others. Sometimes it is 
necessary to close boundaries, to shore up distinctions, in order that we may step back 
from things and learn who or what it is that we are dealing with. This is not a point about 
anything determinate such as immigration or prison reform, but about the broad function 
of authority and differentiation within and between societies. Determination of 
boundaries is necessary in order to coordinate adaptive responses that require 
collaborative work. In short, coordination requires difference, not identity. The solution to 
the problem of authority is not to decapitate all authority and to live in Eden, but to strive 
endlessly for good authority in a world that depends on and consists in particular 
difference, including even differences in rank and prestige: that is, to live on the messy 
and gradated surface of Earth, where boundaries are real.
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